Narrative:

Day 2 of a 2 day trip. Throughout trip the captain would depart at or just above minimum fuel required by dispatch, even though circumstances would allow additional fuel to be carried. The leg previous to incident was cvg to stl. Dispatch fuel was 4400 pounds, which was an attempt to round-trip fuel the flight. This is standard procedure when passenger loads allow and capts are encouraged to do this in order to save money and time when at outstations. WX en route was good with scattered convective activity. 50 mi east of stl, crew encountered a solid line between the aircraft and the field. Additionally, there was an active thunderstorm over the airport. Crew slowed down to help out approach and to avoid the line of WX. ATC directed crew to orbit in a racetrack pattern since tower was changing runways and ATC didn't 'know what to do with you right now.' 20 mins elapsed while ATC sorted things out and crew worked radar to determine best course of action. Radio traffic was monitored and crew heard other aircraft shooting the ILS approach. One crew said 'we'll give it a shot and if doesn't work we're going to kansas city.' after shutdown, first officer asked captain if he wanted any fuel. (2600 pounds onboard, 2400 pounds required, passenger load was less than half full) captain responded that 'no, we have legal fuel to depart.' first officer pointed out the light passenger load, a long line of departures for the runway, and the presence of WX that had been encountered on arrival and approach, and once again asked if more fuel would be a good idea. Again the captain said no. During the walkaround, the first officer noted the presence of the fuel truck standing by and upon completion, once again asked if they should put on some extra fuel since the truck was already there. Again the captain said no, we had more than he was legally supposed to have and didn't see a reason to put on more fuel. Flight blocked out at XA00 EST after 25 mins on the ground. Flight had both engines running to cool the cabin and was roughly #40 in line for departure. Crew monitored ground/tower and learned that all south and east departures were stopped due to WX. After 30 mins company called and told flight to call dispatch. Captain handled the call while the first officer monitored ground. Captain did not discuss the call with the first officer, except to say that dispatch had given the flight dayton (day) as an alternate. The first officer had monitored the call and got the impression dispatch was concerned that the fuel on board, 2400 pounds, was not enough to reach the alternate. Captain told dispatch that the contingency fuel would be enough for the alternate and that we had 2600 pounds when we left the gate. When the captain told the first officer about day as an alternate, the first officer suggested going back to the gate for more fuel. Captain didn't want to give up his place in line and rationalized his decision by saying that the contingency fuel of 200 pounds would be enough to cover the alternate. After roughly 10 mins ground called and said to get ready to go, since they were letting flts depart. Flight received clearance to taxi onto the runway. First officer remarked that he didn't like the looks of the WX. Tower issued takeoff clearance and a heading to avoid the WX. Flight departed (XB05 EST) and immediately began to deviate for WX. Fuel onboard at this time was just above 2000 pounds. Captain fixated on going towards enl VOR as per the turbo 2 SID. First officer saw many cells and what looked like a solid line in the vicinity of enl VOR and suggested a more south heading. Captain said no that he saw a hole and wanted to continue towards enl. First officer was hand flying and had his hands full avoiding WX and riding out turbulence. First officer requested higher altitude and the captain got him 15000 ft (filed for 10000 ft). Captain directed first officer to within 