Narrative:

I went out on a solo training flight as a student pilot to practice maneuvers for my private pilot fixed wing rating. I completed a preflight inspection on the airplane. The airplane was ok, but I noted that the tanks were not filled to capacity, but the fuel gauges said 3/4 of a tank in each wing and after visual inspection of the level in the tanks, I decided that that looked about right. I planned to practice in the local area for 1.5-2.0 hours. According to my instructor the 152 was the same as the 150 except that the 152 had a bigger engine and I would be able to use my own 150 manual to study limits etc. According to my manual, the airplane had a range of 4.1 hours at 75 percent power and 7500 ft, and a maximum possible range of 6.1 hours. I concluded that I had plenty of fuel for the flight. As I was about to start the plane, a fuel truck drove up and asked if I needed any fuel -- I declined reasoning that I had more than enough. I went on my flight, spending time on approachs, stalls and turns about a point. After about 1.6 hours of flying time I decided to head back. I had been monitoring my fuel and burn seemed to coincide with expected burn (the fuel gauges read between 1/4 and 1/2 tank when I decided to return to arlington airport -- approximately 1/4 tank per hour). A couple of mi before reaching the airport the engine quit. I set up to land in the only available field and began to analyze the cause of the engine failure. Since the fuel gauges read 1/4 tank in both wings, I thought that the cause of the engine failure may have been carburetor icing (it was in the upper 40's or low 50's on the ground and there was a thin layer of scud at about 2500 ft), so I turned the carburetor heat on, which caused the engine to sputter momentarily back to life, but then it quit again. I turned the carburetor heat off and then tried to lean out the engine thinking that it must have flooded, with no result. I checked the fuel shutoff valve to ensure that it was on -- it was. By the time I had gone through all of this, I was on very short final to the chosen field. The field that I landed in was covered with small mesquite trees, most of which were only 3 or 4 ft high, but some were 6 or 7 ft high. On the landing roll it was necessary to drive between 2 of the taller trees. After landing the plane, I brought it to a stop, called F54 unicom told them I was ok and the plane was ok and turned off the key and the master switch and got out of the plane. The trees struck the wings at the outboard edges and wrinkled the skin of the leading edges of both wings, but the damage did not seem severe at all. I called FBO on a cellular phone and told them where I was and that the plane was ok. While I was waiting, I looked over the outside of the plane, checking the oil and fuel. At this point I could still see fuel in the tanks, but it looked low. 3 people were sent out from FBO to pick up the plane. They inspected it and determined that it was low on fuel, but otherwise flyable. They took me back to the airport and told me that they would get in touch with me later. Later, they added gas and flew it back to the airport. On dec/xx/95, mr X the owner, of the FBO called and said that he would like to see me. I went to his office and met with 1 of the people who had picked up the plane and mr X. Mr X informed me that we could avoid calling the FAA if I would just pay to fix the plane, which had sustained only minor damage -- he thought that it could be repaired for approximately $1500 -- although he had estimates at between $5000 and $6000 (he said that he knew someone). At the meeting he accused me of running out of fuel flying 4.1 hours in a plane that has a range of 3 hours. He showed me photocopies of the 152 manual with the range and the emergency procedures highlighted (this information was new to me). The range was obviously different than what I had been told to learn, although the emergency procedure was the same. I had performed the emergency procedure incorrectly as I was still trying to restart the engine until I was within a few ft of the ground -- thinking that I had gas and that maybe it was carburetor icing and that it would restart. I did not close the throttle or lean the engine out after trying to restart the engine as I judged I was too low to divert my attention inside at that time. I still do not know that lack of fuel caused the engine failure as the gauges read 1/4 tank, but it was apparent to me that the instruction I received was incorrect -- the cessna 152 is not just like the 150 -- among other things one can fly longer than the other. I was never informed to always start out with a full tank of gas and in fact was told that, 'in a cessna, if you can see gas it is full.' my instructor and I had gone on several dual training flts with what appeared to me to be less than a full tank of gas. In my military rotary wing flying we always started with a full tank of gas, but we have no way to verify the fuel level unless it is full. Several factors caused the incident to occur. First, I was taught incorrectly and second, the fuel gauges were incorrect and they have no backup system to warn of low fuel -- it seems that such a system would be very inexpensive and simple. If there had been some way of determining the amount of fuel that was actually in the tank, or if there had been a secondary low fuel warning system, or if the training had been more standardized and I been issued or told to purchase manual for the 152 as well as the 150 the incident would not have occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUEL EXHAUSTION RESULTED IN A FORCED LNDG.

