Narrative:

On an FAA line check, rdu-dca with an FAA inspector in the jumpseat. The flight from rdu through the approach phase at dca was normal and uneventful. Being vectored for the river visual 18 dca I (first officer, PF) slowed to 200 KTS (autoplt on). We were issued a descent to 3000 ft, given a turn to intercept the river and cleared for the approach. We realized our turn was a bit wide and I disconnected the autoplt to hand fly the approach and keep the turn tight. I asked for 'speed select 200 KTS' to command the autothrottles. However, while my attention was diverted outside to fly the river visual and descend to intercept the profile the airspeed had increased to approximately 215 KTS. I challenged 'gear down, flaps 25 degrees, before landing checklist.' the captain (PNF) reached for the gear and selected down. At that instant I realized (barber pole) we were approximately 15 KTS fast for the gear (vlo, vle 200 KTS). I immediately extended the speed brake and slowed the aircraft. By the time (approximately 10 seconds) the nose gear was down we were below 200 KTS. We continued to a normal approach and landing. Upon arrival at the gate the inspector questioned us about the overspd. We decided that an inspection by maintenance, a write-up and notification of dispatch were in order. All necessary inspections were completed (no damage) and we were released for departure. The inspector was never clear how he would progress but did ride back with us to rdu, not in the jumpseat -- in the cabin. When we returned to rdu, our trip was complete and we prepared to commute home. Our chief pilot informed us that the inspector had brought the incident to his attention and it would be prudent to do a line check with a company check airman. The captain and I agreed this would be a good idea and did another round trip to dca, did the same approach and returned to rdu without incident. The check airman was completely satisfied with our performance. I realize the importance of double-checking speeds before calling for a confign change. Equally important is the need to verify speeds before selecting a confign change. Looking back on the event, the aircraft was not damaged, there was no compromise of safety (though an overspd, a very minor one) and all inspections and paper work required was accomplished prior to departure. I feel our additional line check the same day was a show of responsibility and an effective resolution to the incident.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MLG EXCEEDED THE LNDG GEAR EXTENSION SPD DURING DSCNT.

Narrative: ON AN FAA LINE CHK, RDU-DCA WITH AN FAA INSPECTOR IN THE JUMPSEAT. THE FLT FROM RDU THROUGH THE APCH PHASE AT DCA WAS NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. BEING VECTORED FOR THE RIVER VISUAL 18 DCA I (FO, PF) SLOWED TO 200 KTS (AUTOPLT ON). WE WERE ISSUED A DSCNT TO 3000 FT, GIVEN A TURN TO INTERCEPT THE RIVER AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. WE REALIZED OUR TURN WAS A BIT WIDE AND I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO HAND FLY THE APCH AND KEEP THE TURN TIGHT. I ASKED FOR 'SPD SELECT 200 KTS' TO COMMAND THE AUTOTHROTTLES. HOWEVER, WHILE MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED OUTSIDE TO FLY THE RIVER VISUAL AND DSND TO INTERCEPT THE PROFILE THE AIRSPD HAD INCREASED TO APPROX 215 KTS. I CHALLENGED 'GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 25 DEGS, BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST.' THE CAPT (PNF) REACHED FOR THE GEAR AND SELECTED DOWN. AT THAT INSTANT I REALIZED (BARBER POLE) WE WERE APPROX 15 KTS FAST FOR THE GEAR (VLO, VLE 200 KTS). I IMMEDIATELY EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKE AND SLOWED THE ACFT. BY THE TIME (APPROX 10 SECONDS) THE NOSE GEAR WAS DOWN WE WERE BELOW 200 KTS. WE CONTINUED TO A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. UPON ARR AT THE GATE THE INSPECTOR QUESTIONED US ABOUT THE OVERSPD. WE DECIDED THAT AN INSPECTION BY MAINT, A WRITE-UP AND NOTIFICATION OF DISPATCH WERE IN ORDER. ALL NECESSARY INSPECTIONS WERE COMPLETED (NO DAMAGE) AND WE WERE RELEASED FOR DEP. THE INSPECTOR WAS NEVER CLR HOW HE WOULD PROGRESS BUT DID RIDE BACK WITH US TO RDU, NOT IN THE JUMPSEAT -- IN THE CABIN. WHEN WE RETURNED TO RDU, OUR TRIP WAS COMPLETE AND WE PREPARED TO COMMUTE HOME. OUR CHIEF PLT INFORMED US THAT THE INSPECTOR HAD BROUGHT THE INCIDENT TO HIS ATTN AND IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO DO A LINE CHK WITH A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN. THE CAPT AND I AGREED THIS WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA AND DID ANOTHER ROUND TRIP TO DCA, DID THE SAME APCH AND RETURNED TO RDU WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE CHK AIRMAN WAS COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH OUR PERFORMANCE. I REALIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF DOUBLE-CHKING SPDS BEFORE CALLING FOR A CONFIGN CHANGE. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS THE NEED TO VERIFY SPDS BEFORE SELECTING A CONFIGN CHANGE. LOOKING BACK ON THE EVENT, THE ACFT WAS NOT DAMAGED, THERE WAS NO COMPROMISE OF SAFETY (THOUGH AN OVERSPD, A VERY MINOR ONE) AND ALL INSPECTIONS AND PAPER WORK REQUIRED WAS ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO DEP. I FEEL OUR ADDITIONAL LINE CHK THE SAME DAY WAS A SHOW OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION TO THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.