Flight crew fails to level at assigned altitude to climb.

Attributes
ACN	299761
Time
Date	199503
Day	Sat
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : sln
State Reference	KS
Altitude	msl bound lower : 5000 msl bound upper : 5500
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 135
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude climbout : initial
Route In Use	enroute airway : zkc
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 14800 flight time type : 2000
ASRS Report	299761
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 1900 flight time type : 600
ASRS Report	299304
Events
Anomaly	altitude deviation : overshoot non adherence : clearance
Independent Detector	other controllera other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

My takeoff briefing to the first officer covers many items, but up until recently, not the assigned altitude on departure. Why not? The airplane is equipped with an altitude alerter on the instrument panel, which can easily be read by both pilots. And since it is set to the assigned altitude, I never felt the need to mention it during the briefing. During taxi, the first officer reads the clearance aloud at the appropriate time during the 'taxi' checklist. I heard the altitude assignment: maintain 5000 ft, expect 13000 ft, however it did not register. My attention was on taxiing the airplane. Also, I am partly distracted by the chatter on the radio. The first officer mistakenly puts 13000 ft in the altitude alerter instead of 5000 ft. The non-radar tower hands us off to ZKC. By the time we establish communications with center, we're at 5500 ft and climbing. Center asks us to verify assigned altitude. We report 13000 ft. Center acknowledges in a matter-of-fact manner, and we are assigned a new heading in order to allow another airplane to descend to the airport we departed. About that time, the first officer happens to notice the takeoff data card, which has our clearance written on it. The first officer also calls my attention to the error. I elect to continue climb to 13000 ft, since the controller has already acknowledged it, and has not challenged our error in altitude assignment. The manner in which the events occurred lead me to believe that there was no traffic conflict or loss of separation. The error was a result of inattn on the part of both crewmembers. The first officer should have been more attentive in setting the altitude alerter, especially since the clearance was posted right next to it. As captain, I should not have allowed myself to have been distracted when the clearance was read aloud by the first officer. If I had included the assigned altitude in the takeoff briefing, as I will henceforth, I believe the error would have been caught before takeoff.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC FAILS TO LEVEL AT ASSIGNED ALT TO CLB.

Narrative: MY TKOF BRIEFING TO THE FO COVERS MANY ITEMS, BUT UP UNTIL RECENTLY, NOT THE ASSIGNED ALT ON DEP. WHY NOT? THE AIRPLANE IS EQUIPPED WITH AN ALT ALERTER ON THE INST PANEL, WHICH CAN EASILY BE READ BY BOTH PLTS. AND SINCE IT IS SET TO THE ASSIGNED ALT, I NEVER FELT THE NEED TO MENTION IT DURING THE BRIEFING. DURING TAXI, THE FO READS THE CLRNC ALOUD AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME DURING THE 'TAXI' CHKLIST. I HEARD THE ALT ASSIGNMENT: MAINTAIN 5000 FT, EXPECT 13000 FT, HOWEVER IT DID NOT REGISTER. MY ATTN WAS ON TAXIING THE AIRPLANE. ALSO, I AM PARTLY DISTRACTED BY THE CHATTER ON THE RADIO. THE FO MISTAKENLY PUTS 13000 FT IN THE ALT ALERTER INSTEAD OF 5000 FT. THE NON-RADAR TWR HANDS US OFF TO ZKC. BY THE TIME WE ESTABLISH COMS WITH CTR, WE'RE AT 5500 FT AND CLBING. CTR ASKS US TO VERIFY ASSIGNED ALT. WE RPT 13000 FT. CTR ACKNOWLEDGES IN A MATTER-OF-FACT MANNER, AND WE ARE ASSIGNED A NEW HDG IN ORDER TO ALLOW ANOTHER AIRPLANE TO DSND TO THE ARPT WE DEPARTED. ABOUT THAT TIME, THE FO HAPPENS TO NOTICE THE TKOF DATA CARD, WHICH HAS OUR CLRNC WRITTEN ON IT. THE FO ALSO CALLS MY ATTN TO THE ERROR. I ELECT TO CONTINUE CLB TO 13000 FT, SINCE THE CTLR HAS ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGED IT, AND HAS NOT CHALLENGED OUR ERROR IN ALT ASSIGNMENT. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE EVENTS OCCURRED LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT OR LOSS OF SEPARATION. THE ERROR WAS A RESULT OF INATTN ON THE PART OF BOTH CREWMEMBERS. THE FO SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ATTENTIVE IN SETTING THE ALT ALERTER, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE CLRNC WAS POSTED RIGHT NEXT TO IT. AS CAPT, I SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED MYSELF TO HAVE BEEN DISTRACTED WHEN THE CLRNC WAS READ ALOUD BY THE FO. IF I HAD INCLUDED THE ASSIGNED ALT IN THE TKOF BRIEFING, AS I WILL HENCEFORTH, I BELIEVE THE ERROR WOULD HAVE BEEN CAUGHT BEFORE TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.