Narrative:

Normal pushback. Received clearance from pushback crew to start engines. We received all normal indications except no egt. The captain discontinued the start on the left engine and proceeded to start the right engine intending to address the problem after we got the right engine on line. During the start of the right engine, we received xmissions from other aircraft that the left engine was showing some flame out the back. We assumed that we had a tailpipe fire and were intending to 'motor' the left engine immediately after finishing the right engine start (about 5-10 more seconds). Upon completion of right engine start, we received more 'unofficial' xmissions that we 'really' had some flame, out of the back of the left engine. The left egt peaked rapidly at about 695 degrees, but we, at no time, had any 'engine fire' indications. Ground control could confirm smoke out the back of the aircraft but could not confirm any flame on the left engine. The captain called for the airport safety equipment. (May I suggest that airport safety equipment radio frequency be issued to the involved aircraft. We had to relay messages from airport safety (121.90) to ground control (121.80) to us (121.80) for several xmissions until ground control advised us that we could contact the firemen directly on 121.90). Airport safety advised us we still had a small flame in the back of the left engine. The captain immediately issued an emergency evacuation command over the PA to evacuate aircraft right. He then commanded the emergency evacuation checklist, which we accomplished. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies the dc-9-31 for a major united states air carrier. The tragedy of this incident is that there was no fire, just a prolonged tailpipe fire. The crash fire rescue equipment crew had no one at the front of the aircraft to communicate with the flight crew. The crash fire rescue equipment people were on a different VHF frequency than the ATCT and aircraft. The crash fire rescue equipment people were in the process of plugging in the interphone system to tell the flight crew that there was only a tailpipe fire when the order was given to evacuate. 1 passenger sprained an ankle and others complained of 'rug burns' from the slide. A flight attendant broke her tail bone when she fell backwards while trying to get off the slide. She is required, by air carrier procedure, to carry a megaphone, medical kit, and fire extinguisher. No one was at the bottom of the slide to help her off with her load. All of the passenger had to be herded away from the aircraft , no one wanted to move away.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EVACUATED ON RAMP WITH PAX AND CABIN ATTENDANT INJURIES.

Narrative: NORMAL PUSHBACK. RECEIVED CLRNC FROM PUSHBACK CREW TO START ENGS. WE RECEIVED ALL NORMAL INDICATIONS EXCEPT NO EGT. THE CAPT DISCONTINUED THE START ON THE L ENG AND PROCEEDED TO START THE R ENG INTENDING TO ADDRESS THE PROB AFTER WE GOT THE R ENG ON LINE. DURING THE START OF THE R ENG, WE RECEIVED XMISSIONS FROM OTHER ACFT THAT THE L ENG WAS SHOWING SOME FLAME OUT THE BACK. WE ASSUMED THAT WE HAD A TAILPIPE FIRE AND WERE INTENDING TO 'MOTOR' THE L ENG IMMEDIATELY AFTER FINISHING THE R ENG START (ABOUT 5-10 MORE SECONDS). UPON COMPLETION OF R ENG START, WE RECEIVED MORE 'UNOFFICIAL' XMISSIONS THAT WE 'REALLY' HAD SOME FLAME, OUT OF THE BACK OF THE L ENG. THE L EGT PEAKED RAPIDLY AT ABOUT 695 DEGS, BUT WE, AT NO TIME, HAD ANY 'ENG FIRE' INDICATIONS. GND CTL COULD CONFIRM SMOKE OUT THE BACK OF THE ACFT BUT COULD NOT CONFIRM ANY FLAME ON THE L ENG. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE ARPT SAFETY EQUIP. (MAY I SUGGEST THAT ARPT SAFETY EQUIP RADIO FREQ BE ISSUED TO THE INVOLVED ACFT. WE HAD TO RELAY MESSAGES FROM ARPT SAFETY (121.90) TO GND CTL (121.80) TO US (121.80) FOR SEVERAL XMISSIONS UNTIL GND CTL ADVISED US THAT WE COULD CONTACT THE FIREMEN DIRECTLY ON 121.90). ARPT SAFETY ADVISED US WE STILL HAD A SMALL FLAME IN THE BACK OF THE L ENG. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY ISSUED AN EMER EVACUATION COMMAND OVER THE PA TO EVACUATE ACFT RIGHT. HE THEN COMMANDED THE EMER EVACUATION CHKLIST, WHICH WE ACCOMPLISHED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE DC-9-31 FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATES ACR. THE TRAGEDY OF THIS INCIDENT IS THAT THERE WAS NO FIRE, JUST A PROLONGED TAILPIPE FIRE. THE CFR CREW HAD NO ONE AT THE FRONT OF THE ACFT TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE FLC. THE CFR PEOPLE WERE ON A DIFFERENT VHF FREQ THAN THE ATCT AND ACFT. THE CFR PEOPLE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF PLUGGING IN THE INTERPHONE SYS TO TELL THE FLC THAT THERE WAS ONLY A TAILPIPE FIRE WHEN THE ORDER WAS GIVEN TO EVACUATE. 1 PAX SPRAINED AN ANKLE AND OTHERS COMPLAINED OF 'RUG BURNS' FROM THE SLIDE. A FLT ATTENDANT BROKE HER TAIL BONE WHEN SHE FELL BACKWARDS WHILE TRYING TO GET OFF THE SLIDE. SHE IS REQUIRED, BY ACR PROC, TO CARRY A MEGAPHONE, MEDICAL KIT, AND FIRE EXTINGUISHER. NO ONE WAS AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SLIDE TO HELP HER OFF WITH HER LOAD. ALL OF THE PAX HAD TO BE HERDED AWAY FROM THE ACFT , NO ONE WANTED TO MOVE AWAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.