Narrative:

Location approach and landing at cvg. WX 32 degrees, wind 270 degrees at 20 KTS as reported by approach and tower. Runway 36L&right. Visibility ILS approach required. Landing weight 100000 pounds with aft center of gravity. '0' passenger. Flight was 3 hours late from ind as a result of problems with determining the deice capability of the aircraft. Moderate to heavy mixed icing was encountered on arrival at cvg below 5000 ft. The crew was advised that runway 36R had been in use and that several aircraft had encountered control problems on landing and approach with moderate turbulence reported. No windshear reports. The aircraft were corporate jets and turboprops. Runway 36L was in the process of being cleaned by the airport and we requested a delay until that runway was available. Braking action on runway 36R was poor to nil. Within 10 mins we were advised that the airport had finished cleaning runway 36L and we were cleared for approach. We encountered heavy buffeting during the approach but were able to keep the approach parameters stable. We had the runway visually 2 mi out and flew a flaps 40 degrees approach with medium autobrakes selected. We touched down at an estimated bug plus 10-15 KTS. We had flown the approach with bug plus 20. The tower had reported plus or minus 20 KTS on final again with no wind shear reports or additional wind reports. Spoilers deployed on touchdown but no apparent deceleration was noted and no antiskid cycling. During the landing roll, the aircraft drifted out of control several times and required full deflection of rudder and aileron to keep the aircraft from departing the runway. We encountered 1 slide with the aircraft nose 30 degrees left of runway heading and the aircraft sliding left despite the wind being from 270 degrees 20 KTS and later reported by the tower during our roll as 30 KTS on the east boundary wind (the first such report). This is the crosswind limit of the md-88. There were at least 3 large areas of shear ice with braking action as nil. Reverse thrust was not deployed at first because of the danger of differential reverse adding to the control problems. Later in the landing roll idle reverse was deployed and manual braking was instituted at approximately 50-60 KTS. We eventually stopped the aircraft and slowly exited the runway at the last highspd for runway 36L. During our approach aircraft were continuing to depart on runway 27. No approach was available or in use for runway 27. We gave a PIREP to the tower that the landing conditions on runway 36L were unacceptable. We also advised our dispatcher that any aircraft departing on runway 27 should have a takeoff alternate because they could not safely land at cvg if they had a problem. In hindsight it is clear that wind shear conditions existed and should have been detectable by the wind sensors at the cvg airport. The practice of using runway 27 for takeoff and runway 36L&right for landing in these WX conditions is clearly unacceptable. I have landed in cvg previously with WX 200 ft and 1/2 mi visibility and the wind 310 degrees 65 KTS in blowing snow. A CAT I approach to the west with appropriate lighting is required for this type of frontal activity. A parallel runway for runway 27 would be necessary for any type of schedule integrity is to be maintained. The very light weight of this aircraft and the full aft center of gravity made the control situation more challenging. Before leaving ind we had to have a second wdr done and sand loaded to bring the aircraft into balance. Additionally we had all the flight attendants forward for landing. Previous cold WX experience of this crew includes arctic military operations in the winter time. The first officer was particularly professional and added to the success of the landing effort by backing up the captain with verbal accounts of the flight control position when aircraft positioning and direction appeared out of sync with control position. The narrative was similar to that encouraged during simulator training for stalls or wind shear with ground contact. An additional item was the delay in ind that was related to an mco regarding pack overheat sensing. We anticipated a problem with anti- icing system before landing in ind and in fact had them. The MEL did not look ahead for this. We spent several hours with contract maintenance and felt that we had the situation under control. We again encountered problems on this legand cvg maintenance worked on the aircraft for several hours before canceling the flts for the remainder of the day. I know this issue has been addressed recently on the chief pilot's board but as a former navy safety officer and aircraft maintenance officer, there is frankly no substitute for a fully capable aircraft- legal issues aside.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT ENCOUNTERS SLICK, ICY RWY ON LNDG. LOSS OF ACFT CTL.

