Narrative:

We performed a normal takeoff. First officer rotated on speed and settled on a climb speed of approximately V2 plus 25. Aircraft attitude eventually reached 20 degrees nose up. At approximately 800 ft above field elevation, our airspeed rapidly dropped to about V2 plus 5. At the same time the wind shear warning activated with both an oral warning and flight director guidance. I stated to first officer, 'we have a wind shear. Firewall thrust!' I put my hand on his throttle hand and together we pushed the throttles to the farthest they could go forward -- all the way to the stops. First officer kept flying the aircraft. Even with the engines giving us everything they were capable of, our airspeed hung at V2 plus 5. We were in a slight descent. I gave the appropriate callouts. 'Follow the guidance. Airspeed V2 plus 5. We are descending.' we then leveled. Our descent was never more than 100-200 FPM. We used our available energy to arrest the descent and then evidently burst clear of the wind shear. Our airspeed jumped to 200 KTS in less time than it takes to read this sentence and our rate of climb shot from negligible to 2200 FPM. I assessed the situation and told first officer to pull the throttles back to climb thrust. He did so. I called back to the sat tower with a wind shear PIREP. First officer put the aircraft on autoplt for the climb and we prepared to analyze what we had just encountered. I noticed the overhead annunciator panel had 2 cautions evident: l-gen off and l-csd oil press low. I reaffirmed to first officer that he should fly the aircraft and work the ATC radio. I got into the abnormals and ran the appropriate checklist for a failed generator. I took the controls after running that checklist and asked first officer to run the CSD oil pressure low abnormal checklist. The aircraft flew fine. I noted no engine roughness or any lack of responsiveness. First officer coordinated with our flight dispatcher and maintenance coordinator for the maintenance write-ups. We 'put it in the book.' the remainder of the flight into dfw was uneventful. We parked at the gate, and waited to discuss the write-ups with maintenance. Maintenance wanted to know what our egt was during the engine parameters exceedance. I told them that we were extremely busy at the time of the exceedance assuring the continued flight of the aircraft. I neither noticed nor noted the egt. I did push those engines to the firewall stops on the throttles and they gave us everything they advertise themselves capable of. I was pleased with the engines. Maintenance wanted to know if I had exceeded any engine limit. I said that we had certainly exceeded the EPR limit on our gauges. Maintenance wanted to know what our EPR was. I did not know. I answered, 'it was whatever those engines could give.' our wind shear encounter lasted maybe 20-30 seconds. Time has a way of distorting when one is in an emergency situation. I do not believe we pushed those engines much longer than that. Neither first officer nor I noticed any visible signs that a wind shear was possible. There wasn't any blowing dust devils or previous wind shears reported to us by tower or ATIS. But the wind shear was there, lurking invisible at 800 ft AGL. I am pleased with the training we have received on wind shear. I believe that this was a text book encounter and that we did exactly what we were trained to do. We managed our energy and survived the encounter. You know, the people in back never even knew that we had brushed against a potential nightmare. That's good. We did the job we are paid to do. The a-line flight attendant did tell me she had heard the wind shear oral from her jumpseat. She thanked me for getting us out of the wind shear. It was not me that saved us. It was our team working together. I want to thank all of the men and women at air carrier and aircraft and their vendors that came up with the wind shear guidance equipment and the procedures to use it. I want to thank our ground instructors for teaching us and simulator instructors for testing us and refining our technique. It works. Supplemental information from acn 296823: the engines operated normally but were written up for an inspection due to the overboost. Subsequent inspection detected damage and both engines were replaced. All system and the pilots operated as intended during this event. I have no idea whether the successful outcome would have been achieved without over- temping the engines and did not consider returning to sat since we did not suspect any engine damage.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR ENCOUNTER BY ACR FLT. ENGS OVERTEMPTED IN EVASIVE MANEUVER.

