Narrative:

Potential for midair collision due to departing VFR aircraft and landing IFR aircraft at uncontrolled airport. Approaching/descending aircraft on instrument flight plan using VOR runway 6 approach encountered departing/climbing aircraft using runway 24. Tuned to cable airport unicom for active runway information. Sighted departing aircraft and took evasive action by right turn. Contacted cable airport unicom to confirm active runway. Entered left downwind for runway 24. Not a 'close call.' rather it was an uncomfortable reduction of normal safety due to multiple factors. This situation is inherently dangerous. Here, again, are the circumstances: cable airport. Uncontrolled. Conducting occasional training and other flts under VFR. In coming plane on IFR clearance and published approach to runway 6. Ontario approach offers 'no WX for cable.' thus no 'favoring runway' information. Due to noise considerations outgoing aircraft using runway 24 are advised to make a sharp left turn almost immediately after takeoff. An incoming plane on IFR approach would make a right turn to avoid a directly oncoming aircraft and a right turn to enter left traffic for runway 24. This would put both aircraft on converging courses assuming the same altitude or direct to almost direct runway alignment. These circumstances pose substantial danger. I was aware and alert to avoiding any VFR aircraft as I carried out a careful forward scan during the IFR approach but the situation developed quite rapidly and I was unaware of departing aircraft on runway 24 despite being tuned into the unicom frequency. I may have unconsciously been assuming that as I was on an IFR clearance that the area would be cleared for me, this was an incorrect assumption given that conditions were declared (though arguably not) VFR and I was approaching an uncontrolled airport. I was tuned to cable airport unicom and established monitoring. I had heard no indication of departing aircraft nor announcement of 'favoring runway,' however, in the activity of the approach and scan for the runway and traffic in what was essentially IFR conditions I had not yet requested 'favoring runway' information nor had I announced my arrival. Upon sighting the other aircraft I took immediate evasive action, confirmed with unicom that cable was favoring runway 24, properly entered downwind for runway 24, and announced my position at least 3 times in the pattern. Pattern and landing was uneventful. Already difficult circumstances were made even more difficult for a proper breakoff to entry to downwind because it was not possible to see the runway until descent to or just before the MDA which is just over 500 ft AGL. Therefore, it was not possible to tell where a proper traffic pattern was! (This is, of course, assuming that I had known that runway 24 was favored and/or that there was departing aircraft. Visual contact with the airport, the other aircraft, and thus where the proper traffic pattern should be all occurred either simultaneously or within very short sequence. Systemic corrective actions: 1) given the conditions that I encountered in december I am convinced that the flight conditions around cable airport should have been officially IFR. Were the conditions declared IFR, no training or other flts would have departed under VFR conditions and the entire episode would have been avoided. The determination of IFR/VFR status should be reviewed for uncontrolled airports whose experience would indicate frequent low flying and thick haze. Cable is 1 of those airports. 2) in the absence of declared IFR conditions but the presence of 'substantially marginal' conditions which have been declared VFR, all flts from cable airport or other similarly circumstanced airports from cable airport or other similarly circumstanced airports should be reminded to monitor not only unicom (123.0) prior to takeoff but to monitor also (ontario) approach (125.5) for warning of incoming IFR flts. 3) consider requiring approach to provide 'favoring runway' information to the incoming IFR flight in similar sits. 4) provide a published IFR approach to runway 24 which would be used when winds (or lack of winds) favor runway 24. This would still required contact with unicom for the possibility of conflict on a 'straight in' but would eliminate most potential for head on convergence. Nearby mountains, however, probably preclude such an approach. When discussing the situation with ground personnel at the FBO after landing, I was told: 'at least you were in contact with us on your approach. Most other IFR flight (approach cable under these circumstances) are not (in contact). They just come on in! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter believes the cable airport should be in controled airspace. Then VFR would be 3 mi and a control zone would exist in less visibility. Now, who determines the 1 mi visibility? The reporter did not know and thought that was part of the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR DESCRIBES NEAR MID AIR.

