Narrative:

At 1200 ft MSL and 3 mi from touchdown at oakland airport, runway 27R, the engine quit due to fuel starvation. I declared an emergency with the tower and switched the fuel selector valve from the right to the left fuel tank and the engine started and continued to run for the remainder of the flight. The localizer needle was at full deflection to the left when the engine started running. The aircraft was in IMC conditions at the time and the tower recommended recapturing the localizer, which I did, and shortly afterwards broke out of the clouds and made a normal landing. At no time did I drop below the minimum descent ht for the approach. The estimated time that the engine was not producing power was 20-30 seconds. The fuel was not managed properly on this flight. The aircraft was full of fuel at takeoff from inyokern airport and is equipped with a left and right fuel tank and fuel selector valve that permits 1 tank to be selected at a time. The aircraft holds 48 useable gallons of gas and burns 10 gallons per hour. My fuel management plan was to fly for 1 hour on the left tank, switch to the right tank and fly for 2 hours, then switch back to the left tank. The flight was expected to take 2 hours: 40 min, during which, the tank would be switched once while in route and again just prior to landing. Unexpected head winds and diverting to an alternate airport lengthened the flight time, during which, I forget to switch tanks back to the left after 3 hours in the air. Overcome by events, I failed to forget to switch tanks back to the left after 3 hours in the air. Overcome by events, I failed to complete the prelndg checklist prior to reaching the OM which was also part of my fuel management plan. Contributing factors: the WX conditions that day were worse than expected. The WX prediction for our estimated time of arrival in the oakland area was 9000 ft broken. IMC conditions were entered about 15 mi from gnoss airport and were never good enough to cancel IFR and make a VFR descent to land at the airport. Head winds were stronger than expected which added about 30 min to the estimated time to gnoss airport. Inadequate preflight time was spent preparing for an instrument approach into oakland airport. In general, flying an airplane in IMC is a poor environment to study an approach plate and knowledge of the inoperable GS was not known until the approach was requested. The pilot was not in the seat of choice (left seat) while flying in IMC. In VMC I am most comfortable in the right seat and had expected this flight to be flown in VMC conditions. The left seat was occupied by an unlicensed passenger, who had flying skills. Communications outside the aircraft was awkward for the pilot to perform, and as a result, the passenger performed most of those duties. An intercom was used, however, the 'push to talk' switch was on the left yoke. Although the passenger performed these duties well, coordinating our efforts increased the pilot work load. Human performance considerations: my flying skills in IMC conditions are adequate to pass an instrument competency check ride. However, lack of experience and practice in instruments flying will put me in an overload condition if unexpected events arise as was demonstrated on this flight. Available WX information was not used. In route I should have acquired WX updates from WX watch, flight service stations, or vors. Had I done that, I would have known I would be arriving in the oakland area at the same time as the fast moving cold front from the north. I could have either prepared for an instrument approach into oakland airport or landed at an airport that was still VMC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ENG