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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 292325 |
Time | |
Date | 199412 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : oma |
State Reference | NE |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 19000 flight time type : 15000 |
ASRS Report | 292325 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : clearance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
While taxiing out for takeoff with low visibility (1400-1800 RVR) the first officer changed to the tower frequency without my knowledge. After reaching the departure end of the runway he called the tower and advised that we were ready for takeoff. The tower did not respond. He discovered that either he had put in the wrong frequency or the radio had mischanneled. Only when he made contact with the tower, they advised that they had been trying to call us for some time. The point I am trying to make is that good cockpit resource management is always important but it can be critical during low visibility operation. The first officer should have waited until we had reached the departure end of the runway before he changed to the tower frequency. Also, he should have advised me prior to any communication frequency changes. I think he now understands that good communication is a prime ingredient for a safe flight.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FO OF AN MLG CHANGED TO TWR LCL CTL FREQ TOO SOON WILE TAXIING OUT FOR TKOF DURING LOW VISIBILITY RESULTING IN MISSING CALLS FROM GND CTL.
Narrative: WHILE TAXIING OUT FOR TKOF WITH LOW VISIBILITY (1400-1800 RVR) THE FO CHANGED TO THE TWR FREQ WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE. AFTER REACHING THE DEP END OF THE RWY HE CALLED THE TWR AND ADVISED THAT WE WERE READY FOR TKOF. THE TWR DID NOT RESPOND. HE DISCOVERED THAT EITHER HE HAD PUT IN THE WRONG FREQ OR THE RADIO HAD MISCHANNELED. ONLY WHEN HE MADE CONTACT WITH THE TWR, THEY ADVISED THAT THEY HAD BEEN TRYING TO CALL US FOR SOME TIME. THE POINT I AM TRYING TO MAKE IS THAT GOOD COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT IS ALWAYS IMPORTANT BUT IT CAN BE CRITICAL DURING LOW VISIBILITY OP. THE FO SHOULD HAVE WAITED UNTIL WE HAD REACHED THE DEP END OF THE RWY BEFORE HE CHANGED TO THE TWR FREQ. ALSO, HE SHOULD HAVE ADVISED ME PRIOR TO ANY COM FREQ CHANGES. I THINK HE NOW UNDERSTANDS THAT GOOD COM IS A PRIME INGREDIENT FOR A SAFE FLT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.