Narrative:

On may/mon/95, my airlines management requested a dash 8 (far part 121) to cover for a broken EM120 (far part 135) to operate den-cod-den. As the dispatcher, I informed them that we could not operate into an unsecure airport. I was then told by my supervisor and the director of operations that we were approved to run a flight part 121 to cod. Because of workload, I accepted their decision to operate the flight. The captain questioned the flight, but also accepted our director's decision. Because of the wording 'approved for cod operations,' both the captain and I understood it to be an exemption. Approved by the feds. This was not the case. The flight operated with trained ground handlers (with training manuals and fuelers) aboard, but unsecure passenger were boarded. Everyone is now fully aware of our mistake in both operating the flight and using our authority/authorized to question our director's decisions. Callback conversation with reporter from acn #304577 revealed the following information: the dispatcher believes that cod is a part 139 airport except for security screening. Ground handling personnel were taken along in the aircraft and there was a proper WX observation. The gist of the matter was that the airport was listed as an alternate airport for the dhc-8 but not as a primary airport. Callback conversation with reporter acn #304446 revealed the following information: the captain has had no personal contact with the FAA over this incident. She understands that the air carrier made a self-declaration to the FAA and that there may have been a fine. Supplemental information from acn 304446: operations told me that we were taking a flight to cody, wy. I was concerned that this was not an approved part 121 airport for us and called dispatch to clarify. The first officer and I questioned the problem of security and proper approval. The dispatcher assured me we had approval and that the security was taken care of by bringing back the unsecured passenger in cody through to the unsecured side of the ramp in denver. I asked who had made provisions and approved us going to cody. He said the vice president of operations had cleared it and told us we were legal to go. Supplemental information from acn 304326: the captain and I questioned the legality of the flight on 5 points: 1) no destination terminal forecast (required by part 121). 2) airport not in company operations specifications. 3) airport not part 121 security approved. 4) no certified dash 8 ground service personnel. 5) WX was IMC and possibly below that required for a 'high minimums' captain. After voicing our concerns to company dispatch, we were told that: 1) the company vice president of airline operations had approved the flight. 2) a terminal forecast had been acquried from an approved source and the WX was above dispatch minimums. (However, a hard copy was not on board the flight.) 3) passenger would be security screened in denver. There is precedence in aviation law that allows pilots to take information from certified sources at 'face value' and not have to verify such information. However, I feel 'blind' faith is not the answer either. In order to guarantee compliance with the numerous, complex aviation regulations, pilots need to be well informed, cautiously skeptical, and they need to document their actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MDT WAS FLOWN IN VIOLATION OF ITS ACR'S OPS SPECS.

Narrative: ON MAY/MON/95, MY AIRLINES MGMNT REQUESTED A DASH 8 (FAR PART 121) TO COVER FOR A BROKEN EM120 (FAR PART 135) TO OPERATE DEN-COD-DEN. AS THE DISPATCHER, I INFORMED THEM THAT WE COULD NOT OPERATE INTO AN UNSECURE ARPT. I WAS THEN TOLD BY MY SUPVR AND THE DIRECTOR OF OPS THAT WE WERE APPROVED TO RUN A FLT PART 121 TO COD. BECAUSE OF WORKLOAD, I ACCEPTED THEIR DECISION TO OPERATE THE FLT. THE CAPT QUESTIONED THE FLT, BUT ALSO ACCEPTED OUR DIRECTOR'S DECISION. BECAUSE OF THE WORDING 'APPROVED FOR COD OPS,' BOTH THE CAPT AND I UNDERSTOOD IT TO BE AN EXEMPTION. APPROVED BY THE FEDS. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THE FLT OPERATED WITH TRAINED GND HANDLERS (WITH TRAINING MANUALS AND FUELERS) ABOARD, BUT UNSECURE PAX WERE BOARDED. EVERYONE IS NOW FULLY AWARE OF OUR MISTAKE IN BOTH OPERATING THE FLT AND USING OUR AUTH TO QUESTION OUR DIRECTOR'S DECISIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR FROM ACN #304577 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE DISPATCHER BELIEVES THAT COD IS A PART 139 ARPT EXCEPT FOR SECURITY SCREENING. GND HANDLING PERSONNEL WERE TAKEN ALONG IN THE ACFT AND THERE WAS A PROPER WX OBSERVATION. THE GIST OF THE MATTER WAS THAT THE ARPT WAS LISTED AS AN ALTERNATE ARPT FOR THE DHC-8 BUT NOT AS A PRIMARY ARPT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN #304446 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT HAS HAD NO PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE FAA OVER THIS INCIDENT. SHE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE ACR MADE A SELF-DECLARATION TO THE FAA AND THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A FINE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 304446: OPS TOLD ME THAT WE WERE TAKING A FLT TO CODY, WY. I WAS CONCERNED THAT THIS WAS NOT AN APPROVED PART 121 ARPT FOR US AND CALLED DISPATCH TO CLARIFY. THE FO AND I QUESTIONED THE PROB OF SECURITY AND PROPER APPROVAL. THE DISPATCHER ASSURED ME WE HAD APPROVAL AND THAT THE SECURITY WAS TAKEN CARE OF BY BRINGING BACK THE UNSECURED PAX IN CODY THROUGH TO THE UNSECURED SIDE OF THE RAMP IN DENVER. I ASKED WHO HAD MADE PROVISIONS AND APPROVED US GOING TO CODY. HE SAID THE VICE PRESIDENT OF OPS HAD CLRED IT AND TOLD US WE WERE LEGAL TO GO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 304326: THE CAPT AND I QUESTIONED THE LEGALITY OF THE FLT ON 5 POINTS: 1) NO DEST TERMINAL FORECAST (REQUIRED BY PART 121). 2) ARPT NOT IN COMPANY OPS SPECS. 3) ARPT NOT PART 121 SECURITY APPROVED. 4) NO CERTIFIED DASH 8 GND SVC PERSONNEL. 5) WX WAS IMC AND POSSIBLY BELOW THAT REQUIRED FOR A 'HIGH MINIMUMS' CAPT. AFTER VOICING OUR CONCERNS TO COMPANY DISPATCH, WE WERE TOLD THAT: 1) THE COMPANY VICE PRESIDENT OF AIRLINE OPS HAD APPROVED THE FLT. 2) A TERMINAL FORECAST HAD BEEN ACQURIED FROM AN APPROVED SOURCE AND THE WX WAS ABOVE DISPATCH MINIMUMS. (HOWEVER, A HARD COPY WAS NOT ON BOARD THE FLT.) 3) PAX WOULD BE SECURITY SCREENED IN DENVER. THERE IS PRECEDENCE IN AVIATION LAW THAT ALLOWS PLTS TO TAKE INFO FROM CERTIFIED SOURCES AT 'FACE VALUE' AND NOT HAVE TO VERIFY SUCH INFO. HOWEVER, I FEEL 'BLIND' FAITH IS NOT THE ANSWER EITHER. IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NUMEROUS, COMPLEX AVIATION REGS, PLTS NEED TO BE WELL INFORMED, CAUTIOUSLY SKEPTICAL, AND THEY NEED TO DOCUMENT THEIR ACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.