Narrative:

On departure from phl we were cleared direct ditch by departure control. We were then switched to ZNY frequency 132.95. As we approached ditch, nyc gave us a heading 20 degrees to the left to intercept J225. At the same time, nyc cleared us to climb to FL230. I was flying the aircraft and made the entry into the FMC for the intercept. I then made the necessary entries to commence the climb to FL230. While doing this, the aircraft flew through the radials of J225 without capturing. The first officer and I both saw this and I started a turn back to the airway. At the same time nyc advised us we were almost 5 mi east of J225. He gave us a left turn back and stopped our climb at 16000 ft. As we approached J225, center cleared us direct jfk and resumed our climb to FL230. We then proceeded to bos. I feel that the lack of experience of both pilots in the B757 contributed greatly to the overshoot. Before the 757, I flew the 727 and the first officer was a captain on the F28. We both have been on the aircraft for about 2 months. In my briefing, I emphasized this point so that we would be especially aware and careful. This was the first leg of a 4 day trip and since we were both operating a bit slower than we would have liked, it might have been wiser not to use so much of the magic. I feel I also should have just flown the aircraft instead of making all the entries. Good procedure is the PF flies, the PNF does all the computer entries and executes upon the PF checking and agreeing. I can assure you we made sure we did this for the remainder of the trip. I've flown this leg phl-bos many times over the yrs. A new work environment, a first officer and captain new in the equipment make even doing something we've done many times before feel totally new. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter and the first officer are both new to the B-757. They had never flown together before in any aircraft and had only met at the school house in a refresher program. The reporter believes that he failed to hit 'LNAV' to direct the aircraft to intercept the radial. The reporter was having to fly and type at the same time while the first officer was verifying the location of the intersection on a chart. There is always one more button to push on these fancy aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 296783: the new york area high altitude area chart should be reissued. It is much less cluttered and easier to read in the crowded northeast corridor. The commercial high altitude #8 is a spaghetti bowl in this area and difficult to pinpoint position, especially in a hurry. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting first officer recently downgraded to the B-757 first officer seat after 14 yrs as an F-28 captain. Both he and the captain were brand new to the 757 and each other. His air carrier tries to avoid pairing 2 new crew members but sometimes the system fails. The reporter believes that the captain did not push the LNAV button hard enough and that both of them did not check to see that LNAV was initiated. The reporter has not heard from the FAA on this incident. From the pretkof briefing and a brief social encounter, the first officer believed the captain to be 'very professional.' the first officer said 'LNAV available' but did not check to see that it was properly engaged.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT FAILED TO INTERCEPT AN AIRWAY.

Narrative: ON DEP FROM PHL WE WERE CLRED DIRECT DITCH BY DEP CTL. WE WERE THEN SWITCHED TO ZNY FREQ 132.95. AS WE APCHED DITCH, NYC GAVE US A HDG 20 DEGS TO THE L TO INTERCEPT J225. AT THE SAME TIME, NYC CLRED US TO CLB TO FL230. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND MADE THE ENTRY INTO THE FMC FOR THE INTERCEPT. I THEN MADE THE NECESSARY ENTRIES TO COMMENCE THE CLB TO FL230. WHILE DOING THIS, THE ACFT FLEW THROUGH THE RADIALS OF J225 WITHOUT CAPTURING. THE FO AND I BOTH SAW THIS AND I STARTED A TURN BACK TO THE AIRWAY. AT THE SAME TIME NYC ADVISED US WE WERE ALMOST 5 MI E OF J225. HE GAVE US A L TURN BACK AND STOPPED OUR CLB AT 16000 FT. AS WE APCHED J225, CTR CLRED US DIRECT JFK AND RESUMED OUR CLB TO FL230. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO BOS. I FEEL THAT THE LACK OF EXPERIENCE OF BOTH PLTS IN THE B757 CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE OVERSHOOT. BEFORE THE 757, I FLEW THE 727 AND THE FO WAS A CAPT ON THE F28. WE BOTH HAVE BEEN ON THE ACFT FOR ABOUT 2 MONTHS. IN MY BRIEFING, I EMPHASIZED THIS POINT SO THAT WE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY AWARE AND CAREFUL. THIS WAS THE FIRST LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP AND SINCE WE WERE BOTH OPERATING A BIT SLOWER THAN WE WOULD HAVE LIKED, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN WISER NOT TO USE SO MUCH OF THE MAGIC. I FEEL I ALSO SHOULD HAVE JUST FLOWN THE ACFT INSTEAD OF MAKING ALL THE ENTRIES. GOOD PROC IS THE PF FLIES, THE PNF DOES ALL THE COMPUTER ENTRIES AND EXECUTES UPON THE PF CHKING AND AGREEING. I CAN ASSURE YOU WE MADE SURE WE DID THIS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TRIP. I'VE FLOWN THIS LEG PHL-BOS MANY TIMES OVER THE YRS. A NEW WORK ENVIRONMENT, A FO AND CAPT NEW IN THE EQUIP MAKE EVEN DOING SOMETHING WE'VE DONE MANY TIMES BEFORE FEEL TOTALLY NEW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR AND THE FO ARE BOTH NEW TO THE B-757. THEY HAD NEVER FLOWN TOGETHER BEFORE IN ANY ACFT AND HAD ONLY MET AT THE SCHOOL HOUSE IN A REFRESHER PROGRAM. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT HE FAILED TO HIT 'LNAV' TO DIRECT THE ACFT TO INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. THE RPTR WAS HAVING TO FLY AND TYPE AT THE SAME TIME WHILE THE FO WAS VERIFYING THE LOCATION OF THE INTXN ON A CHART. THERE IS ALWAYS ONE MORE BUTTON TO PUSH ON THESE FANCY ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 296783: THE NEW YORK AREA HIGH ALT AREA CHART SHOULD BE REISSUED. IT IS MUCH LESS CLUTTERED AND EASIER TO READ IN THE CROWDED NE CORRIDOR. THE COMMERCIAL HIGH ALT #8 IS A SPAGHETTI BOWL IN THIS AREA AND DIFFICULT TO PINPOINT POS, ESPECIALLY IN A HURRY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING FO RECENTLY DOWNGRADED TO THE B-757 FO SEAT AFTER 14 YRS AS AN F-28 CAPT. BOTH HE AND THE CAPT WERE BRAND NEW TO THE 757 AND EACH OTHER. HIS ACR TRIES TO AVOID PAIRING 2 NEW CREW MEMBERS BUT SOMETIMES THE SYS FAILS. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE CAPT DID NOT PUSH THE LNAV BUTTON HARD ENOUGH AND THAT BOTH OF THEM DID NOT CHK TO SEE THAT LNAV WAS INITIATED. THE RPTR HAS NOT HEARD FROM THE FAA ON THIS INCIDENT. FROM THE PRETKOF BRIEFING AND A BRIEF SOCIAL ENCOUNTER, THE FO BELIEVED THE CAPT TO BE 'VERY PROFESSIONAL.' THE FO SAID 'LNAV AVAILABLE' BUT DID NOT CHK TO SEE THAT IT WAS PROPERLY ENGAGED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.