Narrative:

My non-instrument rated nephew was giving me a lift in his aircraft to a field about 400 NM from our departure point. He has over 800 hours, most in type, and I left the flying to him, as I did some reading and dozing. He was PIC, I was the passenger. I had not checked the WX or participated in the flight planning in any way, nor was I familiar with the aircraft. He said he had checked the WX at around XX00 am (about 3 hours prior) and made the go decision. We departed in good VFR conditions, and after an hour or so, were cruising at 4500 ft well above a scattered broken layer. I asked my nephew briefly about the forecast conditions at our destination, and he told me that the cloud cover below us was due to lake effect and that conditions were expected to be improving towards our destination, which was on the windward side of lake ontario. I became much more 'interested' in our situation as the tops of the undercast raised, the scattered broken layer became overcast with no breaks, and he started talking about getting low on fuel. (I was not familiar with endurance figures for the aircraft). Our gndspd was poor , and I had doubts about our ability to reach his earlier- stated fuel stop with sufficient reserves, since it was possible that we might have to go IFR shortly, presumably with me as PIC. Rather than trying to stretch it, I suggested stopping at a field relatively close by along on our present route, and he agreed. I asked ATC if we could get IFR with them, and they complied shortly thereafter. I took out my approach plates and IFR charts and took over, anticipating (with little basis) a routine instrument approach to MVFR conditions beneath the undercast. When the controller reported 500 ft overcast (at a field about 40 mi east, no WX reporting at the field we were going into) I began to have doubts. We shot a VOR approach to a 657 ft MDA, picked up some ice on the way down, didn't break out, then shot the localizer to a 402 ft MDA, picked up a bit more ice, and still didn't break out. By then, our fuel situation was very uncomfortable, and we diverted to a field about 45 mi away with an ILS to 200 ft, shot the approach and landed without incident. We had accumulated about 1/2-3/4 inches of rime and the crash fire rescue equipment trucks were out to greet us, since I had declared minimum fuel on the way in. Based on the fuel required to top off, my nephew reported that we had less than 6 gals usable when we landed. There seem to be 2 major contributing factors to the development of this situation. 1ST, on my nephew's part, I'm sorry to say, poor preflight planning, inadequate understanding of WX information, failure to update WX information en route. Despite my nephew's claims that the WX was unforecast, I was later able to determine from old forecasts and WX information that the WX we encountered was not significantly worse than forecast, was not due to lake effect (it was due to a large quasi- stationary front across our path) that icing conditions were both forecast and reported, and that it was very unlikely from the WX information that was available - even before we departed - that a VFR flight could have been conducted all the way to our destination that day, regardless of fuel. While we were on the ground, I made a point of asking my nephew (who has been working towards his instrument rating for quite a few yrs) some pointed questions about airmets and other elements of the WX briefing process as we looked at the printouts from duats. To my chagrin, his knowledge was lacking in some fundamental areas. On my part, I clearly should not have been complacent about the flight once the undercast started to develop, and should have suggested that we begin considering our options earlier on, instead of waiting for him to decide. There was also probably an element of the classic 'who is PIC?' confusion as a contributing factor, since my nephew assumed that if we couldn't maintain VFR, that I would just take over and everything would be ok. Even though I was not at all prepared to become PIC on that flight, once it became likely that I would have to, I should have familiarized myself more completely with the WX and alternate situation. Inretrospect, it would have been much better to have diverted to the ILS field after our first VOR approach, instead of going back for the localizer. Having a clear understanding of how the flight was going to be conducted and who was PIC would have probably avoided the situation. If we were clear that he was PIC, then (one can hope) he would have turned back fairly early on in the flight instead of continuing above the undercast, burning fuel and reducing our options, and with the unwarranted assumption that I would take over if we couldn't maintain VFR. Although I was angry about being flown into a bad situation and then relied upon to extricate us from it, it is likely that it could have been avoided beforehand by clarifying who was PIC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INST RATED PLT RIDING AS A PAX WITH A NON INST RATED PVT PLT FINDS HIMSELF TAKING OVER DUE TO BEING CAUGHT ON TOP WITHOUT FUEL TO GO TO DEST.