Narrative: LOCATION APCH AND LNDG AT CVG. WX 32 DEGS, WIND 270 DEGS AT 20 KTS AS RPTED BY APCH AND TWR. RWY 36L&R. VISIBILITY ILS APCH REQUIRED. LNDG WT 100000 LBS WITH AFT CTR OF GRAVITY. '0' PAX. FLT WAS 3 HRS LATE FROM IND AS A RESULT OF PROBS WITH DETERMINING THE DEICE CAPABILITY OF THE ACFT. MODERATE TO HVY MIXED ICING WAS ENCOUNTERED ON ARR AT CVG BELOW 5000 FT. THE CREW WAS ADVISED THAT RWY 36R HAD BEEN IN USE AND THAT SEVERAL ACFT HAD ENCOUNTERED CTL PROBS ON LNDG AND APCH WITH MODERATE TURB RPTED. NO WINDSHEAR RPTS. THE ACFT WERE CORPORATE JETS AND TURBOPROPS. RWY 36L WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING CLEANED BY THE ARPT AND WE REQUESTED A DELAY UNTIL THAT RWY WAS AVAILABLE. BRAKING ACTION ON RWY 36R WAS POOR TO NIL. WITHIN 10 MINS WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE ARPT HAD FINISHED CLEANING RWY 36L AND WE WERE CLRED FOR APCH. WE ENCOUNTERED HVY BUFFETING DURING THE APCH BUT WERE ABLE TO KEEP THE APCH PARAMETERS STABLE. WE HAD THE RWY VISUALLY 2 MI OUT AND FLEW A FLAPS 40 DEGS APCH WITH MEDIUM AUTOBRAKES SELECTED. WE TOUCHED DOWN AT AN ESTIMATED BUG PLUS 10-15 KTS. WE HAD FLOWN THE APCH WITH BUG PLUS 20. THE TWR HAD RPTED PLUS OR MINUS 20 KTS ON FINAL AGAIN WITH NO WIND SHEAR RPTS OR ADDITIONAL WIND RPTS. SPOILERS DEPLOYED ON TOUCHDOWN BUT NO APPARENT DECELERATION WAS NOTED AND NO ANTISKID CYCLING. DURING THE LNDG ROLL, THE ACFT DRIFTED OUT OF CTL SEVERAL TIMES AND REQUIRED FULL DEFLECTION OF RUDDER AND AILERON TO KEEP THE ACFT FROM DEPARTING THE RWY. WE ENCOUNTERED 1 SLIDE WITH THE ACFT NOSE 30 DEGS L OF RWY HDG AND THE ACFT SLIDING L DESPITE THE WIND BEING FROM 270 DEGS 20 KTS AND LATER RPTED BY THE TWR DURING OUR ROLL AS 30 KTS ON THE E BOUNDARY WIND (THE FIRST SUCH RPT). THIS IS THE XWIND LIMIT OF THE MD-88. THERE WERE AT LEAST 3 LARGE AREAS OF SHEAR ICE WITH BRAKING ACTION AS NIL. REVERSE THRUST WAS NOT DEPLOYED AT FIRST BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF DIFFERENTIAL REVERSE ADDING TO THE CTL PROBS. LATER IN THE LNDG ROLL IDLE REVERSE WAS DEPLOYED AND MANUAL BRAKING WAS INSTITUTED AT APPROX 50-60 KTS. WE EVENTUALLY STOPPED THE ACFT AND SLOWLY EXITED THE RWY AT THE LAST HIGHSPD FOR RWY 36L. DURING OUR APCH ACFT WERE CONTINUING TO DEPART ON RWY 27. NO APCH WAS AVAILABLE OR IN USE FOR RWY 27. WE GAVE A PIREP TO THE TWR THAT THE LNDG CONDITIONS ON RWY 36L WERE UNACCEPTABLE. WE ALSO ADVISED OUR DISPATCHER THAT ANY ACFT DEPARTING ON RWY 27 SHOULD HAVE A TKOF ALTERNATE BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT SAFELY LAND AT CVG IF THEY HAD A PROB. IN HINDSIGHT IT IS CLR THAT WIND SHEAR CONDITIONS EXISTED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DETECTABLE BY THE WIND SENSORS AT THE CVG ARPT. THE PRACTICE OF USING RWY 27 FOR TKOF AND RWY 36L&R FOR LNDG IN THESE WX CONDITIONS IS CLRLY UNACCEPTABLE. I HAVE LANDED IN CVG PREVIOUSLY WITH WX 200 FT AND 1/2 MI VISIBILITY AND THE WIND 310 DEGS 65 KTS IN BLOWING SNOW. A CAT I APCH TO THE W WITH APPROPRIATE LIGHTING IS REQUIRED FOR THIS TYPE OF FRONTAL ACTIVITY. A PARALLEL RWY FOR RWY 27 WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR ANY TYPE OF SCHEDULE INTEGRITY IS TO BE MAINTAINED. THE VERY LIGHT WT OF THIS ACFT AND THE FULL AFT CTR OF GRAVITY MADE THE CTL SIT MORE CHALLENGING. BEFORE LEAVING IND WE HAD TO HAVE A SECOND WDR DONE AND SAND LOADED TO BRING THE ACFT INTO BAL. ADDITIONALLY WE HAD ALL THE FLT ATTENDANTS FORWARD FOR LNDG. PREVIOUS COLD WX EXPERIENCE OF THIS CREW INCLUDES ARCTIC MIL OPS IN THE WINTER TIME. THE FO WAS PARTICULARLY PROFESSIONAL AND ADDED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE LNDG EFFORT BY BACKING UP THE CAPT WITH VERBAL ACCOUNTS OF THE FLT CTL POS WHEN ACFT POSITIONING AND DIRECTION APPEARED OUT OF SYNC WITH CTL POS. THE NARRATIVE WAS SIMILAR TO THAT ENCOURAGED DURING SIMULATOR TRAINING FOR STALLS OR WIND SHEAR WITH GND CONTACT. AN ADDITIONAL ITEM WAS THE DELAY IN IND THAT WAS RELATED TO AN MCO REGARDING PACK OVERHEAT SENSING. WE ANTICIPATED A PROB WITH ANTI- ICING SYS BEFORE LNDG IN IND AND IN FACT HAD THEM. THE MEL DID NOT LOOK AHEAD FOR THIS. WE SPENT SEVERAL HRS WITH CONTRACT MAINT AND FELT THAT WE HAD THE SIT UNDER CTL. WE AGAIN ENCOUNTERED PROBS ON THIS LEGAND CVG MAINT WORKED ON THE ACFT FOR SEVERAL HRS BEFORE CANCELING THE FLTS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY. I KNOW THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN ADDRESSED RECENTLY ON THE CHIEF PLT'S BOARD BUT AS A FORMER NAVY SAFETY OFFICER AND ACFT MAINT OFFICER, THERE IS FRANKLY NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A FULLY CAPABLE ACFT- LEGAL ISSUES ASIDE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.