15 mi of enl VOR before he realized the hole was not there. He then told the first officer to fly towards fam VOR. First officer said that wouldn't work since aircraft holding at fam VOR were going elsewhere to hold due to thunderstorms over the VOR. The captain then had the first officer fly back towards enl VOR which the first officer refused to do. He instead suggested a heading of 150-180 degrees and said, 'we don't have a lot of gas to screw around with.' captain continued to work radar while the first officer flew. Not much wassaid during this time. Captain directed a turn towards the east, and the first officer generally followed a southeast track due to what he saw visually. Once clear of the line, ATC directed the crew to rejoin the departure and head towards enl VOR for the mosey transition. First officer plugged fuel numbers into the computer and told the captain that there was insufficient fuel onboard for the destination (cvg) and an alternate. The computer showed 1:29 hours with reserve and time to destination as 2:11 hours. Captain looked startled and didn't say anything but rechked the fuel numbers. He then took the reserve out of the calculation and determined that there was sufficient fuel to reach cvg, but that we would probably fly into our reserve. There was also some discussion about climbing to get a better fuel burn and or winds, but the crew elected to stay at 15000 ft with negligible winds. The captain also said we also could declare minimum fuel if necessary. Captain checked in with cincinnati approach (XC15 EST) and told them that our 1:30 hour flight had become over 2:00 hours, and he wanted to know how long the final was. Informed that the final was 20 mi the first officer said no way. Captain said he would declare minimum fuel so as not to get such a long final to which the first officer agreed. Approach turned the aircraft on a 10 mi right downwind and the captain declared 'minimum fuel.' approach acknowledged and in an act of ironic timing the left fuel low light illuminated. The first officer had the field in sight and the captain called for a visual approach. ATC cleared the flight for a visual approach and the captain contacted tower. Tower cleared the flight for landing and the first officer began his base turn. On the turn from base to final the right fuel low light illuminated. Aircraft landed without further incident and taxied to the gate. Fuel totalizer read 2110 pounds and the fuel gauges showed less than 250 pounds per side. Flight flew approximately 15 mins into its reserve. First officer is upset that this situation ever occurred. Despite numerous attempts to tell the captain that more fuel should have been loaded, it is obvious that the captain did not realize the degree of discomfort felt by the first officer. First officer should have, and will be in the future, be more direct. If this does not produce satisfactory results, then this first officer will refuse to continue the flight. Additionally, it seems that at times the captain lost his situational awareness (approach to stl, on the ground at stl, on departure from stl), and that the first officer should have said something when he suspected as much. This crew had flown together before about a yr prior without anything significant happening. This maybe due to the fact that the first officer is now more experienced and comfortable in the aircraft and things are more noticeable at an earlier stage than when he first started. Recently, the first officer had become more senior and had flown with capts who allowed him to have more input into the decision making process, and who picked up on a more indirect questioning of a decision or series of decisions. This might have contributed to the lack of a clear statement from the first officer about his concerns.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUEL REMAINING -- PLANNING PREFLT -- AN ACR FLT DEPARTS WITH THE MINIMUM FUEL, BUT LESS THAN THE FO THOUGHT PRUDENT.