Narrative: MY NON-INST RATED NEPHEW WAS GIVING ME A LIFT IN HIS ACFT TO A FIELD ABOUT 400 NM FROM OUR DEP POINT. HE HAS OVER 800 HRS, MOST IN TYPE, AND I LEFT THE FLYING TO HIM, AS I DID SOME READING AND DOZING. HE WAS PIC, I WAS THE PAX. I HAD NOT CHKED THE WX OR PARTICIPATED IN THE FLT PLANNING IN ANY WAY, NOR WAS I FAMILIAR WITH THE ACFT. HE SAID HE HAD CHKED THE WX AT AROUND XX00 AM (ABOUT 3 HRS PRIOR) AND MADE THE GO DECISION. WE DEPARTED IN GOOD VFR CONDITIONS, AND AFTER AN HR OR SO, WERE CRUISING AT 4500 FT WELL ABOVE A SCATTERED BROKEN LAYER. I ASKED MY NEPHEW BRIEFLY ABOUT THE FORECAST CONDITIONS AT OUR DEST, AND HE TOLD ME THAT THE CLOUD COVER BELOW US WAS DUE TO LAKE EFFECT AND THAT CONDITIONS WERE EXPECTED TO BE IMPROVING TOWARDS OUR DEST, WHICH WAS ON THE WINDWARD SIDE OF LAKE ONTARIO. I BECAME MUCH MORE 'INTERESTED' IN OUR SIT AS THE TOPS OF THE UNDERCAST RAISED, THE SCATTERED BROKEN LAYER BECAME OVCST WITH NO BREAKS, AND HE STARTED TALKING ABOUT GETTING LOW ON FUEL. (I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ENDURANCE FIGURES FOR THE ACFT). OUR GNDSPD WAS POOR , AND I HAD DOUBTS ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO REACH HIS EARLIER- STATED FUEL STOP WITH SUFFICIENT RESERVES, SINCE IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO GO IFR SHORTLY, PRESUMABLY WITH ME AS PIC. RATHER THAN TRYING TO STRETCH IT, I SUGGESTED STOPPING AT A FIELD RELATIVELY CLOSE BY ALONG ON OUR PRESENT RTE, AND HE AGREED. I ASKED ATC IF WE COULD GET IFR WITH THEM, AND THEY COMPLIED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. I TOOK OUT MY APCH PLATES AND IFR CHARTS AND TOOK OVER, ANTICIPATING (WITH LITTLE BASIS) A ROUTINE INST APCH TO MVFR CONDITIONS BENEATH THE UNDERCAST. WHEN THE CTLR RPTED 500 FT OVCST (AT A FIELD ABOUT 40 MI E, NO WX RPTING AT THE FIELD WE WERE GOING INTO) I BEGAN TO HAVE DOUBTS. WE SHOT A VOR APCH TO A 657 FT MDA, PICKED UP SOME ICE ON THE WAY DOWN, DIDN'T BREAK OUT, THEN SHOT THE LOC TO A 402 FT MDA, PICKED UP A BIT MORE ICE, AND STILL DIDN'T BREAK OUT. BY THEN, OUR FUEL SIT WAS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE, AND WE DIVERTED TO A FIELD ABOUT 45 MI AWAY WITH AN ILS TO 200 FT, SHOT THE APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE HAD ACCUMULATED ABOUT 1/2-3/4 INCHES OF RIME AND THE CFR TRUCKS WERE OUT TO GREET US, SINCE I HAD DECLARED MINIMUM FUEL ON THE WAY IN. BASED ON THE FUEL REQUIRED TO TOP OFF, MY NEPHEW RPTED THAT WE HAD LESS THAN 6 GALS USABLE WHEN WE LANDED. THERE SEEM TO BE 2 MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS SIT. 1ST, ON MY NEPHEW'S PART, I'M SORRY TO SAY, POOR PREFLT PLANNING, INADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF WX INFO, FAILURE TO UPDATE WX INFO ENRTE. DESPITE MY NEPHEW'S CLAIMS THAT THE WX WAS UNFORECAST, I WAS LATER ABLE TO DETERMINE FROM OLD FORECASTS AND WX INFO THAT THE WX WE ENCOUNTERED WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE THAN FORECAST, WAS NOT DUE TO LAKE EFFECT (IT WAS DUE TO A LARGE QUASI- STATIONARY FRONT ACROSS OUR PATH) THAT ICING CONDITIONS WERE BOTH FORECAST AND RPTED, AND THAT IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY FROM THE WX INFO THAT WAS AVAILABLE - EVEN BEFORE WE DEPARTED - THAT A VFR FLT COULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ALL THE WAY TO OUR DEST THAT DAY, REGARDLESS OF FUEL. WHILE WE WERE ON THE GND, I MADE A POINT OF ASKING MY NEPHEW (WHO HAS BEEN WORKING TOWARDS HIS INST RATING FOR QUITE A FEW YRS) SOME POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT AIRMETS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE WX BRIEFING PROCESS AS WE LOOKED AT THE PRINTOUTS FROM DUATS. TO MY CHAGRIN, HIS KNOWLEDGE WAS LACKING IN SOME FUNDAMENTAL AREAS. ON MY PART, I CLRLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPLACENT ABOUT THE FLT ONCE THE UNDERCAST STARTED TO DEVELOP, AND SHOULD HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WE BEGIN CONSIDERING OUR OPTIONS EARLIER ON, INSTEAD OF WAITING FOR HIM TO DECIDE. THERE WAS ALSO PROBABLY AN ELEMENT OF THE CLASSIC 'WHO IS PIC?' CONFUSION AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, SINCE MY NEPHEW ASSUMED THAT IF WE COULDN'T MAINTAIN VFR, THAT I WOULD JUST TAKE OVER AND EVERYTHING WOULD BE OK. EVEN THOUGH I WAS NOT AT ALL PREPARED TO BECOME PIC ON THAT FLT, ONCE IT BECAME LIKELY THAT I WOULD HAVE TO, I SHOULD HAVE FAMILIARIZED MYSELF MORE COMPLETELY WITH THE WX AND ALTERNATE SIT. INRETROSPECT, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER TO HAVE DIVERTED TO THE ILS FIELD AFTER OUR FIRST VOR APCH, INSTEAD OF GOING BACK FOR THE LOC. HAVING A CLR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE FLT WAS GOING TO BE CONDUCTED AND WHO WAS PIC WOULD HAVE PROBABLY AVOIDED THE SIT. IF WE WERE CLR THAT HE WAS PIC, THEN (ONE CAN HOPE) HE WOULD HAVE TURNED BACK FAIRLY EARLY ON IN THE FLT INSTEAD OF CONTINUING ABOVE THE UNDERCAST, BURNING FUEL AND REDUCING OUR OPTIONS, AND WITH THE UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION THAT I WOULD TAKE OVER IF WE COULDN'T MAINTAIN VFR. ALTHOUGH I WAS ANGRY ABOUT BEING FLOWN INTO A BAD SIT AND THEN RELIED UPON TO EXTRICATE US FROM IT, IT IS LIKELY THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BEFOREHAND BY CLARIFYING WHO WAS PIC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.