Narrative:

Our flight was scheduled to operate from paris, france (cdg), to memphis, tn, on the evening of feb/fri/95. The inbound crew, delivering the aircraft we would be flying to the united states, had written up the #2 HF radio in the following manner: '#2 HF needs to be checked, takes long time to key frequency. Heavy static. Cannot transmit or receive on different frequency.' we researched the problem in our MEL binder where it was addressed in the following manner: (both HF's) 'must operate normally on rtes where HF is the only means of communication, ie, any route having en route parts beyond the range of VHF stations.' although we would be within VHF contact of other aircraft along our entire route, should a message need to be relayed, we decided to make sure our global operations center, back in memphis, knew of the problem and could propose a rerte to our filed departure if necessary (to within range of appropriate facilities for communications). We were issued a new flight plan release which acknowledged the MEL item, controller initials, and time confirming that the individual responsible for the flight knew of the situation, and that we were ok to operate the flight along the original route of flight, while remaining within FAA and company guidelines. No route changes had been made. We accepted the flight plan to be within parameters, as planned, and began our trip back to the united states. Later once en route over the atlantic, the subject of HF resurfaced and we discussed the situation in greater detail. Although we had been released along our stipulated route by operations, our track was not viewed as far enough north to be within communications range of VHF facilities. We had been led to believe that our release was within operating parameters of official guidelines by our operations who we knew to be informed of this situation. Although the flight was otherwise uneventful, and the #1 HF worked fine en route, we should have researched the problem more thoroughly prior to departure, and placed less faith and confidence in others to foresee possible problems. Greater awareness and understanding of the problem was necessary, which then could be acted upon in a more decisive manner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR ACFT DEPARTED ON A TRANS-ATLANTIC FLT WITH AN INOP HF COMS RADIO (MEL. ITEM), BUT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MEL LIMITATIONS REGARDING A VHF PROX ROUTING REQUIREMENTS.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO OPERATE FROM PARIS, FRANCE (CDG), TO MEMPHIS, TN, ON THE EVENING OF FEB/FRI/95. THE INBOUND CREW, DELIVERING THE ACFT WE WOULD BE FLYING TO THE UNITED STATES, HAD WRITTEN UP THE #2 HF RADIO IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: '#2 HF NEEDS TO BE CHKED, TAKES LONG TIME TO KEY FREQ. HVY STATIC. CANNOT XMIT OR RECEIVE ON DIFFERENT FREQ.' WE RESEARCHED THE PROB IN OUR MEL BINDER WHERE IT WAS ADDRESSED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: (BOTH HF'S) 'MUST OPERATE NORMALLY ON RTES WHERE HF IS THE ONLY MEANS OF COM, IE, ANY RTE HAVING ENRTE PARTS BEYOND THE RANGE OF VHF STATIONS.' ALTHOUGH WE WOULD BE WITHIN VHF CONTACT OF OTHER ACFT ALONG OUR ENTIRE RTE, SHOULD A MESSAGE NEED TO BE RELAYED, WE DECIDED TO MAKE SURE OUR GLOBAL OPS CTR, BACK IN MEMPHIS, KNEW OF THE PROB AND COULD PROPOSE A RERTE TO OUR FILED DEP IF NECESSARY (TO WITHIN RANGE OF APPROPRIATE FACILITIES FOR COMS). WE WERE ISSUED A NEW FLT PLAN RELEASE WHICH ACKNOWLEDGED THE MEL ITEM, CTLR INITIALS, AND TIME CONFIRMING THAT THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FLT KNEW OF THE SIT, AND THAT WE WERE OK TO OPERATE THE FLT ALONG THE ORIGINAL RTE OF FLT, WHILE REMAINING WITHIN FAA AND COMPANY GUIDELINES. NO RTE CHANGES HAD BEEN MADE. WE ACCEPTED THE FLT PLAN TO BE WITHIN PARAMETERS, AS PLANNED, AND BEGAN OUR TRIP BACK TO THE UNITED STATES. LATER ONCE ENRTE OVER THE ATLANTIC, THE SUBJECT OF HF RESURFACED AND WE DISCUSSED THE SIT IN GREATER DETAIL. ALTHOUGH WE HAD BEEN RELEASED ALONG OUR STIPULATED RTE BY OPS, OUR TRACK WAS NOT VIEWED AS FAR ENOUGH N TO BE WITHIN COMS RANGE OF VHF FACILITIES. WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THAT OUR RELEASE WAS WITHIN OPERATING PARAMETERS OF OFFICIAL GUIDELINES BY OUR OPS WHO WE KNEW TO BE INFORMED OF THIS SIT. ALTHOUGH THE FLT WAS OTHERWISE UNEVENTFUL, AND THE #1 HF WORKED FINE ENRTE, WE SHOULD HAVE RESEARCHED THE PROB MORE THOROUGHLY PRIOR TO DEP, AND PLACED LESS FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN OTHERS TO FORESEE POSSIBLE PROBS. GREATER AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROB WAS NECESSARY, WHICH THEN COULD BE ACTED UPON IN A MORE DECISIVE MANNER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.