Narrative:

On takeoff for a scheduled far 121 flight to cvg from clt it was discovered that the mai landing gear would not retract. The crew elected to return to clt for landing, as per standard procedure. Upon investigation, the safety pins were found in position on both main gear, preventing their retraction. The first officer had reported that his preflight inspection had been completed, and was accepted by the captain. This first officer is a senior pilot, and should have been trustworthy. Ordinarily, the captain also personally inspects the wheel well area, but his flight only made a cursory glance at the landing gear as he passed. The flight release for this flight had been delayed by flight operations until 10 mins before departure time. The first officer's preflight inspection occurred while the captain awaited the flight release. Captain boarded the flight with the release, completed the flight manifest, and departed the gate approximately on time. A critical factor in this occurrence is that the streamers (red in color) attached to these pins are very dirty (almost black in color, now) and that the length of them vary by aircraft. Some are worn, torn, and in need of replacement, if not, then clearing to their original color. This incident occurred after at least 3 procedures should have prevented it: maintenance should have removed them. Pilots should have found them. Aircraft marshallers should have seen the streamers (or have been able to see them). Increased vigilance by all parties is needed. My contribution to it is assured.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PART 121 COMMUTER ACFT RETURN LAND AFTER UNABLE TO RETRACT LNDG GEAR. GEAR PINS STILL IN.

Narrative: ON TKOF FOR A SCHEDULED FAR 121 FLT TO CVG FROM CLT IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE MAI LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. THE CREW ELECTED TO RETURN TO CLT FOR LNDG, AS PER STANDARD PROC. UPON INVESTIGATION, THE SAFETY PINS WERE FOUND IN POS ON BOTH MAIN GEAR, PREVENTING THEIR RETRACTION. THE FO HAD RPTED THAT HIS PREFLT INSPECTION HAD BEEN COMPLETED, AND WAS ACCEPTED BY THE CAPT. THIS FO IS A SENIOR PLT, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN TRUSTWORTHY. ORDINARILY, THE CAPT ALSO PERSONALLY INSPECTS THE WHEEL WELL AREA, BUT HIS FLT ONLY MADE A CURSORY GLANCE AT THE LNDG GEAR AS HE PASSED. THE FLT RELEASE FOR THIS FLT HAD BEEN DELAYED BY FLT OPS UNTIL 10 MINS BEFORE DEP TIME. THE FO'S PREFLT INSPECTION OCCURRED WHILE THE CAPT AWAITED THE FLT RELEASE. CAPT BOARDED THE FLT WITH THE RELEASE, COMPLETED THE FLT MANIFEST, AND DEPARTED THE GATE APPROX ON TIME. A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THIS OCCURRENCE IS THAT THE STREAMERS (RED IN COLOR) ATTACHED TO THESE PINS ARE VERY DIRTY (ALMOST BLACK IN COLOR, NOW) AND THAT THE LENGTH OF THEM VARY BY ACFT. SOME ARE WORN, TORN, AND IN NEED OF REPLACEMENT, IF NOT, THEN CLEARING TO THEIR ORIGINAL COLOR. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED AFTER AT LEAST 3 PROCS SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED IT: MAINT SHOULD HAVE REMOVED THEM. PLTS SHOULD HAVE FOUND THEM. ACFT MARSHALLERS SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE STREAMERS (OR HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SEE THEM). INCREASED VIGILANCE BY ALL PARTIES IS NEEDED. MY CONTRIBUTION TO IT IS ASSURED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.