Narrative:

This was my first arrival into bwi since construction began on the ramp and the inner taxiway. After a night landing on runway 33L -- we exited the runway on taxiway F and followed ground control's instructions to taxi to our gate via the outer taxiway and taxiway C. I taxied slowly because I was having trouble finding the signs labeling the various txwys we were to use or cross. I knew the outer taxiway made a half left turn at taxiway P. At that point -- I started to follow a taxi line that curved off to the left. At this time, the first officer, who had been to bwi recently -- warned me that I was about to enter runway 4/22. I immediately turned farther left and reintercepted the outer taxiway and proceeded to parking. During the turn to reintercept the outer taxiway, I noticed that the aircraft had crossed the hold line a small amount but no part of the aircraft actually extended over the runway itself. A number of human factors contributed to this incident. I had never taken that particular route to parking before. All the construction and lighted barricades on and around the inner taxiway made it harder to stay position oriented. I was trying so hard to find the boundaries of the outer taxiway that I failed to notice the runway hold line. I should be able to overcome these factors in the future by increased vigilance and better prior planning. Another human factor, an alert first officer, prevented a more serious incident. Some other factors contributed to this incident. To the best of my knowledge, neither the NOTAMS nor the ATIS mentioned the major construction on the inner taxiway on the south and southwest part of the ramp. Prior knowledge of this would have helped me plan my taxi better. The page 10-9 depiction of taxiway P at the corner of the outer taxiway and the entrance to runway 4/22 is misleading. The pavement at the runway entrance is much wider than it seems on the depiction -- making a turn onto the northeast side of the pavement to seem like staying on the outer taxiway. This area is not shown on page 10-9B. Being able to see the depiction of the subject intersection in greater detail would have made it much easier to follow the outer taxiway. I strongly recommend the 10-9B page be changed to include this intersection. The red runway sign appeared to set well to the northeast of taxiway P. If it were set closer to the taxiway -- it might have caught my attention before I crossed the hold line. If there was a red runway sign to the southwest of taxiway P, I did not notice it. Placing or enhancing a red runway sign there would also help. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that ground was completely oblivious to the problem and flight crew corrected it themselves. He believes controller was working 2 position. They never really got onto the runway but 'could' have and thus reporter concern. This is a large area of pavement and does not appear to be so from the airport diagram. There is also a page 10-9B that is a blow up of the gate area and cuts off just prior to the 'P' taxiway interchange. If the 'P' taxiway area could be included on this blow up it would help a great deal to identify the complexity of the intersection. Reporter also states the construction has been a great problem and caused confusion with the lights and changes. Reporter suggestion is to have red hold lights at the hold line as line is not very visible at night. Reporter company is having their safety officer follow up with the airport on the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG TAXIING, TAXIES BEYOND HOLD LINE AND ALMOST ONTO RWY.

Narrative: THIS WAS MY FIRST ARR INTO BWI SINCE CONSTRUCTION BEGAN ON THE RAMP AND THE INNER TXWY. AFTER A NIGHT LNDG ON RWY 33L -- WE EXITED THE RWY ON TXWY F AND FOLLOWED GND CTL'S INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI TO OUR GATE VIA THE OUTER TXWY AND TXWY C. I TAXIED SLOWLY BECAUSE I WAS HAVING TROUBLE FINDING THE SIGNS LABELING THE VARIOUS TXWYS WE WERE TO USE OR CROSS. I KNEW THE OUTER TXWY MADE A HALF L TURN AT TXWY P. AT THAT POINT -- I STARTED TO FOLLOW A TAXI LINE THAT CURVED OFF TO THE L. AT THIS TIME, THE FO, WHO HAD BEEN TO BWI RECENTLY -- WARNED ME THAT I WAS ABOUT TO ENTER RWY 4/22. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED FARTHER L AND REINTERCEPTED THE OUTER TXWY AND PROCEEDED TO PARKING. DURING THE TURN TO REINTERCEPT THE OUTER TXWY, I NOTICED THAT THE ACFT HAD CROSSED THE HOLD LINE A SMALL AMOUNT BUT NO PART OF THE ACFT ACTUALLY EXTENDED OVER THE RWY ITSELF. A NUMBER OF HUMAN FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. I HAD NEVER TAKEN THAT PARTICULAR RTE TO PARKING BEFORE. ALL THE CONSTRUCTION AND LIGHTED BARRICADES ON AND AROUND THE INNER TXWY MADE IT HARDER TO STAY POS ORIENTED. I WAS TRYING SO HARD TO FIND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE OUTER TXWY THAT I FAILED TO NOTICE THE RWY HOLD LINE. I SHOULD BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THESE FACTORS IN THE FUTURE BY INCREASED VIGILANCE AND BETTER PRIOR PLANNING. ANOTHER HUMAN FACTOR, AN ALERT FO, PREVENTED A MORE SERIOUS INCIDENT. SOME OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, NEITHER THE NOTAMS NOR THE ATIS MENTIONED THE MAJOR CONSTRUCTION ON THE INNER TXWY ON THE S AND SW PART OF THE RAMP. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS WOULD HAVE HELPED ME PLAN MY TAXI BETTER. THE PAGE 10-9 DEPICTION OF TXWY P AT THE CORNER OF THE OUTER TXWY AND THE ENTRANCE TO RWY 4/22 IS MISLEADING. THE PAVEMENT AT THE RWY ENTRANCE IS MUCH WIDER THAN IT SEEMS ON THE DEPICTION -- MAKING A TURN ONTO THE NE SIDE OF THE PAVEMENT TO SEEM LIKE STAYING ON THE OUTER TXWY. THIS AREA IS NOT SHOWN ON PAGE 10-9B. BEING ABLE TO SEE THE DEPICTION OF THE SUBJECT INTXN IN GREATER DETAIL WOULD HAVE MADE IT MUCH EASIER TO FOLLOW THE OUTER TXWY. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THE 10-9B PAGE BE CHANGED TO INCLUDE THIS INTXN. THE RED RWY SIGN APPEARED TO SET WELL TO THE NE OF TXWY P. IF IT WERE SET CLOSER TO THE TXWY -- IT MIGHT HAVE CAUGHT MY ATTN BEFORE I CROSSED THE HOLD LINE. IF THERE WAS A RED RWY SIGN TO THE SW OF TXWY P, I DID NOT NOTICE IT. PLACING OR ENHANCING A RED RWY SIGN THERE WOULD ALSO HELP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT GND WAS COMPLETELY OBLIVIOUS TO THE PROB AND FLC CORRECTED IT THEMSELVES. HE BELIEVES CTLR WAS WORKING 2 POS. THEY NEVER REALLY GOT ONTO THE RWY BUT 'COULD' HAVE AND THUS RPTR CONCERN. THIS IS A LARGE AREA OF PAVEMENT AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SO FROM THE ARPT DIAGRAM. THERE IS ALSO A PAGE 10-9B THAT IS A BLOW UP OF THE GATE AREA AND CUTS OFF JUST PRIOR TO THE 'P' TXWY INTERCHANGE. IF THE 'P' TXWY AREA COULD BE INCLUDED ON THIS BLOW UP IT WOULD HELP A GREAT DEAL TO IDENT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE INTXN. RPTR ALSO STATES THE CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN A GREAT PROB AND CAUSED CONFUSION WITH THE LIGHTS AND CHANGES. RPTR SUGGESTION IS TO HAVE RED HOLD LIGHTS AT THE HOLD LINE AS LINE IS NOT VERY VISIBLE AT NIGHT. RPTR COMPANY IS HAVING THEIR SAFETY OFFICER FOLLOW UP WITH THE ARPT ON THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.