Severe WX avoidance program rerted aircraft into another area of severe WX.

Attributes
ACN	312210
Time
Date	199508
Day	Wed
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : bgm
State Reference	NY
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zbw
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : radar
Qualification	controller : radar
Experience	controller non radar : 1 controller radar : 4
ASRS Report	312210
Person 2
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	other personnel other
Qualification	controller : radar
Events
Anomaly	inflight encounter : weather
Independent Detector	other controllera other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Weather
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

On the afternoon of aug/wed/95, severe WX was impacting an area between bgm, hnk, alb, center, pou, swf and back to bgm. During this time period we were instructed that severe WX avoidance program (swap) would be instituted for several aircraft. The traffic was to be re-routed directly into our severe WX. The traffic we would normally work had already been deviating extremely off course. The addition of these severe WX avoidance program aircraft created additional extensive workload. Also, the aircraft generally came on frequency stating the need to deviate away from the changed (or swap) route. When I voiced my concern to my supervisor, he explained to me our traffic management unit had been instructed by central flow to take these aircraft. The people in central flow knew of the severe WX and deviations, yet still sent the traffic. During this period of time numerous PIREPS of icing, turbulence, etc were received. My major concern with these actions by central flow is their inability to properly analyze current WX data and current deviations around severe WX. The decisions they made the afternoon of aug/wed/95, with no doubt in my mind, jeopardized the lives of thousands of people. The WX, at the time, south of new york was basically clear. Yet nothing was done, that I am aware of, to route this severe WX avoidance program traffic to a safer route.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SEVERE WX AVOIDANCE PROGRAM RERTED ACFT INTO ANOTHER AREA OF SEVERE WX.

Narrative: ON THE AFTERNOON OF AUG/WED/95, SEVERE WX WAS IMPACTING AN AREA BTWN BGM, HNK, ALB, CTR, POU, SWF AND BACK TO BGM. DURING THIS TIME PERIOD WE WERE INSTRUCTED THAT SEVERE WX AVOIDANCE PROGRAM (SWAP) WOULD BE INSTITUTED FOR SEVERAL ACFT. THE TFC WAS TO BE RE-ROUTED DIRECTLY INTO OUR SEVERE WX. THE TFC WE WOULD NORMALLY WORK HAD ALREADY BEEN DEVIATING EXTREMELY OFF COURSE. THE ADDITION OF THESE SEVERE WX AVOIDANCE PROGRAM ACFT CREATED ADDITIONAL EXTENSIVE WORKLOAD. ALSO, THE ACFT GENERALLY CAME ON FREQ STATING THE NEED TO DEVIATE AWAY FROM THE CHANGED (OR SWAP) RTE. WHEN I VOICED MY CONCERN TO MY SUPVR, HE EXPLAINED TO ME OUR TFC MGMNT UNIT HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY CENTRAL FLOW TO TAKE THESE ACFT. THE PEOPLE IN CENTRAL FLOW KNEW OF THE SEVERE WX AND DEVS, YET STILL SENT THE TFC. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME NUMEROUS PIREPS OF ICING, TURB, ETC WERE RECEIVED. MY MAJOR CONCERN WITH THESE ACTIONS BY CENTRAL FLOW IS THEIR INABILITY TO PROPERLY ANALYZE CURRENT WX DATA AND CURRENT DEVS AROUND SEVERE WX. THE DECISIONS THEY MADE THE AFTERNOON OF AUG/WED/95, WITH NO DOUBT IN MY MIND, JEOPARDIZED THE LIVES OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE. THE WX, AT THE TIME, S OF NEW YORK WAS BASICALLY CLR. YET NOTHING WAS DONE, THAT I AM AWARE OF, TO RTE THIS SEVERE WX AVOIDANCE PROGRAM TFC TO A SAFER RTE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.