Narrative:

Our crew departed adq on a routine operational mission to eilson AFB. Adq WX upon departure was a 450 ft ceiling and about 2 mi visibility. At the conclusion of our mission we returned to kodiak and were cleared for the ILS/DME 2 approach to runway 25 via the 10 DME arc. The captain had stated that he wanted to keep maximum speed on the arc, begin to configure on final and bring the gear down at the FAF. This was done for 2 reasons: 1) to minimize our crew mission time and 2) to provide training for the captain in flying an approach in the same profile as commercial carriers. Though a typical profile for commercial carriers, our normal pattern was to configure and complete all checklists prior to the IAF or at least on the arc. As we intercepted the final approach course, I called tower, stated our position, approach clearance and requested lights to full bright. I also stated that I would contact them FAF inbound. Tower rogered and requested if we had the new ATIS information which had come out after we joined the arc. While copying down the new ATIS information, the captain called for the gear to be lowered. I lowered the gear and completed the 'before landing checklist' and began making backup calls to the captain as we were experiencing light wind shear and a 27 KT tailwind. As we continued down the GS it became apparent that the actual WX did not correspond with the ATIS report and I began reviewing the missed approach procedures. At 50 ft above minimums we broke out of the clouds and still didn't have the runway. At minimums the runway was in sight, though I was surprised to not see runway lights on. The tailwind had changed to a crosswind and the captain made a rapid correction to align with the runway and landed the aircraft. 40 mins later I was advised by the captain that tower had called because we landed without a landing clearance. I feel that this error was made because of altering our normal habit pattern of configuring and completing all checklists prior to the FAF. The normal call was missed in the rapid chain of events preceding and following the FAF. I plan to use our normal confign technique in the future, ensuring that checklists are complete prior to the initial approach fix or at least prior to reaching the final approach course. I feel that this will prevent a recurrence of this error. If pressed by the captain to delay checklists, I will ask him to back me up on radio calls and checklists at the FAF.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COAST GUARD MLG LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: OUR CREW DEPARTED ADQ ON A ROUTINE OPERATIONAL MISSION TO EILSON AFB. ADQ WX UPON DEP WAS A 450 FT CEILING AND ABOUT 2 MI VISIBILITY. AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR MISSION WE RETURNED TO KODIAK AND WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS/DME 2 APCH TO RWY 25 VIA THE 10 DME ARC. THE CAPT HAD STATED THAT HE WANTED TO KEEP MAX SPD ON THE ARC, BEGIN TO CONFIGURE ON FINAL AND BRING THE GEAR DOWN AT THE FAF. THIS WAS DONE FOR 2 REASONS: 1) TO MINIMIZE OUR CREW MISSION TIME AND 2) TO PROVIDE TRAINING FOR THE CAPT IN FLYING AN APCH IN THE SAME PROFILE AS COMMERCIAL CARRIERS. THOUGH A TYPICAL PROFILE FOR COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, OUR NORMAL PATTERN WAS TO CONFIGURE AND COMPLETE ALL CHKLISTS PRIOR TO THE IAF OR AT LEAST ON THE ARC. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH COURSE, I CALLED TWR, STATED OUR POS, APCH CLRNC AND REQUESTED LIGHTS TO FULL BRIGHT. I ALSO STATED THAT I WOULD CONTACT THEM FAF INBOUND. TWR ROGERED AND REQUESTED IF WE HAD THE NEW ATIS INFO WHICH HAD COME OUT AFTER WE JOINED THE ARC. WHILE COPYING DOWN THE NEW ATIS INFO, THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE GEAR TO BE LOWERED. I LOWERED THE GEAR AND COMPLETED THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' AND BEGAN MAKING BACKUP CALLS TO THE CAPT AS WE WERE EXPERIENCING LIGHT WIND SHEAR AND A 27 KT TAILWIND. AS WE CONTINUED DOWN THE GS IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE ACTUAL WX DID NOT CORRESPOND WITH THE ATIS RPT AND I BEGAN REVIEWING THE MISSED APCH PROCS. AT 50 FT ABOVE MINIMUMS WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AND STILL DIDN'T HAVE THE RWY. AT MINIMUMS THE RWY WAS IN SIGHT, THOUGH I WAS SURPRISED TO NOT SEE RWY LIGHTS ON. THE TAILWIND HAD CHANGED TO A XWIND AND THE CAPT MADE A RAPID CORRECTION TO ALIGN WITH THE RWY AND LANDED THE ACFT. 40 MINS LATER I WAS ADVISED BY THE CAPT THAT TWR HAD CALLED BECAUSE WE LANDED WITHOUT A LNDG CLRNC. I FEEL THAT THIS ERROR WAS MADE BECAUSE OF ALTERING OUR NORMAL HABIT PATTERN OF CONFIGURING AND COMPLETING ALL CHKLISTS PRIOR TO THE FAF. THE NORMAL CALL WAS MISSED IN THE RAPID CHAIN OF EVENTS PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING THE FAF. I PLAN TO USE OUR NORMAL CONFIGN TECHNIQUE IN THE FUTURE, ENSURING THAT CHKLISTS ARE COMPLETE PRIOR TO THE INITIAL APCH FIX OR AT LEAST PRIOR TO REACHING THE FINAL APCH COURSE. I FEEL THAT THIS WILL PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS ERROR. IF PRESSED BY THE CAPT TO DELAY CHKLISTS, I WILL ASK HIM TO BACK ME UP ON RADIO CALLS AND CHKLISTS AT THE FAF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.