Narrative:

My captain and myself were on a passenger trip inbound to oklahoma city airport (okc) in a learjet model 24 series. There was frontal system moving through the area with reported scattered level 3-5 cells imbedded in the frontal line. I noticed, approximately 100 mi out my captain began getting very nervous about the WX. My personal feelings were that the WX was something to be concerned with, however, nothing to be alarmed about. The captain began to make WX inquiries regarding the WX with flight service over the radio. I thought he should have delegated this duty to me since he was flying. His flying technique was deteriorating with wandering altitudes and headings because he was trying to write and fly at the same time. When ARTCC would call he was quick to jump in and answer, when this was clearly my duty. He began to omit me from the loop and operate this jet aircraft single pilot, which is against policy and logic. At this point I became concerned, with what appeared to be his over concern with the WX and how it was affecting his performance. Within 40 mi from the airport the ride began to get choppy with an occasional moderate bump, to me this was to be expected on descent into this area of WX, however the captain began to show signs of panic. He then reached over and lowered the landing gear. (This is not standard procedure in a learjet at 20 mi out). Center requested us to descend to 6000 ft and fly a wbound heading. Keep in mind, at this point the captain appeared to be a nervous wreck and was flying single pilot. He electively increased his work load by doing everything himself and his flying technique was going down the drain fast. Our altitudes and heading began to deviate beyond an acceptable level. I watched our altitude fluctuate 300-400 ft on numerous occasions. Finally, drifting down to 800 ft low, I called out 'altitude' he responded by jerking back on the controls, as if surprised of his altitude. He was saying something to okc approach. Approach replied with, 'ok maintain 5000 ft .' you could hear in the controller's voice he knew this pilot was panicking. I believe the captain must have requested a lower altitude due to rough turbulence, however, I would have categorized it as only light. Within seconds the captain had again deviated from the assigned 5000 ft to approximately 4400 ft. It appeared he was trying to stay out of the cloud layer above by descending. I called out again, 'altitude,' he began to respond when I heard center say, 'we cannot authority/authorized a visual approach due to IMC conditions at the airport, so we'll have to have you on the ILS.' the captain must have requested a visual approach. Then I heard the captain request a contact approach and was cleared for that approach, which per my company's operation specifications we are not trained for, nor authority/authorized to do. In my opinion there was no urgency to land. We had plenty of fuel and 5 mi to the west the WX was fine. Now we are at approximately pattern altitude, with good visual ground contact and turning downwind to base. The captain then reaches over and selects flaps 20 degrees, again this is my job! (20 degrees is also the takeoff setting on a model 24 learjet). He neglected to call for the 'before landing' checklist, so I elected to prompt him by challenging him for the responses. He was so overwhelmed by his