Narrative:

On nov/xa/94 I was occupying the right seat of a B-737, as check captain, on an FAA proving run for my company. 4 people were in the cockpit, captain in left seat, myself in right, company jumpseat pilot receiving IOE and an FAA air carrier inspector in the aft jumpseat. We were inbound to den, receiving radar vectors for a visual, parallel approach to runway 26R. Parallel traffic to runway 26L was an air carrier X B-727. I had briefed the captain during descent that we would: 1) turn on to final from the north, 2) absolutely not to overshoot final, and 3) to approach runway centerline from an oblique angle slightly north of centerline. On base leg, parallel traffic was pointed out by approach. The captain and company jumpseat rider saw air carrier X. Air carrier X acknowledged seeing us. We were cleared for the visual runway 26R. During our right turn to final the TCASII announced a TA followed quickly by an RA. 3 things happened quickly: 1) the RA commanded a climb, 2) I commanded a climb and a right turn towards the runway, and 3) the FAA inspector screamed 'climb the expletive aircraft' or words to that effect. He came forward, out of his seat as far as the seat belt would allow. Although startled, the captain immediately applied power, climbed, and turned toward the runway. Upon level out, air carrier X was slightly ahead, approximately 500 ft below and to our left. At this point we were slightly south of centerline. At approximately 2000 ft AGL and 5-6 mi from runway, I told captain to intercept centerline, he did and we landed uneventfully. Neither air carrier X nor the tower mentioned anything about the closeness of the traffic or a TCASII message. With approximately 800 ft separating these runways, all visual approachs are close. Upon arrival at the gate, the FAA inspector exited the cockpit and announced to the flight attendants and FAA personnel on board that, 'that dumb south.O.B. Captain almost got us killed in a midair.' contributing factors: 1) the TCASII which was in 'TA/RA' should have been placed in TA when visual with air carrier X. 2) the FAA's response was inappropriate and unprofessional. He physically could not see the traffic. His scream delayed the captain's response because of the shock. Corrective action: denver should stagger the traffic inbound to runway 26L/right. With less than standard runway separation, the potential is too great for conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OVERSHOT TURN TO FINAL ON PARALLEL APCH AND INTRUDED ON ADJACENT ARR.

Narrative: ON NOV/XA/94 I WAS OCCUPYING THE R SEAT OF A B-737, AS CHK CAPT, ON AN FAA PROVING RUN FOR MY COMPANY. 4 PEOPLE WERE IN THE COCKPIT, CAPT IN L SEAT, MYSELF IN R, COMPANY JUMPSEAT PLT RECEIVING IOE AND AN FAA ACR INSPECTOR IN THE AFT JUMPSEAT. WE WERE INBOUND TO DEN, RECEIVING RADAR VECTORS FOR A VISUAL, PARALLEL APCH TO RWY 26R. PARALLEL TFC TO RWY 26L WAS AN ACR X B-727. I HAD BRIEFED THE CAPT DURING DSCNT THAT WE WOULD: 1) TURN ON TO FINAL FROM THE N, 2) ABSOLUTELY NOT TO OVERSHOOT FINAL, AND 3) TO APCH RWY CTRLINE FROM AN OBLIQUE ANGLE SLIGHTLY N OF CTRLINE. ON BASE LEG, PARALLEL TFC WAS POINTED OUT BY APCH. THE CAPT AND COMPANY JUMPSEAT RIDER SAW ACR X. ACR X ACKNOWLEDGED SEEING US. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL RWY 26R. DURING OUR R TURN TO FINAL THE TCASII ANNOUNCED A TA FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY AN RA. 3 THINGS HAPPENED QUICKLY: 1) THE RA COMMANDED A CLB, 2) I COMMANDED A CLB AND A R TURN TOWARDS THE RWY, AND 3) THE FAA INSPECTOR SCREAMED 'CLB THE EXPLETIVE ACFT' OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. HE CAME FORWARD, OUT OF HIS SEAT AS FAR AS THE SEAT BELT WOULD ALLOW. ALTHOUGH STARTLED, THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY APPLIED PWR, CLBED, AND TURNED TOWARD THE RWY. UPON LEVEL OUT, ACR X WAS SLIGHTLY AHEAD, APPROX 500 FT BELOW AND TO OUR L. AT THIS POINT WE WERE SLIGHTLY S OF CTRLINE. AT APPROX 2000 FT AGL AND 5-6 MI FROM RWY, I TOLD CAPT TO INTERCEPT CTRLINE, HE DID AND WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. NEITHER ACR X NOR THE TWR MENTIONED ANYTHING ABOUT THE CLOSENESS OF THE TFC OR A TCASII MESSAGE. WITH APPROX 800 FT SEPARATING THESE RWYS, ALL VISUAL APCHS ARE CLOSE. UPON ARR AT THE GATE, THE FAA INSPECTOR EXITED THE COCKPIT AND ANNOUNCED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND FAA PERSONNEL ON BOARD THAT, 'THAT DUMB S.O.B. CAPT ALMOST GOT US KILLED IN A MIDAIR.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE TCASII WHICH WAS IN 'TA/RA' SHOULD HAVE BEEN PLACED IN TA WHEN VISUAL WITH ACR X. 2) THE FAA'S RESPONSE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND UNPROFESSIONAL. HE PHYSICALLY COULD NOT SEE THE TFC. HIS SCREAM DELAYED THE CAPT'S RESPONSE BECAUSE OF THE SHOCK. CORRECTIVE ACTION: DENVER SHOULD STAGGER THE TFC INBOUND TO RWY 26L/R. WITH LESS THAN STANDARD RWY SEPARATION, THE POTENTIAL IS TOO GREAT FOR CONFLICT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.