Narrative:

Ord approach was using runway 4R for arrs. Surface winds were calm but winds at the OM were 25 KTS on the tail. We were cleared for the approach above the GS and given 180 KTS speed until the OM. It was impossible to slow down and go down to make a stabilized approach. During the missed approach, we were told to fly a 360 degree heading which would have put us directly into a large thunderstorm. We refused the turn. The second approach attempt concluded with a 100 degree turn to intercept the localizer and we were above the GS. We missed a second time and were given vectors to runway 9R. During touchdown (first officer flying) the left wing came up and we were heading off the runway. I took control of the aircraft. Instinctively I moved the side stick without depressing the red take-over button. This is very dangerous in an A-320 because the side sticks are not connected. I quickly realized my mistake and pushed the red button to take control of the aircraft. The non interconnected side sticks are a severe safety hazard in the A-320. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: large thunderstorm to the northeast of the airport could have contributed to unusual and shifting winds. Approach controller had all aircraft maintaining 180 KTS to the OM, which is standard at ord. The A-320 is a very clean aircraft and can be difficult to slow down and descend in order to be stabilized on final. However, with advanced planning and experience, it can be done. In this situation, after the second go around, the tower asked the flight crew what they wanted to do. The captain said they wanted 140 KTS at the OM which the tower could not approve for the runway in use (runway 4R) as all other aircraft were maintaining 180 KTS. So, the tower cleared them for runway 9R. In the landing flare the flying first officer let the left wing come up (there was a slight left crosswind), and the captain reacted by correcting with his side stick. The captain did not depress the takeover button before correcting and he states, 'this is very dangerous in the A-320 because the side sticks are not interconnected.' that is partially true, but the correction that the captain put in did correct the problem. Depressing the takeover button removes controller completely from the other side stick. Otherwise, corrections are algebraic, so, unless the other side stick is deflected completely opposite, a correction will be made. The reporter captain particularly wanted to emphasize the danger of non interconnected side sticks. As to date, that hasn't appeared to be as much of a safety hazard as the reporter indicates.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 GARS DUE TO UNSTABLE APCHS. DIRECTIONAL PROB ON LNDG.

Narrative: ORD APCH WAS USING RWY 4R FOR ARRS. SURFACE WINDS WERE CALM BUT WINDS AT THE OM WERE 25 KTS ON THE TAIL. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH ABOVE THE GS AND GIVEN 180 KTS SPD UNTIL THE OM. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SLOW DOWN AND GO DOWN TO MAKE A STABILIZED APCH. DURING THE MISSED APCH, WE WERE TOLD TO FLY A 360 DEG HDG WHICH WOULD HAVE PUT US DIRECTLY INTO A LARGE TSTM. WE REFUSED THE TURN. THE SECOND APCH ATTEMPT CONCLUDED WITH A 100 DEG TURN TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND WE WERE ABOVE THE GS. WE MISSED A SECOND TIME AND WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO RWY 9R. DURING TOUCHDOWN (FO FLYING) THE L WING CAME UP AND WE WERE HDG OFF THE RWY. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT. INSTINCTIVELY I MOVED THE SIDE STICK WITHOUT DEPRESSING THE RED TAKE-OVER BUTTON. THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS IN AN A-320 BECAUSE THE SIDE STICKS ARE NOT CONNECTED. I QUICKLY REALIZED MY MISTAKE AND PUSHED THE RED BUTTON TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT. THE NON INTERCONNECTED SIDE STICKS ARE A SEVERE SAFETY HAZARD IN THE A-320. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: LARGE TSTM TO THE NE OF THE ARPT COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO UNUSUAL AND SHIFTING WINDS. APCH CTLR HAD ALL ACFT MAINTAINING 180 KTS TO THE OM, WHICH IS STANDARD AT ORD. THE A-320 IS A VERY CLEAN ACFT AND CAN BE DIFFICULT TO SLOW DOWN AND DSND IN ORDER TO BE STABILIZED ON FINAL. HOWEVER, WITH ADVANCED PLANNING AND EXPERIENCE, IT CAN BE DONE. IN THIS SIT, AFTER THE SECOND GAR, THE TWR ASKED THE FLC WHAT THEY WANTED TO DO. THE CAPT SAID THEY WANTED 140 KTS AT THE OM WHICH THE TWR COULD NOT APPROVE FOR THE RWY IN USE (RWY 4R) AS ALL OTHER ACFT WERE MAINTAINING 180 KTS. SO, THE TWR CLRED THEM FOR RWY 9R. IN THE LNDG FLARE THE FLYING FO LET THE L WING COME UP (THERE WAS A SLIGHT L XWIND), AND THE CAPT REACTED BY CORRECTING WITH HIS SIDE STICK. THE CAPT DID NOT DEPRESS THE TAKEOVER BUTTON BEFORE CORRECTING AND HE STATES, 'THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS IN THE A-320 BECAUSE THE SIDE STICKS ARE NOT INTERCONNECTED.' THAT IS PARTIALLY TRUE, BUT THE CORRECTION THAT THE CAPT PUT IN DID CORRECT THE PROB. DEPRESSING THE TAKEOVER BUTTON REMOVES CTLR COMPLETELY FROM THE OTHER SIDE STICK. OTHERWISE, CORRECTIONS ARE ALGEBRAIC, SO, UNLESS THE OTHER SIDE STICK IS DEFLECTED COMPLETELY OPPOSITE, A CORRECTION WILL BE MADE. THE RPTR CAPT PARTICULARLY WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THE DANGER OF NON INTERCONNECTED SIDE STICKS. AS TO DATE, THAT HASN'T APPEARED TO BE AS MUCH OF A SAFETY HAZARD AS THE RPTR INDICATES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.