work load, he wouldn't respond. Then he called for me to select landing flaps (40 degrees) we then turned final approach. There was a crosswind component of approximately 20-25 KTS, we were landing runway 36 and the winds were 050 degrees at 30 KTS gusting to 45 KTS at 1 1/2 mi out, on short final he requested for me to select flaps 20 degrees, I thought to myself this was an unusual request at this point, unless he was planning on going around. I turned to him and confirmed his request, he turned back to me and snapped, 'flaps 20, now!' I gave him what he asked for and to my surprise he was continuing the approach. I have not been briefed on his intentions and he is obviously too busy to talk. He has chosen to take on the entire work load himself and obviously in a panic. On short final and over the threshold our speed was 160 KTS, our bugged vref is 120 KTS. I was not concerned of his ability to land the aircraft fast, even though the runway was wet, it was also very long and wide (9800 ft X 150 ft). I was mostly concerned about his decision making process and why this WX had affected his rational thinking process. We landed on the runway and he pounded on the brakes the aircraft began to hydroplane and swerve to the left, mostly due to the strong right crosswind, I suspect. He commanded me to select flaps up right after touchdown. (Out of the takeoff range) at this point,he had just committed us to stopping this aircraft within the pavement boundaries, rather than having the option of going around. I reached the point of seriously considering mutiny and taking the aircraft, selecting flaps 20 degrees and full power and getting out of there when he began to get it slowed down. I continued to monitor the situation until we exited the runway and taxied to the ramp. It was obvious he scared the hell out of our passenger and after their exit, he asked me, 'did I scare you?' I said, 'I think you were way over-reacting to the WX and panicked. You became irrational and I disagree with your use of flaps 20 degrees and high speed for landing.' he responded with, 'that's what you do in an strong crosswind, just like in a cessna 152.' I told him, 'we were not in a 152 and that flaps 20 degrees was not a crosswind procedure in a learjet and our speed was too fast for that wet runway.' also, I told him, 'he should not have asked for flaps up after touchdown because we needed the flaps for drag and in case we would have needed to abort the landing. I also questioned him on his acceptance of a contact approach and he said, 'that's ok, nobody knows we can't do that because of the way its worded in our operation specifications.' I suggested that it appeared, he thought he was getting in over his head he should have just aborted the attempt and held out west for 15 mins and waited for the WX to blow over. 10 mins after we landed the winds made a 180 degree shift in direction because of the frontal passage and the WX calmed down. Conclusion: this all happened because this captain panics in WX and bases his decision making on past experiences as a flight instructor in cessna 152. His cockpit resource management procedures stink and he would have been a lot less stressed out if he would have shared the work-load. I am myself an experienced pilot with over 7000 hours and an ex B727 first officer, so there was no need to omit me from the loop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CHARTER FLT CAPT PANICS REGARDING WX AND FLT SKILLS GO TO POT AS HE CREATES A SINGLE PLT OP.

