Narrative:

We had just off loaded our cargo and refueled. Since we were blocking another aircraft I felt the need to 'get going.' my first officer had picked up the clearance and done the prestart checks while fueling was being completed so as soon as I had paid for the fuel I got on board and we started up and called for taxi. We were cleared to runway 11 so the taxi was short. By the time we had completed the taxi and pre takeoff checks we were at the end of the runway. With the 'blocked' airplane right behind us and already calling ready, the urgency to 'get going' was still there. I asked my first officer if he was ready and when he said yes I told him to call the tower. We were immediately cleared for takeoff. While I was not sure of the specifics of the SID I was generally familiar with it and since my first officer said he had reviewed it and set up the navs I was not concerned. We made the takeoff and since I was the PNF I completed the after takeoff checks and then realized that we were not making the turn that I expected. I asked the first officer what heading he had been given and it became readily apparent that he was not sure what he was to do. I took the airplane and began a left turn toward the northwest and told the first officer to get the SID page and tell me the heading called out. At this time the controller asked if we were following the SID and I replied that there was some confusion on our part. He then gave us a heading for vectors and a climb clearance. This is a departure that I have made a number of times previously but always with a crewmember who was equally as qualified and familiar as I. In this case my first officer was very new. In fact, this was his first revenue trip after completing his chkride, a fact that I was not aware of. In my hurry to get airborne I had relied on my first officer to provide me with the specifics of the SID when in fact he had never flown in this area before and was relying on me. The fault here was obviously mine for first allowing myself to get in a hurry and second not completely reviewing the SID before departing. This is a new position for me, particularly flying with low time fos. My reliance on the other person to have the particulars which in my previous position worked very well and expedited the operation is not appropriate here and for that matter was not appropriate previously even though it seemed to work well. My familiarity of the area and the general layout of the SID saved us from some much more serious consequences but I have vowed to never again call ready before all of the particulars of the departure have been reviewed and both crewmembers are comfortable with what is to be done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG DEV DUE TO NOT REVIEWING SID PRIOR TO DEP.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST OFF LOADED OUR CARGO AND REFUELED. SINCE WE WERE BLOCKING ANOTHER ACFT I FELT THE NEED TO 'GET GOING.' MY FO HAD PICKED UP THE CLRNC AND DONE THE PRESTART CHKS WHILE FUELING WAS BEING COMPLETED SO AS SOON AS I HAD PAID FOR THE FUEL I GOT ON BOARD AND WE STARTED UP AND CALLED FOR TAXI. WE WERE CLRED TO RWY 11 SO THE TAXI WAS SHORT. BY THE TIME WE HAD COMPLETED THE TAXI AND PRE TKOF CHKS WE WERE AT THE END OF THE RWY. WITH THE 'BLOCKED' AIRPLANE RIGHT BEHIND US AND ALREADY CALLING READY, THE URGENCY TO 'GET GOING' WAS STILL THERE. I ASKED MY FO IF HE WAS READY AND WHEN HE SAID YES I TOLD HIM TO CALL THE TWR. WE WERE IMMEDIATELY CLRED FOR TKOF. WHILE I WAS NOT SURE OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE SID I WAS GENERALLY FAMILIAR WITH IT AND SINCE MY FO SAID HE HAD REVIEWED IT AND SET UP THE NAVS I WAS NOT CONCERNED. WE MADE THE TKOF AND SINCE I WAS THE PNF I COMPLETED THE AFTER TKOF CHKS AND THEN REALIZED THAT WE WERE NOT MAKING THE TURN THAT I EXPECTED. I ASKED THE FO WHAT HDG HE HAD BEEN GIVEN AND IT BECAME READILY APPARENT THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT HE WAS TO DO. I TOOK THE AIRPLANE AND BEGAN A L TURN TOWARD THE NW AND TOLD THE FO TO GET THE SID PAGE AND TELL ME THE HDG CALLED OUT. AT THIS TIME THE CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE FOLLOWING THE SID AND I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION ON OUR PART. HE THEN GAVE US A HDG FOR VECTORS AND A CLB CLRNC. THIS IS A DEP THAT I HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF TIMES PREVIOUSLY BUT ALWAYS WITH A CREWMEMBER WHO WAS EQUALLY AS QUALIFIED AND FAMILIAR AS I. IN THIS CASE MY FO WAS VERY NEW. IN FACT, THIS WAS HIS FIRST REVENUE TRIP AFTER COMPLETING HIS CHKRIDE, A FACT THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF. IN MY HURRY TO GET AIRBORNE I HAD RELIED ON MY FO TO PROVIDE ME WITH THE SPECIFICS OF THE SID WHEN IN FACT HE HAD NEVER FLOWN IN THIS AREA BEFORE AND WAS RELYING ON ME. THE FAULT HERE WAS OBVIOUSLY MINE FOR FIRST ALLOWING MYSELF TO GET IN A HURRY AND SECOND NOT COMPLETELY REVIEWING THE SID BEFORE DEPARTING. THIS IS A NEW POS FOR ME, PARTICULARLY FLYING WITH LOW TIME FOS. MY RELIANCE ON THE OTHER PERSON TO HAVE THE PARTICULARS WHICH IN MY PREVIOUS POS WORKED VERY WELL AND EXPEDITED THE OP IS NOT APPROPRIATE HERE AND FOR THAT MATTER WAS NOT APPROPRIATE PREVIOUSLY EVEN THOUGH IT SEEMED TO WORK WELL. MY FAMILIARITY OF THE AREA AND THE GENERAL LAYOUT OF THE SID SAVED US FROM SOME MUCH MORE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES BUT I HAVE VOWED TO NEVER AGAIN CALL READY BEFORE ALL OF THE PARTICULARS OF THE DEP HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND BOTH CREWMEMBERS ARE COMFORTABLE WITH WHAT IS TO BE DONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.