Narrative: DAY 2 OF A 2 DAY TRIP. THROUGHOUT TRIP THE CAPT WOULD DEPART AT OR JUST ABOVE MINIMUM FUEL REQUIRED BY DISPATCH, EVEN THOUGH CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD ALLOW ADDITIONAL FUEL TO BE CARRIED. THE LEG PREVIOUS TO INCIDENT WAS CVG TO STL. DISPATCH FUEL WAS 4400 LBS, WHICH WAS AN ATTEMPT TO ROUND-TRIP FUEL THE FLT. THIS IS STANDARD PROC WHEN PAX LOADS ALLOW AND CAPTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO DO THIS IN ORDER TO SAVE MONEY AND TIME WHEN AT OUTSTATIONS. WX ENRTE WAS GOOD WITH SCATTERED CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY. 50 MI E OF STL, CREW ENCOUNTERED A SOLID LINE BTWN THE ACFT AND THE FIELD. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WAS AN ACTIVE TSTM OVER THE ARPT. CREW SLOWED DOWN TO HELP OUT APCH AND TO AVOID THE LINE OF WX. ATC DIRECTED CREW TO ORBIT IN A RACETRACK PATTERN SINCE TWR WAS CHANGING RWYS AND ATC DIDN'T 'KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH YOU RIGHT NOW.' 20 MINS ELAPSED WHILE ATC SORTED THINGS OUT AND CREW WORKED RADAR TO DETERMINE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. RADIO TFC WAS MONITORED AND CREW HEARD OTHER ACFT SHOOTING THE ILS APCH. ONE CREW SAID 'WE'LL GIVE IT A SHOT AND IF DOESN'T WORK WE'RE GOING TO KANSAS CITY.' AFTER SHUTDOWN, FO ASKED CAPT IF HE WANTED ANY FUEL. (2600 LBS ONBOARD, 2400 LBS REQUIRED, PAX LOAD WAS LESS THAN HALF FULL) CAPT RESPONDED THAT 'NO, WE HAVE LEGAL FUEL TO DEPART.' FO POINTED OUT THE LIGHT PAX LOAD, A LONG LINE OF DEPS FOR THE RWY, AND THE PRESENCE OF WX THAT HAD BEEN ENCOUNTERED ON ARR AND APCH, AND ONCE AGAIN ASKED IF MORE FUEL WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA. AGAIN THE CAPT SAID NO. DURING THE WALKAROUND, THE FO NOTED THE PRESENCE OF THE FUEL TRUCK STANDING BY AND UPON COMPLETION, ONCE AGAIN ASKED IF THEY SHOULD PUT ON SOME EXTRA FUEL SINCE THE TRUCK WAS ALREADY THERE. AGAIN THE CAPT SAID NO, WE HAD MORE THAN HE WAS LEGALLY SUPPOSED TO HAVE AND DIDN'T SEE A REASON TO PUT ON MORE FUEL. FLT BLOCKED OUT AT XA00 EST AFTER 25 MINS ON THE GND. FLT HAD BOTH ENGS RUNNING TO COOL THE CABIN AND WAS ROUGHLY #40 IN LINE FOR DEP. CREW MONITORED GND/TWR AND LEARNED THAT ALL S AND E DEPS WERE STOPPED DUE TO WX. AFTER 30 MINS COMPANY CALLED AND TOLD FLT TO CALL DISPATCH. CAPT HANDLED THE CALL WHILE THE FO MONITORED GND. CAPT DID NOT DISCUSS THE CALL WITH THE FO, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT DISPATCH HAD GIVEN THE FLT DAYTON (DAY) AS AN ALTERNATE. THE FO HAD MONITORED THE CALL AND GOT THE IMPRESSION DISPATCH WAS CONCERNED THAT THE FUEL ON BOARD, 2400 LBS, WAS NOT ENOUGH TO REACH THE ALTERNATE. CAPT TOLD DISPATCH THAT THE CONTINGENCY FUEL WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR THE ALTERNATE AND THAT WE HAD 2600 LBS WHEN WE LEFT THE GATE. WHEN THE CAPT TOLD THE FO ABOUT DAY AS AN ALTERNATE, THE FO SUGGESTED GOING BACK TO THE GATE FOR MORE FUEL. CAPT DIDN'T WANT TO GIVE UP HIS PLACE IN LINE AND RATIONALIZED HIS DECISION BY SAYING THAT THE CONTINGENCY FUEL OF 200 LBS WOULD BE ENOUGH TO COVER THE ALTERNATE. AFTER ROUGHLY 10 MINS GND CALLED AND SAID TO GET READY TO GO, SINCE THEY WERE LETTING FLTS DEPART. FLT RECEIVED CLRNC TO TAXI ONTO THE RWY. FO REMARKED THAT HE DIDN'T LIKE THE LOOKS OF THE WX. TWR ISSUED TKOF CLRNC AND A HDG TO AVOID THE WX. FLT DEPARTED (XB05 EST) AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO DEVIATE FOR WX. FUEL ONBOARD AT THIS TIME WAS JUST ABOVE 2000 LBS. CAPT FIXATED ON GOING TOWARDS ENL VOR AS PER THE TURBO 2 SID. FO SAW MANY CELLS AND WHAT LOOKED LIKE A SOLID LINE IN THE VICINITY OF ENL VOR AND SUGGESTED A MORE S HDG. CAPT SAID NO THAT HE SAW A HOLE AND WANTED TO CONTINUE TOWARDS ENL. FO WAS HAND FLYING AND HAD HIS HANDS FULL AVOIDING WX AND RIDING OUT TURB. FO REQUESTED HIGHER ALT AND THE CAPT GOT HIM 15000 FT (FILED FOR 10000 FT). CAPT DIRECTED FO