Narrative: POTENTIAL FOR MIDAIR COLLISION DUE TO DEPARTING VFR ACFT AND LNDG IFR ACFT AT UNCTLED ARPT. APCHING/DSNDING ACFT ON INST FLT PLAN USING VOR RWY 6 APCH ENCOUNTERED DEPARTING/CLBING ACFT USING RWY 24. TUNED TO CABLE ARPT UNICOM FOR ACTIVE RWY INFO. SIGHTED DEPARTING ACFT AND TOOK EVASIVE ACTION BY R TURN. CONTACTED CABLE ARPT UNICOM TO CONFIRM ACTIVE RWY. ENTERED L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 24. NOT A 'CLOSE CALL.' RATHER IT WAS AN UNCOMFORTABLE REDUCTION OF NORMAL SAFETY DUE TO MULTIPLE FACTORS. THIS SIT IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS. HERE, AGAIN, ARE THE CIRCUMSTANCES: CABLE ARPT. UNCTLED. CONDUCTING OCCASIONAL TRAINING AND OTHER FLTS UNDER VFR. IN COMING PLANE ON IFR CLRNC AND PUBLISHED APCH TO RWY 6. ONTARIO APCH OFFERS 'NO WX FOR CABLE.' THUS NO 'FAVORING RWY' INFO. DUE TO NOISE CONSIDERATIONS OUTGOING ACFT USING RWY 24 ARE ADVISED TO MAKE A SHARP L TURN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF. AN INCOMING PLANE ON IFR APCH WOULD MAKE A R TURN TO AVOID A DIRECTLY ONCOMING ACFT AND A R TURN TO ENTER L TFC FOR RWY 24. THIS WOULD PUT BOTH ACFT ON CONVERGING COURSES ASSUMING THE SAME ALT OR DIRECT TO ALMOST DIRECT RWY ALIGNMENT. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES POSE SUBSTANTIAL DANGER. I WAS AWARE AND ALERT TO AVOIDING ANY VFR ACFT AS I CARRIED OUT A CAREFUL FORWARD SCAN DURING THE IFR APCH BUT THE SIT DEVELOPED QUITE RAPIDLY AND I WAS UNAWARE OF DEPARTING ACFT ON RWY 24 DESPITE BEING TUNED INTO THE UNICOM FREQ. I MAY HAVE UNCONSCIOUSLY BEEN ASSUMING THAT AS I WAS ON AN IFR CLRNC THAT THE AREA WOULD BE CLRED FOR ME, THIS WAS AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION GIVEN THAT CONDITIONS WERE DECLARED (THOUGH ARGUABLY NOT) VFR AND I WAS APCHING AN UNCTLED ARPT. I WAS TUNED TO CABLE ARPT UNICOM AND ESTABLISHED MONITORING. I HAD HEARD NO INDICATION OF DEPARTING ACFT NOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF 'FAVORING RWY,' HOWEVER, IN THE ACTIVITY OF THE APCH AND SCAN FOR THE RWY AND TFC IN WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY IFR CONDITIONS I HAD NOT YET REQUESTED 'FAVORING RWY' INFO NOR HAD I ANNOUNCED MY ARR. UPON SIGHTING THE OTHER ACFT I TOOK IMMEDIATE EVASIVE ACTION, CONFIRMED WITH UNICOM THAT CABLE WAS FAVORING RWY 24, PROPERLY ENTERED DOWNWIND FOR RWY 24, AND ANNOUNCED MY POS AT LEAST 3 TIMES IN THE PATTERN. PATTERN AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. ALREADY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE MADE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR A PROPER BREAKOFF TO ENTRY TO DOWNWIND BECAUSE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SEE THE RWY UNTIL DSCNT TO OR JUST BEFORE THE MDA WHICH IS JUST OVER 500 FT AGL. THEREFORE, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TELL WHERE A PROPER TFC PATTERN WAS! (THIS IS, OF COURSE, ASSUMING THAT I HAD KNOWN THAT RWY 24 WAS FAVORED AND/OR THAT THERE WAS DEPARTING ACFT. VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ARPT, THE OTHER ACFT, AND THUS WHERE THE PROPER TFC PATTERN SHOULD BE ALL OCCURRED EITHER SIMULTANEOUSLY OR WITHIN VERY SHORT SEQUENCE. SYSTEMIC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) GIVEN THE CONDITIONS THAT I ENCOUNTERED IN DECEMBER I AM CONVINCED THAT THE FLT CONDITIONS AROUND CABLE ARPT SHOULD HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY IFR. WERE THE CONDITIONS DECLARED IFR, NO TRAINING OR OTHER FLTS WOULD HAVE DEPARTED UNDER VFR CONDITIONS AND THE ENTIRE EPISODE WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. THE DETERMINATION OF IFR/VFR STATUS SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR UNCTLED ARPTS WHOSE EXPERIENCE WOULD INDICATE FREQUENT LOW FLYING AND THICK HAZE. CABLE IS 1 OF THOSE ARPTS. 2) IN THE ABSENCE OF DECLARED IFR CONDITIONS BUT THE PRESENCE OF 'SUBSTANTIALLY MARGINAL' CONDITIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN DECLARED VFR, ALL FLTS FROM CABLE ARPT OR OTHER SIMILARLY CIRCUMSTANCED ARPTS FROM CABLE ARPT OR OTHER SIMILARLY CIRCUMSTANCED ARPTS SHOULD BE REMINDED TO MONITOR NOT ONLY UNICOM (123.0) PRIOR TO TKOF BUT TO MONITOR ALSO (ONTARIO) APCH (125.5) FOR WARNING OF INCOMING IFR FLTS. 3) CONSIDER REQUIRING APCH TO PROVIDE 'FAVORING RWY' INFO TO THE INCOMING IFR FLT IN SIMILAR SITS. 4) PROVIDE A PUBLISHED IFR APCH TO RWY 24 WHICH WOULD BE USED WHEN WINDS (OR LACK OF WINDS) FAVOR RWY 24. THIS WOULD STILL REQUIRED CONTACT WITH UNICOM FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT ON A 'STRAIGHT IN' BUT WOULD ELIMINATE MOST POTENTIAL FOR HEAD ON CONVERGENCE. NEARBY MOUNTAINS, HOWEVER, PROBABLY PRECLUDE SUCH AN APCH. WHEN DISCUSSING THE SIT WITH GND PERSONNEL AT THE FBO AFTER LNDG, I WAS TOLD: 'AT LEAST YOU WERE IN CONTACT WITH US ON YOUR APCH. MOST OTHER IFR FLT (APCH CABLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES) ARE NOT (IN CONTACT). THEY JUST COME ON IN! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR BELIEVES THE CABLE ARPT SHOULD BE IN CTLED AIRSPACE. THEN VFR WOULD BE 3 MI AND A CTL ZONE WOULD EXIST IN LESS VISIBILITY. NOW, WHO DETERMINES THE 1 MI VISIBILITY? THE RPTR DID NOT KNOW AND THOUGHT THAT WAS PART OF THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.