Narrative:

At about XA00 local on dec/sat/94, having been told to land on santa barbara runway 7 and hold short of runway 15 for landing traffic, my student was unable to land the aircraft and come to a complete stop in time to hold short of runway 15. We had accepted the clearance while on final, doing a practice localizer approach, and intended to hold short as instructed. However, my student got confused after taking off his hood, during the transition from instrument to visual flight. He held too much speed on final approach, despite my instructions to slow down. His confusion caused him to ignore my warnings to slow down, and as a result we floated too far. Unfortunately, it only started to become apparent that we would truly land too long once it was too late to do something. At that time, we could have gone around and avoided acting contrary to the clearance, but the controller had already told the aircraft landing on the intersecting runway to go around. If we had initiated a go around it would have created another dangerous situation as we may have 'intersected' in the air. In retrospect, since I was never under the hood, and therefore was not as confused as my student, I should have had him initiated a go around as soon as there was any doubt that we might not be able to stop short of the intersecting runway. Unfortunately, I was too fixated on my duties as a flight instructor to either: 1) decisively make up my mind as to how long we would land at an early enough time, or 2) take over control of the aircraft from my confused student and initiated a go around from the right seat. There are a number of 'human factors' which influenced the outcome of this event. My student was confused about everything that day. He was unable to master either that day's lesson, or many of the previous ones he had mastered on earlier dates. As a result, I was very busy explaining and correcting his instrument approachs. My eyes were in the cockpit more than they should have been. Also, I was frustrated with his poor performance. As we got closer to the runway I told him to slow down a number of times. He did not comply with my suggestion. By the time I was aware of his poor reaction and our proximity to the intersecting runway, it was too late and the other plane was going around. Additionally, our high speed and low altitude as we floated in ground effect made it very difficult to judge how close the intersection was. It was too low an angle to accurately judge how close to the intersection we were. However, as I have written, there was a small window of time when a go around could have been initiated. It was my diverted attention to a floundering student combined with my student's confusion upon transitioning from instruments to visual flight that caused us to miss that window.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH CLRNC TO 'LAND AND HOLD SHORT' OF INTERSECTING RWY, RESULTING IN RWY TRANSGRESSION. PLT DEV.

Narrative: AT ABOUT XA00 LCL ON DEC/SAT/94, HAVING BEEN TOLD TO LAND ON SANTA BARBARA RWY 7 AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 15 FOR LNDG TFC, MY STUDENT WAS UNABLE TO LAND THE ACFT AND COME TO A COMPLETE STOP IN TIME TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 15. WE HAD ACCEPTED THE CLRNC WHILE ON FINAL, DOING A PRACTICE LOC APCH, AND INTENDED TO HOLD SHORT AS INSTRUCTED. HOWEVER, MY STUDENT GOT CONFUSED AFTER TAKING OFF HIS HOOD, DURING THE TRANSITION FROM INST TO VISUAL FLT. HE HELD TOO MUCH SPD ON FINAL APCH, DESPITE MY INSTRUCTIONS TO SLOW DOWN. HIS CONFUSION CAUSED HIM TO IGNORE MY WARNINGS TO SLOW DOWN, AND AS A RESULT WE FLOATED TOO FAR. UNFORTUNATELY, IT ONLY STARTED TO BECOME APPARENT THAT WE WOULD TRULY LAND TOO LONG ONCE IT WAS TOO LATE TO DO SOMETHING. AT THAT TIME, WE COULD HAVE GONE AROUND AND AVOIDED ACTING CONTRARY TO THE CLRNC, BUT THE CTLR HAD ALREADY TOLD THE ACFT LNDG ON THE INTERSECTING RWY TO GAR. IF WE HAD INITIATED A GAR IT WOULD HAVE CREATED ANOTHER DANGEROUS SIT AS WE MAY HAVE 'INTERSECTED' IN THE AIR. IN RETROSPECT, SINCE I WAS NEVER UNDER THE HOOD, AND THEREFORE WAS NOT AS CONFUSED AS MY STUDENT, I SHOULD HAVE HAD HIM INITIATED A GAR AS SOON AS THERE WAS ANY DOUBT THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO STOP SHORT OF THE INTERSECTING RWY. UNFORTUNATELY, I WAS TOO FIXATED ON MY DUTIES AS A FLT INSTRUCTOR TO EITHER: 1) DECISIVELY MAKE UP MY MIND AS TO HOW LONG WE WOULD LAND AT AN EARLY ENOUGH TIME, OR 2) TAKE OVER CTL OF THE ACFT FROM MY CONFUSED STUDENT AND INITIATED A GAR FROM THE R SEAT. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF 'HUMAN FACTORS' WHICH INFLUENCED THE OUTCOME OF THIS EVENT. MY STUDENT WAS CONFUSED ABOUT EVERYTHING THAT DAY. HE WAS UNABLE TO MASTER EITHER THAT DAY'S LESSON, OR MANY OF THE PREVIOUS ONES HE HAD MASTERED ON EARLIER DATES. AS A RESULT, I WAS VERY BUSY EXPLAINING AND CORRECTING HIS INST APCHS. MY EYES WERE IN THE COCKPIT MORE THAN THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN. ALSO, I WAS FRUSTRATED WITH HIS POOR PERFORMANCE. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO THE RWY I TOLD HIM TO SLOW DOWN A NUMBER OF TIMES. HE DID NOT COMPLY WITH MY SUGGESTION. BY THE TIME I WAS AWARE OF HIS POOR REACTION AND OUR PROX TO THE INTERSECTING RWY, IT WAS TOO LATE AND THE OTHER PLANE WAS GOING AROUND. ADDITIONALLY, OUR HIGH SPD AND LOW ALT AS WE FLOATED IN GND EFFECT MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO JUDGE HOW CLOSE THE INTXN WAS. IT WAS TOO LOW AN ANGLE TO ACCURATELY JUDGE HOW CLOSE TO THE INTXN WE WERE. HOWEVER, AS I HAVE WRITTEN, THERE WAS A SMALL WINDOW OF TIME WHEN A GAR COULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED. IT WAS MY DIVERTED ATTN TO A FLOUNDERING STUDENT COMBINED WITH MY STUDENT'S CONFUSION UPON TRANSITIONING FROM INSTS TO VISUAL FLT THAT CAUSED US TO MISS THAT WINDOW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.