TO WITHIN 15 MI OF ENL VOR BEFORE HE REALIZED THE HOLE WAS NOT THERE. HE THEN TOLD THE FO TO FLY TOWARDS FAM VOR. FO SAID THAT WOULDN'T WORK SINCE ACFT HOLDING AT FAM VOR WERE GOING ELSEWHERE TO HOLD DUE TO TSTMS OVER THE VOR. THE CAPT THEN HAD THE FO FLY BACK TOWARDS ENL VOR WHICH THE FO REFUSED TO DO. HE INSTEAD SUGGESTED A HDG OF 150-180 DEGS AND SAID, 'WE DON'T HAVE A LOT OF GAS TO SCREW AROUND WITH.' CAPT CONTINUED TO WORK RADAR WHILE THE FO FLEW. NOT MUCH WASSAID DURING THIS TIME. CAPT DIRECTED A TURN TOWARDS THE E, AND THE FO GENERALLY FOLLOWED A SE TRACK DUE TO WHAT HE SAW VISUALLY. ONCE CLR OF THE LINE, ATC DIRECTED THE CREW TO REJOIN THE DEP AND HEAD TOWARDS ENL VOR FOR THE MOSEY TRANSITION. FO PLUGGED FUEL NUMBERS INTO THE COMPUTER AND TOLD THE CAPT THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FUEL ONBOARD FOR THE DEST (CVG) AND AN ALTERNATE. THE COMPUTER SHOWED 1:29 HRS WITH RESERVE AND TIME TO DEST AS 2:11 HRS. CAPT LOOKED STARTLED AND DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING BUT RECHKED THE FUEL NUMBERS. HE THEN TOOK THE RESERVE OUT OF THE CALCULATION AND DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT FUEL TO REACH CVG, BUT THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY FLY INTO OUR RESERVE. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT CLBING TO GET A BETTER FUEL BURN AND OR WINDS, BUT THE CREW ELECTED TO STAY AT 15000 FT WITH NEGLIGIBLE WINDS. THE CAPT ALSO SAID WE ALSO COULD DECLARE MINIMUM FUEL IF NECESSARY. CAPT CHKED IN WITH CINCINNATI APCH (XC15 EST) AND TOLD THEM THAT OUR 1:30 HR FLT HAD BECOME OVER 2:00 HRS, AND HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE FINAL WAS. INFORMED THAT THE FINAL WAS 20 MI THE FO SAID NO WAY. CAPT SAID HE WOULD DECLARE MINIMUM FUEL SO AS NOT TO GET SUCH A LONG FINAL TO WHICH THE FO AGREED. APCH TURNED THE ACFT ON A 10 MI R DOWNWIND AND THE CAPT DECLARED 'MINIMUM FUEL.' APCH ACKNOWLEDGED AND IN AN ACT OF IRONIC TIMING THE L FUEL LOW LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE FO HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND THE CAPT CALLED FOR A VISUAL APCH. ATC CLRED THE FLT FOR A VISUAL APCH AND THE CAPT CONTACTED TWR. TWR CLRED THE FLT FOR LNDG AND THE FO BEGAN HIS BASE TURN. ON THE TURN FROM BASE TO FINAL THE R FUEL LOW LIGHT ILLUMINATED. ACFT LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. FUEL TOTALIZER READ 2110 LBS AND THE FUEL GAUGES SHOWED LESS THAN 250 LBS PER SIDE. FLT FLEW APPROX 15 MINS INTO ITS RESERVE. FO IS UPSET THAT THIS SIT EVER OCCURRED. DESPITE NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO TELL THE CAPT THAT MORE FUEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN LOADED, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE CAPT DID NOT REALIZE THE DEG OF DISCOMFORT FELT BY THE FO. FO SHOULD HAVE, AND WILL BE IN THE FUTURE, BE MORE DIRECT. IF THIS DOES NOT PRODUCE SATISFACTORY RESULTS, THEN THIS FO WILL REFUSE TO CONTINUE THE FLT. ADDITIONALLY, IT SEEMS THAT AT TIMES THE CAPT LOST HIS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (APCH TO STL, ON THE GND AT STL, ON DEP FROM STL), AND THAT THE FO SHOULD HAVE SAID SOMETHING WHEN HE SUSPECTED AS MUCH. THIS CREW HAD FLOWN TOGETHER BEFORE ABOUT A YR PRIOR WITHOUT ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT HAPPENING. THIS MAYBE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE FO IS NOW MORE EXPERIENCED AND COMFORTABLE IN THE ACFT AND THINGS ARE MORE NOTICEABLE AT AN EARLIER STAGE THAN WHEN HE FIRST STARTED. RECENTLY, THE FO HAD BECOME MORE SENIOR AND HAD FLOWN WITH CAPTS WHO ALLOWED HIM TO HAVE MORE INPUT INTO THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS, AND WHO PICKED UP ON A MORE INDIRECT QUESTIONING OF A DECISION OR SERIES OF DECISIONS. THIS MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE LACK OF A CLR STATEMENT FROM THE FO ABOUT HIS CONCERNS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.