Narrative: WE PERFORMED A NORMAL TKOF. FO ROTATED ON SPD AND SETTLED ON A CLB SPD OF APPROX V2 PLUS 25. ACFT ATTITUDE EVENTUALLY REACHED 20 DEGS NOSE UP. AT APPROX 800 FT ABOVE FIELD ELEVATION, OUR AIRSPD RAPIDLY DROPPED TO ABOUT V2 PLUS 5. AT THE SAME TIME THE WIND SHEAR WARNING ACTIVATED WITH BOTH AN ORAL WARNING AND FLT DIRECTOR GUIDANCE. I STATED TO FO, 'WE HAVE A WIND SHEAR. FIREWALL THRUST!' I PUT MY HAND ON HIS THROTTLE HAND AND TOGETHER WE PUSHED THE THROTTLES TO THE FARTHEST THEY COULD GO FORWARD -- ALL THE WAY TO THE STOPS. FO KEPT FLYING THE ACFT. EVEN WITH THE ENGS GIVING US EVERYTHING THEY WERE CAPABLE OF, OUR AIRSPD HUNG AT V2 PLUS 5. WE WERE IN A SLIGHT DSCNT. I GAVE THE APPROPRIATE CALLOUTS. 'FOLLOW THE GUIDANCE. AIRSPD V2 PLUS 5. WE ARE DSNDING.' WE THEN LEVELED. OUR DSCNT WAS NEVER MORE THAN 100-200 FPM. WE USED OUR AVAILABLE ENERGY TO ARREST THE DSCNT AND THEN EVIDENTLY BURST CLR OF THE WIND SHEAR. OUR AIRSPD JUMPED TO 200 KTS IN LESS TIME THAN IT TAKES TO READ THIS SENTENCE AND OUR RATE OF CLB SHOT FROM NEGLIGIBLE TO 2200 FPM. I ASSESSED THE SIT AND TOLD FO TO PULL THE THROTTLES BACK TO CLB THRUST. HE DID SO. I CALLED BACK TO THE SAT TWR WITH A WIND SHEAR PIREP. FO PUT THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT FOR THE CLB AND WE PREPARED TO ANALYZE WHAT WE HAD JUST ENCOUNTERED. I NOTICED THE OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATOR PANEL HAD 2 CAUTIONS EVIDENT: L-GEN OFF AND L-CSD OIL PRESS LOW. I REAFFIRMED TO FO THAT HE SHOULD FLY THE ACFT AND WORK THE ATC RADIO. I GOT INTO THE ABNORMALS AND RAN THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST FOR A FAILED GENERATOR. I TOOK THE CTLS AFTER RUNNING THAT CHKLIST AND ASKED FO TO RUN THE CSD OIL PRESSURE LOW ABNORMAL CHKLIST. THE ACFT FLEW FINE. I NOTED NO ENG ROUGHNESS OR ANY LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS. FO COORDINATED WITH OUR FLT DISPATCHER AND MAINT COORDINATOR FOR THE MAINT WRITE-UPS. WE 'PUT IT IN THE BOOK.' THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT INTO DFW WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE PARKED AT THE GATE, AND WAITED TO DISCUSS THE WRITE-UPS WITH MAINT. MAINT WANTED TO KNOW WHAT OUR EGT WAS DURING THE ENG PARAMETERS EXCEEDANCE. I TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE EXTREMELY BUSY AT THE TIME OF THE EXCEEDANCE ASSURING THE CONTINUED FLT OF THE ACFT. I NEITHER NOTICED NOR NOTED THE EGT. I DID PUSH THOSE ENGS TO THE FIREWALL STOPS ON THE THROTTLES AND THEY GAVE US EVERYTHING THEY ADVERTISE THEMSELVES CAPABLE OF. I WAS PLEASED WITH THE ENGS. MAINT WANTED TO KNOW IF I HAD EXCEEDED ANY ENG LIMIT. I SAID THAT WE HAD CERTAINLY EXCEEDED THE EPR LIMIT ON OUR GAUGES. MAINT WANTED TO KNOW WHAT OUR EPR WAS. I DID NOT KNOW. I ANSWERED, 'IT WAS WHATEVER THOSE ENGS COULD GIVE.' OUR WIND SHEAR ENCOUNTER LASTED MAYBE 20-30 SECONDS. TIME HAS A WAY OF DISTORTING WHEN ONE IS IN AN EMER SIT. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE PUSHED THOSE ENGS MUCH LONGER THAN THAT. NEITHER FO NOR I NOTICED ANY VISIBLE SIGNS THAT A WIND SHEAR WAS POSSIBLE. THERE WASN'T ANY BLOWING DUST DEVILS OR PREVIOUS WIND SHEARS RPTED TO US BY TWR OR ATIS. BUT THE WIND SHEAR WAS THERE, LURKING INVISIBLE AT 800 FT AGL. I AM PLEASED WITH THE TRAINING WE HAVE RECEIVED ON WIND SHEAR. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS A TEXT BOOK ENCOUNTER AND THAT WE DID EXACTLY WHAT WE WERE TRAINED TO DO. WE MANAGED OUR ENERGY AND SURVIVED THE ENCOUNTER. YOU KNOW, THE PEOPLE IN BACK NEVER EVEN KNEW THAT WE HAD BRUSHED AGAINST A POTENTIAL NIGHTMARE. THAT'S GOOD. WE DID THE JOB WE ARE PAID TO DO. THE A-LINE FLT ATTENDANT DID TELL ME SHE HAD HEARD THE WIND SHEAR ORAL FROM HER JUMPSEAT. SHE THANKED ME FOR GETTING US OUT OF THE WIND SHEAR. IT WAS NOT ME THAT SAVED US. IT WAS OUR TEAM WORKING TOGETHER. I WANT TO THANK ALL OF THE MEN AND WOMEN AT ACR AND ACFT AND THEIR VENDORS THAT CAME UP WITH THE WIND SHEAR GUIDANCE EQUIP AND THE PROCS TO USE IT. I WANT TO THANK OUR GND INSTRUCTORS FOR TEACHING US AND SIMULATOR INSTRUCTORS FOR TESTING US AND REFINING OUR TECHNIQUE. IT WORKS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 296823: THE ENGS OPERATED NORMALLY BUT WERE WRITTEN UP FOR AN INSPECTION DUE TO THE OVERBOOST. SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION DETECTED DAMAGE AND BOTH ENGS WERE REPLACED. ALL SYS AND THE PLTS OPERATED AS INTENDED DURING THIS EVENT. I HAVE NO IDEA WHETHER THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT OVER- TEMPING THE ENGS AND DID NOT CONSIDER RETURNING TO SAT SINCE WE DID NOT SUSPECT ANY ENG DAMAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.