Narrative: MY CAPT AND MYSELF WERE ON A PAX TRIP INBOUND TO OKLAHOMA CITY ARPT (OKC) IN A LEARJET MODEL 24 SERIES. THERE WAS FRONTAL SYS MOVING THROUGH THE AREA WITH RPTED SCATTERED LEVEL 3-5 CELLS IMBEDDED IN THE FRONTAL LINE. I NOTICED, APPROX 100 MI OUT MY CAPT BEGAN GETTING VERY NERVOUS ABOUT THE WX. MY PERSONAL FEELINGS WERE THAT THE WX WAS SOMETHING TO BE CONCERNED WITH, HOWEVER, NOTHING TO BE ALARMED ABOUT. THE CAPT BEGAN TO MAKE WX INQUIRIES REGARDING THE WX WITH FLT SVC OVER THE RADIO. I THOUGHT HE SHOULD HAVE DELEGATED THIS DUTY TO ME SINCE HE WAS FLYING. HIS FLYING TECHNIQUE WAS DETERIORATING WITH WANDERING ALTS AND HDGS BECAUSE HE WAS TRYING TO WRITE AND FLY AT THE SAME TIME. WHEN ARTCC WOULD CALL HE WAS QUICK TO JUMP IN AND ANSWER, WHEN THIS WAS CLRLY MY DUTY. HE BEGAN TO OMIT ME FROM THE LOOP AND OPERATE THIS JET ACFT SINGLE PLT, WHICH IS AGAINST POLICY AND LOGIC. AT THIS POINT I BECAME CONCERNED, WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE HIS OVER CONCERN WITH THE WX AND HOW IT WAS AFFECTING HIS PERFORMANCE. WITHIN 40 MI FROM THE ARPT THE RIDE BEGAN TO GET CHOPPY WITH AN OCCASIONAL MODERATE BUMP, TO ME THIS WAS TO BE EXPECTED ON DSCNT INTO THIS AREA OF WX, HOWEVER THE CAPT BEGAN TO SHOW SIGNS OF PANIC. HE THEN REACHED OVER AND LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR. (THIS IS NOT STANDARD PROC IN A LEARJET AT 20 MI OUT). CTR REQUESTED US TO DSND TO 6000 FT AND FLY A WBOUND HDG. KEEP IN MIND, AT THIS POINT THE CAPT APPEARED TO BE A NERVOUS WRECK AND WAS FLYING SINGLE PLT. HE ELECTIVELY INCREASED HIS WORK LOAD BY DOING EVERYTHING HIMSELF AND HIS FLYING TECHNIQUE WAS GOING DOWN THE DRAIN FAST. OUR ALTS AND HDG BEGAN TO DEVIATE BEYOND AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL. I WATCHED OUR ALT FLUCTUATE 300-400 FT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. FINALLY, DRIFTING DOWN TO 800 FT LOW, I CALLED OUT 'ALT' HE RESPONDED BY JERKING BACK ON THE CTLS, AS IF SURPRISED OF HIS ALT. HE WAS SAYING SOMETHING TO OKC APCH. APCH REPLIED WITH, 'OK MAINTAIN 5000 FT .' YOU COULD HEAR IN THE CTLR'S VOICE HE KNEW THIS PLT WAS PANICKING. I BELIEVE THE CAPT MUST HAVE REQUESTED A LOWER ALT DUE TO ROUGH TURB, HOWEVER, I WOULD HAVE CATEGORIZED IT AS ONLY LIGHT. WITHIN SECONDS THE CAPT HAD AGAIN DEVIATED FROM THE ASSIGNED 5000 FT TO APPROX 4400 FT. IT APPEARED HE WAS TRYING TO STAY OUT OF THE CLOUD LAYER ABOVE BY DSNDING. I CALLED OUT AGAIN, 'ALT,' HE BEGAN TO RESPOND WHEN I HEARD CTR SAY, 'WE CANNOT AUTH A VISUAL APCH DUE TO IMC CONDITIONS AT THE ARPT, SO WE'LL HAVE TO HAVE YOU ON THE ILS.' THE CAPT MUST HAVE REQUESTED A VISUAL APCH. THEN I HEARD THE CAPT REQUEST A CONTACT APCH AND WAS CLRED FOR THAT APCH, WHICH PER MY COMPANY'S OP SPECS WE ARE NOT TRAINED FOR, NOR AUTH TO DO. IN MY OPINION THERE WAS NO URGENCY TO LAND. WE HAD PLENTY OF FUEL AND 5 MI TO THE W THE WX WAS FINE. NOW WE ARE AT APPROX PATTERN ALT, WITH GOOD VISUAL GND CONTACT AND TURNING DOWNWIND TO BASE. THE CAPT THEN REACHES OVER AND SELECTS FLAPS 20 DEGS, AGAIN THIS IS MY JOB! (20 DEGS IS ALSO THE TKOF SETTING ON A MODEL 24 LEARJET). HE NEGLECTED TO CALL FOR THE 'BEFORE LNDG' CHKLIST, SO I ELECTED TO PROMPT HIM BY CHALLENGING HIM FOR THE RESPONSES. HE WAS SO OVERWHELMED BY HIS WORK