Narrative:

As we approached our final destination, the mood in the cockpit was quiet. It was XA00 am and the night, which had started at XB00 pm had been filled with thunderstorms and approachs. We were under center's control as we approached the uncontrolled airport. After discussing the WX, an ILS approach was decided upon and center notified of our intention to use this procedure. The captain briefed the approach, including the appropriate MSA's and MEA's for the tranition. We, however, failed to discuss that the approach would be conducted in a non-radar environment. Center descended us to 3200 ft MSL, cleared us for an approach, and switched us to the advisory frequency. The ILS had 2 transitions, 1 from the VOR to the north, and the other an 18 DME arc from the south. Our approach briefing had not specified which procedure the captain intended to execute, just that he planned the ILS. The perfect briefing for radar vectors to the FAF. We were approaching the VOR from the northeast and as we passed 20 DME he began a left turn to intercept the 18 DME arc. I verified that this was his intention and reminded him that the MEA for the arc was 3500 ft instead of the 3200 ft that center had cleared us to. The approach was proceeding normally when another aircraft advised us to recontact center. We did and were queried if we were familiar with the towers to our east. We answered yes and asked if there was a problem. Center responded that he didn't realize that we were planning to execute the arc. The approach terminated normally. After aircraft shutdown and secure, we discussed the controller's inquiry from the standpoint that he had cleared us for any approach. As we looked at the approach plate our error became apparent. There is a published transition from the VOR to the FAF. From our position northeast of the VOR, this was the only option available to us. The IAF for the arc was to our south and we had intercepted it prior to that point. The only way to establish on the arc from our position would have been with radar vectors. We had adhered to all MEA's, but had flown a transition that didn't exist. Contributing factors were: a long night, bad WX, and most importantly, a mind set of operating in a radar environment. The approach briefing should have included how we planned to transition to an IAF and then to the FAF. Basic instrument approach skills that rarely get used in part 121 flying and radar environments. Situational awareness is something I pride myself on, but as this instance illustrates, it's loss would have led to serious consequences. Tunnel vision can strike anytime, and the fact that we're trying to be so careful lulls us into such a sense of security that we miss the obvious.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FREIGHTER IN A NIGHT OP GETS IN PROX OF OBSTRUCTION TWRS DURING TRANSITION TO ILS APCH.

Narrative: AS WE APCHED OUR FINAL DEST, THE MOOD IN THE COCKPIT WAS QUIET. IT WAS XA00 AM AND THE NIGHT, WHICH HAD STARTED AT XB00 PM HAD BEEN FILLED WITH TSTMS AND APCHS. WE WERE UNDER CTR'S CTL AS WE APCHED THE UNCTLED ARPT. AFTER DISCUSSING THE WX, AN ILS APCH WAS DECIDED UPON AND CTR NOTIFIED OF OUR INTENTION TO USE THIS PROC. THE CAPT BRIEFED THE APCH, INCLUDING THE APPROPRIATE MSA'S AND MEA'S FOR THE TRANITION. WE, HOWEVER, FAILED TO DISCUSS THAT THE APCH WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN A NON-RADAR ENVIRONMENT. CTR DSNDED US TO 3200 FT MSL, CLRED US FOR AN APCH, AND SWITCHED US TO THE ADVISORY FREQ. THE ILS HAD 2 TRANSITIONS, 1 FROM THE VOR TO THE N, AND THE OTHER AN 18 DME ARC FROM THE S. OUR APCH BRIEFING HAD NOT SPECIFIED WHICH PROC THE CAPT INTENDED TO EXECUTE, JUST THAT HE PLANNED THE ILS. THE PERFECT BRIEFING FOR RADAR VECTORS TO THE FAF. WE WERE APCHING THE VOR FROM THE NE AND AS WE PASSED 20 DME HE BEGAN A L TURN TO INTERCEPT THE 18 DME ARC. I VERIFIED THAT THIS WAS HIS INTENTION AND REMINDED HIM THAT THE MEA FOR THE ARC WAS 3500 FT INSTEAD OF THE 3200 FT THAT CTR HAD CLRED US TO. THE APCH WAS PROCEEDING NORMALLY WHEN ANOTHER ACFT ADVISED US TO RECONTACT CTR. WE DID AND WERE QUERIED IF WE WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE TWRS TO OUR E. WE ANSWERED YES AND ASKED IF THERE WAS A PROB. CTR RESPONDED THAT HE DIDN'T REALIZE THAT WE WERE PLANNING TO EXECUTE THE ARC. THE APCH TERMINATED NORMALLY. AFTER ACFT SHUTDOWN AND SECURE, WE DISCUSSED THE CTLR'S INQUIRY FROM THE STANDPOINT THAT HE HAD CLRED US FOR ANY APCH. AS WE LOOKED AT THE APCH PLATE OUR ERROR BECAME APPARENT. THERE IS A PUBLISHED TRANSITION FROM THE VOR TO THE FAF. FROM OUR POS NE OF THE VOR, THIS WAS THE ONLY OPTION AVAILABLE TO US. THE IAF FOR THE ARC WAS TO OUR S AND WE HAD INTERCEPTED IT PRIOR TO THAT POINT. THE ONLY WAY TO ESTABLISH ON THE ARC FROM OUR POS WOULD HAVE BEEN WITH RADAR VECTORS. WE HAD ADHERED TO ALL MEA'S, BUT HAD FLOWN A TRANSITION THAT DIDN'T EXIST. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: A LONG NIGHT, BAD WX, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, A MIND SET OF OPERATING IN A RADAR ENVIRONMENT. THE APCH BRIEFING SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED HOW WE PLANNED TO TRANSITION TO AN IAF AND THEN TO THE FAF. BASIC INST APCH SKILLS THAT RARELY GET USED IN PART 121 FLYING AND RADAR ENVIRONMENTS. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS SOMETHING I PRIDE MYSELF ON, BUT AS THIS INSTANCE ILLUSTRATES, IT'S LOSS WOULD HAVE LED TO SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. TUNNEL VISION CAN STRIKE ANYTIME, AND THE FACT THAT WE'RE TRYING TO BE SO CAREFUL LULLS US INTO SUCH A SENSE OF SECURITY THAT WE MISS THE OBVIOUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.