Narrative: I WENT OUT ON A SOLO TRAINING FLT AS A STUDENT PLT TO PRACTICE MANEUVERS FOR MY PVT PLT FIXED WING RATING. I COMPLETED A PREFLT INSPECTION ON THE AIRPLANE. THE AIRPLANE WAS OK, BUT I NOTED THAT THE TANKS WERE NOT FILLED TO CAPACITY, BUT THE FUEL GAUGES SAID 3/4 OF A TANK IN EACH WING AND AFTER VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE LEVEL IN THE TANKS, I DECIDED THAT THAT LOOKED ABOUT RIGHT. I PLANNED TO PRACTICE IN THE LCL AREA FOR 1.5-2.0 HRS. ACCORDING TO MY INSTRUCTOR THE 152 WAS THE SAME AS THE 150 EXCEPT THAT THE 152 HAD A BIGGER ENG AND I WOULD BE ABLE TO USE MY OWN 150 MANUAL TO STUDY LIMITS ETC. ACCORDING TO MY MANUAL, THE AIRPLANE HAD A RANGE OF 4.1 HRS AT 75 PERCENT PWR AND 7500 FT, AND A MAX POSSIBLE RANGE OF 6.1 HRS. I CONCLUDED THAT I HAD PLENTY OF FUEL FOR THE FLT. AS I WAS ABOUT TO START THE PLANE, A FUEL TRUCK DROVE UP AND ASKED IF I NEEDED ANY FUEL -- I DECLINED REASONING THAT I HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH. I WENT ON MY FLT, SPENDING TIME ON APCHS, STALLS AND TURNS ABOUT A POINT. AFTER ABOUT 1.6 HRS OF FLYING TIME I DECIDED TO HEAD BACK. I HAD BEEN MONITORING MY FUEL AND BURN SEEMED TO COINCIDE WITH EXPECTED BURN (THE FUEL GAUGES READ BTWN 1/4 AND 1/2 TANK WHEN I DECIDED TO RETURN TO ARLINGTON ARPT -- APPROX 1/4 TANK PER HR). A COUPLE OF MI BEFORE REACHING THE ARPT THE ENG QUIT. I SET UP TO LAND IN THE ONLY AVAILABLE FIELD AND BEGAN TO ANALYZE THE CAUSE OF THE ENG FAILURE. SINCE THE FUEL GAUGES READ 1/4 TANK IN BOTH WINGS, I THOUGHT THAT THE CAUSE OF THE ENG FAILURE MAY HAVE BEEN CARB ICING (IT WAS IN THE UPPER 40'S OR LOW 50'S ON THE GND AND THERE WAS A THIN LAYER OF SCUD AT ABOUT 2500 FT), SO I TURNED THE CARB HEAT ON, WHICH CAUSED THE ENG TO SPUTTER MOMENTARILY BACK TO LIFE, BUT THEN IT QUIT AGAIN. I TURNED THE CARB HEAT OFF AND THEN TRIED TO LEAN OUT THE ENG THINKING THAT IT MUST HAVE FLOODED, WITH NO RESULT. I CHKED THE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS ON -- IT WAS. BY THE TIME I HAD GONE THROUGH ALL OF THIS, I WAS ON VERY SHORT FINAL TO THE CHOSEN FIELD. THE FIELD THAT I LANDED IN WAS COVERED WITH SMALL MESQUITE TREES, MOST OF WHICH WERE ONLY 3 OR 4 FT HIGH, BUT SOME WERE 6 OR 7 FT HIGH. ON THE LNDG ROLL IT WAS NECESSARY TO DRIVE BTWN 2 OF THE TALLER TREES. AFTER LNDG THE PLANE, I BROUGHT IT TO A STOP, CALLED F54 UNICOM TOLD THEM I WAS OK AND THE PLANE WAS OK AND TURNED OFF THE KEY AND THE MASTER SWITCH AND GOT OUT OF THE PLANE. THE TREES STRUCK THE WINGS AT THE OUTBOARD EDGES AND WRINKLED THE SKIN OF THE LEADING EDGES OF BOTH WINGS, BUT THE DAMAGE DID NOT SEEM SEVERE AT ALL. I CALLED FBO ON A CELLULAR PHONE AND TOLD THEM WHERE I WAS AND THAT THE PLANE WAS OK. WHILE I WAS WAITING, I LOOKED OVER THE OUTSIDE OF THE PLANE, CHKING THE OIL AND FUEL. AT THIS POINT I COULD STILL SEE FUEL