FAILS ON 3 MI FINAL DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: AT 1200 FT MSL AND 3 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN AT OAKLAND ARPT, RWY 27R, THE ENG QUIT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. I DECLARED AN EMER WITH THE TWR AND SWITCHED THE FUEL SELECTOR VALVE FROM THE R TO THE L FUEL TANK AND THE ENG STARTED AND CONTINUED TO RUN FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. THE LOC NEEDLE WAS AT FULL DEFLECTION TO THE L WHEN THE ENG STARTED RUNNING. THE ACFT WAS IN IMC CONDITIONS AT THE TIME AND THE TWR RECOMMENDED RECAPTURING THE LOC, WHICH I DID, AND SHORTLY AFTERWARDS BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG. AT NO TIME DID I DROP BELOW THE MINIMUM DSCNT HT FOR THE APCH. THE ESTIMATED TIME THAT THE ENG WAS NOT PRODUCING PWR WAS 20-30 SECONDS. THE FUEL WAS NOT MANAGED PROPERLY ON THIS FLT. THE ACFT WAS FULL OF FUEL AT TKOF FROM INYOKERN ARPT AND IS EQUIPPED WITH A L AND R FUEL TANK AND FUEL SELECTOR VALVE THAT PERMITS 1 TANK TO BE SELECTED AT A TIME. THE ACFT HOLDS 48 USEABLE GALLONS OF GAS AND BURNS 10 GALLONS PER HR. MY FUEL MGMNT PLAN WAS TO FLY FOR 1 HR ON THE L TANK, SWITCH TO THE R TANK AND FLY FOR 2 HRS, THEN SWITCH BACK TO THE L TANK. THE FLT WAS EXPECTED TO TAKE 2 HRS: 40 MIN, DURING WHICH, THE TANK WOULD BE SWITCHED ONCE WHILE IN RTE AND AGAIN JUST PRIOR TO LNDG. UNEXPECTED HEAD WINDS AND DIVERTING TO AN ALTERNATE ARPT LENGTHENED THE FLT TIME, DURING WHICH, I FORGET TO SWITCH TANKS BACK TO THE L AFTER 3 HRS IN THE AIR. OVERCOME BY EVENTS, I FAILED TO FORGET TO SWITCH TANKS BACK TO THE L AFTER 3 HRS IN THE AIR. OVERCOME BY EVENTS, I FAILED TO COMPLETE THE PRELNDG CHKLIST PRIOR TO REACHING THE OM WHICH WAS ALSO PART OF MY FUEL MGMNT PLAN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE WX CONDITIONS THAT DAY WERE WORSE THAN EXPECTED. THE WX PREDICTION FOR OUR ESTIMATED TIME OF ARR IN THE OAKLAND AREA WAS 9000 FT BROKEN. IMC CONDITIONS WERE ENTERED ABOUT 15 MI FROM GNOSS ARPT AND WERE NEVER GOOD ENOUGH TO CANCEL IFR AND MAKE A VFR DSCNT TO LAND AT THE ARPT. HEAD WINDS WERE STRONGER THAN EXPECTED WHICH ADDED ABOUT 30 MIN TO THE ESTIMATED TIME TO GNOSS ARPT. INADEQUATE PREFLT TIME WAS SPENT PREPARING FOR AN INST APCH INTO OAKLAND ARPT. IN GENERAL, FLYING AN AIRPLANE IN IMC IS A POOR ENVIRONMENT TO STUDY AN APCH PLATE AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE INOPERABLE GS WAS NOT KNOWN UNTIL THE APCH WAS REQUESTED. THE PLT WAS NOT IN THE SEAT OF CHOICE (L SEAT) WHILE FLYING IN IMC. IN VMC I AM MOST COMFORTABLE IN THE R SEAT AND HAD EXPECTED THIS FLT TO BE FLOWN IN VMC CONDITIONS. THE L SEAT WAS OCCUPIED BY AN UNLICENSED PAX, WHO HAD FLYING SKILLS. COMS OUTSIDE THE ACFT WAS AWKWARD FOR THE PLT TO PERFORM, AND AS A RESULT, THE PAX PERFORMED MOST OF THOSE DUTIES. AN INTERCOM WAS USED, HOWEVER, THE 'PUSH TO TALK' SWITCH WAS ON THE L YOKE. ALTHOUGH THE PAX PERFORMED THESE DUTIES WELL, COORDINATING OUR EFFORTS INCREASED THE PLT WORK LOAD. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: MY FLYING SKILLS IN IMC CONDITIONS ARE ADEQUATE TO PASS AN INST COMPETENCY CHK RIDE. HOWEVER, LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND PRACTICE IN INSTS FLYING WILL PUT ME IN AN OVERLOAD CONDITION IF UNEXPECTED EVENTS ARISE AS WAS DEMONSTRATED ON THIS FLT. AVAILABLE WX INFO WAS NOT USED. IN RTE I SHOULD HAVE ACQUIRED WX UPDATES FROM WX WATCH, FLT SVC STATIONS, OR VORS. HAD I DONE THAT, I WOULD HAVE KNOWN I WOULD BE ARRIVING IN THE OAKLAND AREA AT THE SAME TIME AS THE FAST MOVING COLD FRONT FROM THE N. I COULD HAVE EITHER PREPARED FOR AN INST APCH INTO OAKLAND ARPT OR LANDED AT AN ARPT THAT WAS STILL VMC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.