LOAD, HE WOULDN'T RESPOND. THEN HE CALLED FOR ME TO SELECT LNDG FLAPS (40 DEGS) WE THEN TURNED FINAL APCH. THERE WAS A XWIND COMPONENT OF APPROX 20-25 KTS, WE WERE LNDG RWY 36 AND THE WINDS WERE 050 DEGS AT 30 KTS GUSTING TO 45 KTS AT 1 1/2 MI OUT, ON SHORT FINAL HE REQUESTED FOR ME TO SELECT FLAPS 20 DEGS, I THOUGHT TO MYSELF THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL REQUEST AT THIS POINT, UNLESS HE WAS PLANNING ON GOING AROUND. I TURNED TO HIM AND CONFIRMED HIS REQUEST, HE TURNED BACK TO ME AND SNAPPED, 'FLAPS 20, NOW!' I GAVE HIM WHAT HE ASKED FOR AND TO MY SURPRISE HE WAS CONTINUING THE APCH. I HAVE NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON HIS INTENTIONS AND HE IS OBVIOUSLY TOO BUSY TO TALK. HE HAS CHOSEN TO TAKE ON THE ENTIRE WORK LOAD HIMSELF AND OBVIOUSLY IN A PANIC. ON SHORT FINAL AND OVER THE THRESHOLD OUR SPD WAS 160 KTS, OUR BUGGED VREF IS 120 KTS. I WAS NOT CONCERNED OF HIS ABILITY TO LAND THE ACFT FAST, EVEN THOUGH THE RWY WAS WET, IT WAS ALSO VERY LONG AND WIDE (9800 FT X 150 FT). I WAS MOSTLY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND WHY THIS WX HAD AFFECTED HIS RATIONAL THINKING PROCESS. WE LANDED ON THE RWY AND HE POUNDED ON THE BRAKES THE ACFT BEGAN TO HYDROPLANE AND SWERVE TO THE L, MOSTLY DUE TO THE STRONG R XWIND, I SUSPECT. HE COMMANDED ME TO SELECT FLAPS UP RIGHT AFTER TOUCHDOWN. (OUT OF THE TKOF RANGE) AT THIS POINT,HE HAD JUST COMMITTED US TO STOPPING THIS ACFT WITHIN THE PAVEMENT BOUNDARIES, RATHER THAN HAVING THE OPTION OF GOING AROUND. I REACHED THE POINT OF SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING MUTINY AND TAKING THE ACFT, SELECTING FLAPS 20 DEGS AND FULL PWR AND GETTING OUT OF THERE WHEN HE BEGAN TO GET IT SLOWED DOWN. I CONTINUED TO MONITOR THE SIT UNTIL WE EXITED THE RWY AND TAXIED TO THE RAMP. IT WAS OBVIOUS HE SCARED THE HELL OUT OF OUR PAX AND AFTER THEIR EXIT, HE ASKED ME, 'DID I SCARE YOU?' I SAID, 'I THINK YOU WERE WAY OVER-REACTING TO THE WX AND PANICKED. YOU BECAME IRRATIONAL AND I DISAGREE WITH YOUR USE OF FLAPS 20 DEGS AND HIGH SPD FOR LNDG.' HE RESPONDED WITH, 'THAT'S WHAT YOU DO IN AN STRONG XWIND, JUST LIKE IN A CESSNA 152.' I TOLD HIM, 'WE WERE NOT IN A 152 AND THAT FLAPS 20 DEGS WAS NOT A XWIND PROC IN A LEARJET AND OUR SPD WAS TOO FAST FOR THAT WET RWY.' ALSO, I TOLD HIM, 'HE SHOULD NOT HAVE ASKED FOR FLAPS UP AFTER TOUCHDOWN BECAUSE WE NEEDED THE FLAPS FOR DRAG AND IN CASE WE WOULD HAVE NEEDED TO ABORT THE LNDG. I ALSO QUESTIONED HIM ON HIS ACCEPTANCE OF A CONTACT APCH AND HE SAID, 'THAT'S OK, NOBODY KNOWS WE CAN'T DO THAT BECAUSE OF THE WAY ITS WORDED IN OUR OP SPECS.' I SUGGESTED THAT IT APPEARED, HE THOUGHT HE WAS GETTING IN OVER HIS HEAD HE SHOULD HAVE JUST ABORTED THE ATTEMPT AND HELD OUT W FOR 15 MINS AND WAITED FOR THE WX TO BLOW OVER. 10 MINS AFTER WE LANDED THE WINDS MADE A 180 DEG SHIFT IN DIRECTION BECAUSE OF THE FRONTAL PASSAGE AND THE WX CALMED DOWN. CONCLUSION: THIS ALL HAPPENED BECAUSE THIS CAPT PANICS IN WX AND BASES HIS DECISION MAKING ON PAST EXPERIENCES AS A FLT INSTRUCTOR IN CESSNA 152. HIS COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT PROCS STINK AND HE WOULD HAVE BEEN A LOT LESS STRESSED OUT IF HE WOULD HAVE SHARED THE WORK-LOAD. I AM MYSELF AN EXPERIENCED PLT WITH OVER 7000 HRS AND AN EX B727 FO, SO THERE WAS NO NEED TO OMIT ME FROM THE LOOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.