IN THE TANKS, BUT IT LOOKED LOW. 3 PEOPLE WERE SENT OUT FROM FBO TO PICK UP THE PLANE. THEY INSPECTED IT AND DETERMINED THAT IT WAS LOW ON FUEL, BUT OTHERWISE FLYABLE. THEY TOOK ME BACK TO THE ARPT AND TOLD ME THAT THEY WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME LATER. LATER, THEY ADDED GAS AND FLEW IT BACK TO THE ARPT. ON DEC/XX/95, MR X THE OWNER, OF THE FBO CALLED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME. I WENT TO HIS OFFICE AND MET WITH 1 OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD PICKED UP THE PLANE AND MR X. MR X INFORMED ME THAT WE COULD AVOID CALLING THE FAA IF I WOULD JUST PAY TO FIX THE PLANE, WHICH HAD SUSTAINED ONLY MINOR DAMAGE -- HE THOUGHT THAT IT COULD BE REPAIRED FOR APPROX $1500 -- ALTHOUGH HE HAD ESTIMATES AT BTWN $5000 AND $6000 (HE SAID THAT HE KNEW SOMEONE). AT THE MEETING HE ACCUSED ME OF RUNNING OUT OF FUEL FLYING 4.1 HRS IN A PLANE THAT HAS A RANGE OF 3 HRS. HE SHOWED ME PHOTOCOPIES OF THE 152 MANUAL WITH THE RANGE AND THE EMER PROCS HIGHLIGHTED (THIS INFO WAS NEW TO ME). THE RANGE WAS OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENT THAN WHAT I HAD BEEN TOLD TO LEARN, ALTHOUGH THE EMER PROC WAS THE SAME. I HAD PERFORMED THE EMER PROC INCORRECTLY AS I WAS STILL TRYING TO RESTART THE ENG UNTIL I WAS WITHIN A FEW FT OF THE GND -- THINKING THAT I HAD GAS AND THAT MAYBE IT WAS CARB ICING AND THAT IT WOULD RESTART. I DID NOT CLOSE THE THROTTLE OR LEAN THE ENG OUT AFTER TRYING TO RESTART THE ENG AS I JUDGED I WAS TOO LOW TO DIVERT MY ATTN INSIDE AT THAT TIME. I STILL DO NOT KNOW THAT LACK OF FUEL CAUSED THE ENG FAILURE AS THE GAUGES READ 1/4 TANK, BUT IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT THE INSTRUCTION I RECEIVED WAS INCORRECT -- THE CESSNA 152 IS NOT JUST LIKE THE 150 -- AMONG OTHER THINGS ONE CAN FLY LONGER THAN THE OTHER. I WAS NEVER INFORMED TO ALWAYS START OUT WITH A FULL TANK OF GAS AND IN FACT WAS TOLD THAT, 'IN A CESSNA, IF YOU CAN SEE GAS IT IS FULL.' MY INSTRUCTOR AND I HAD GONE ON SEVERAL DUAL TRAINING FLTS WITH WHAT APPEARED TO ME TO BE LESS THAN A FULL TANK OF GAS. IN MY MIL ROTARY WING FLYING WE ALWAYS STARTED WITH A FULL TANK OF GAS, BUT WE HAVE NO WAY TO VERIFY THE FUEL LEVEL UNLESS IT IS FULL. SEVERAL FACTORS CAUSED THE INCIDENT TO OCCUR. FIRST, I WAS TAUGHT INCORRECTLY AND SECOND, THE FUEL GAUGES WERE INCORRECT AND THEY HAVE NO BACKUP SYS TO WARN OF LOW FUEL -- IT SEEMS THAT SUCH A SYS WOULD BE VERY INEXPENSIVE AND SIMPLE. IF THERE HAD BEEN SOME WAY OF DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF FUEL THAT WAS ACTUALLY IN THE TANK, OR IF THERE HAD BEEN A SECONDARY LOW FUEL WARNING SYS, OR IF THE TRAINING HAD BEEN MORE STANDARDIZED AND I BEEN ISSUED OR TOLD TO PURCHASE MANUAL FOR THE 152 AS WELL AS THE 150 THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.