Narrative:

On a visual approach to sba, I monitored approach frequency while the first officer obtained ATIS. He made no mention to me of any intersecting runway operations, nor was such information (evidently) broadcast on ATIS. After the handoff, tower cleared me to land runway 25, behind preceding commuter. I advised the first officer to communicate that the airplane ahead of us for landing runway 25 was in sight, and I then began about a 3 mi leg to the threshold. Vref was particularly low for this approach due to low fuel and passenger load, so I made an attempt to exit runway 25 on whichever parallel intersecting runways (15/33R&left) was practical, rather than roll to nearly full length on runway 25. My recollection is that almost immediately after fully touching down, the tower attempted to advise us to exit on one of the 2 runways or roll through the intxns. However, due to the noise generated by high RPM reverse thrust settings, the communication was not fully 'hearable.' I then began to leave the runway 25 centerline for a runway 15R exit (a left turn in this case). Then tower issued a go around clearance, virtually coincidentally with the first officer calling to my attention (during a normal, by now reflexive intersection check) that 'we had' a plane on very short final runway 15R. By the time the tower had finished its transmission to the other aircraft, I had stopped dead in my tracks, with my nosewheel somewhere around 4 ft from the runway 15R edge stripe. The go around that ensued took place directly toward us, which if nothing else, must have disturbed the passenger on board my plane at least half as much as it did myself and the first officer. The tower then advised that it had said 'exit runway 15L or roll through intersection.' the distinction is not lost on me, but where is the logic in: 1) working multiple aircraft on runways of such close proximity in conflicting patterns, and 2) why, when the tower had had the means to communicate their intentions with regard to working the arrs into intersecting runways, did they wait until what really was the worst possible moment to communicate that intent? We (both aircraft) must have both been on short final at the same time, and the tower should have seen this one coming long before I did! We taxied to the gate without further incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OPDEV PLTDEV INVOLVING AN ACR AND A UGA.

Narrative: ON A VISUAL APCH TO SBA, I MONITORED APCH FREQ WHILE THE FO OBTAINED ATIS. HE MADE NO MENTION TO ME OF ANY INTERSECTING RWY OPS, NOR WAS SUCH INFO (EVIDENTLY) BROADCAST ON ATIS. AFTER THE HDOF, TWR CLRED ME TO LAND RWY 25, BEHIND PRECEDING COMMUTER. I ADVISED THE FO TO COMMUNICATE THAT THE AIRPLANE AHEAD OF US FOR LNDG RWY 25 WAS IN SIGHT, AND I THEN BEGAN ABOUT A 3 MI LEG TO THE THRESHOLD. VREF WAS PARTICULARLY LOW FOR THIS APCH DUE TO LOW FUEL AND PAX LOAD, SO I MADE AN ATTEMPT TO EXIT RWY 25 ON WHICHEVER PARALLEL INTERSECTING RWYS (15/33R&L) WAS PRACTICAL, RATHER THAN ROLL TO NEARLY FULL LENGTH ON RWY 25. MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER FULLY TOUCHING DOWN, THE TWR ATTEMPTED TO ADVISE US TO EXIT ON ONE OF THE 2 RWYS OR ROLL THROUGH THE INTXNS. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE NOISE GENERATED BY HIGH RPM REVERSE THRUST SETTINGS, THE COM WAS NOT FULLY 'HEARABLE.' I THEN BEGAN TO LEAVE THE RWY 25 CTRLINE FOR A RWY 15R EXIT (A L TURN IN THIS CASE). THEN TWR ISSUED A GAR CLRNC, VIRTUALLY COINCIDENTALLY WITH THE FO CALLING TO MY ATTN (DURING A NORMAL, BY NOW REFLEXIVE INTXN CHK) THAT 'WE HAD' A PLANE ON VERY SHORT FINAL RWY 15R. BY THE TIME THE TWR HAD FINISHED ITS XMISSION TO THE OTHER ACFT, I HAD STOPPED DEAD IN MY TRACKS, WITH MY NOSEWHEEL SOMEWHERE AROUND 4 FT FROM THE RWY 15R EDGE STRIPE. THE GAR THAT ENSUED TOOK PLACE DIRECTLY TOWARD US, WHICH IF NOTHING ELSE, MUST HAVE DISTURBED THE PAX ON BOARD MY PLANE AT LEAST HALF AS MUCH AS IT DID MYSELF AND THE FO. THE TWR THEN ADVISED THAT IT HAD SAID 'EXIT RWY 15L OR ROLL THROUGH INTXN.' THE DISTINCTION IS NOT LOST ON ME, BUT WHERE IS THE LOGIC IN: 1) WORKING MULTIPLE ACFT ON RWYS OF SUCH CLOSE PROX IN CONFLICTING PATTERNS, AND 2) WHY, WHEN THE TWR HAD HAD THE MEANS TO COMMUNICATE THEIR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO WORKING THE ARRS INTO INTERSECTING RWYS, DID THEY WAIT UNTIL WHAT REALLY WAS THE WORST POSSIBLE MOMENT TO COMMUNICATE THAT INTENT? WE (BOTH ACFT) MUST HAVE BOTH BEEN ON SHORT FINAL AT THE SAME TIME, AND THE TWR SHOULD HAVE SEEN THIS ONE COMING LONG BEFORE I DID! WE TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.