Narrative:

The flight was routine and uneventful until landing at ord. Approaching (ord) the flight engineer recorded the ATIS information and posted the landing data card. The WX was reported as 5000 ft overcast 5 mi visibility in fog and rain showers with calm winds. The ATIS also reported to expect an ILS approach to runway 14R and to expect to use runway 27 for departure. At no time was it reported to expect less than the full length of runway 14R or that aircraft would be required to land short of the intersecting runway 27. After the flight engineer delivered the ATIS information the captain briefed the ILS approach procedure to runway 14R in accordance with procedures. The approach was briefed as to expect full IMC conditions since both fog and rain showers were reported at ord. The briefing included a planned turnoff to the right at or near the departure end of runway 14R. The planned turnoff was in accordance with operations specifications and general operations manual which prohibits the acceptance of a landing clearance to land short of an intersecting runway and to plan to use all of the available runway with minimum braking. The planned landing was also consistent with the notices to airmen being issued for the last few weeks about the experimental program of simultaneous takeoff and landing at ord. The notices to airman message clearly stated that all DC8 aircraft were to be excluded from this program. The ILS approach was flown in accordance with procedures. The runway was acquired visually at about 3 mi due to the rain showers. The approach was flown on speed and on GS to the decision ht. From decision ht a normal transition was made to touchdown, resulting in a smooth on speed on centerline landing. Since the landing was planned to utilize all of the runway, minimum reverse thrust was used during rollout. As the aircraft approached taxiway T10 the tower issued the following clearance: 'make a right turn at taxiway T10 a turn left on taxiway M and hold short of runway 27.' the first officer instinctively read back the clearance. The captain stated (to the first officer) 'we can't do that, tell them we can't do that.' the first officer transmitted: 'we have gone by the taxiway here.' the tower did not respond. The captain stated (to the first officer) make sure they know we passed taxiway T10. The first officer attempted to make this transmission but other xmissions were being made on the frequency. As we rolled to the end of the runway we heard an air carrier Y aircraft questioning why an aircraft had taxied through his runway. After turning off the runway we contacted ground. After issuing the taxi clearance ground asked us to call them on the phone. During the phone conversation with the tower supervisor I asked him why he had cleared another aircraft for takeoff while I was still rolling out on my active runway. He made the following reply to this question: 'under the program that is in effect we are authority/authorized to issue a takeoff clearance to an aircraft on runway 27 when we judge your speed is slow enough.' I informed him that there was no way that they were capable of judging when my aircraft was at a safe speed on a wet runway. I further informed him that under the braking conditions that existed that there was no way we could have made the taxiway T10 turnoff and that he should not be issuing that clearance to a DC8. His reply was 'well you acknowledged the clearance didn't you.' I informed him that the clearance was acknowledged but then we informed you that we had passed the taxiway and you gave us no response. I also inquired why he had not issued a clearance on final regarding a short landing or that the full length of the runway was not available. He stated that he was not authority/authorized to give that clearance. He then stated 'well okay we will take it from here, we have to listen to the tapes.' the program of simultaneous takeoff and landing on runways 14 and 27 at chicago O'hare, as it is currently implemented, is an unsafe and outright hazardous operation. This operation should be terminated immediately pending a safety review. Air traffic controllers are not qualified, authority/authorized or trained to make decisions relating to the safe operation of individual aircraft. They should not be encouraged or otherwise allowed to do so. When a group of individuals are allowed to assume critical, safety related tasks for which they are not trained or qualified, the quality of human performance becomes a matter of chance. Clearing an aircraft for takeoff on runway 27 with an aircraft still rolling out on runway 14R (regardless of what judgements were made regarding aircraft speed) was a critical and potentially disastrous error. Failure to maintain visual contact with both runway surfaces after issuing these unsafe clrncs demonstrates an inexcusable level of complacency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR, CAPT FLYING, EXPERIENCED A RWY INCURSION WHEN ATC ISSUED A CLRNC THEY COULD NOT COMPLY WITH. ATC WAS ADVISED THAT THEY COULD NOT COMPLY BY FO. FLT THAT WAS TO DEP XING RWY COMPLAINED THAT RPTR'S FLT CROSSED THEIR RWY.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL UNTIL LNDG AT ORD. APCHING (ORD) THE FE RECORDED THE ATIS INFO AND POSTED THE LNDG DATA CARD. THE WX WAS RPTED AS 5000 FT OVCST 5 MI VISIBILITY IN FOG AND RAIN SHOWERS WITH CALM WINDS. THE ATIS ALSO RPTED TO EXPECT AN ILS APCH TO RWY 14R AND TO EXPECT TO USE RWY 27 FOR DEP. AT NO TIME WAS IT RPTED TO EXPECT LESS THAN THE FULL LENGTH OF RWY 14R OR THAT ACFT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO LAND SHORT OF THE INTERSECTING RWY 27. AFTER THE FE DELIVERED THE ATIS INFO THE CAPT BRIEFED THE ILS APCH PROC TO RWY 14R IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCS. THE APCH WAS BRIEFED AS TO EXPECT FULL IMC CONDITIONS SINCE BOTH FOG AND RAIN SHOWERS WERE RPTED AT ORD. THE BRIEFING INCLUDED A PLANNED TURNOFF TO THE R AT OR NEAR THE DEP END OF RWY 14R. THE PLANNED TURNOFF WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPS SPECS AND GENERAL OPS MANUAL WHICH PROHIBITS THE ACCEPTANCE OF A LNDG CLRNC TO LAND SHORT OF AN INTERSECTING RWY AND TO PLAN TO USE ALL OF THE AVAILABLE RWY WITH MINIMUM BRAKING. THE PLANNED LNDG WAS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE NOTICES TO AIRMEN BEING ISSUED FOR THE LAST FEW WKS ABOUT THE EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM OF SIMULTANEOUS TKOF AND LNDG AT ORD. THE NOTICES TO AIRMAN MESSAGE CLRLY STATED THAT ALL DC8 ACFT WERE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THIS PROGRAM. THE ILS APCH WAS FLOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCS. THE RWY WAS ACQUIRED VISUALLY AT ABOUT 3 MI DUE TO THE RAIN SHOWERS. THE APCH WAS FLOWN ON SPD AND ON GS TO THE DECISION HT. FROM DECISION HT A NORMAL TRANSITION WAS MADE TO TOUCHDOWN, RESULTING IN A SMOOTH ON SPD ON CTRLINE LNDG. SINCE THE LNDG WAS PLANNED TO UTILIZE ALL OF THE RWY, MINIMUM REVERSE THRUST WAS USED DURING ROLLOUT. AS THE ACFT APCHED TXWY T10 THE TWR ISSUED THE FOLLOWING CLRNC: 'MAKE A R TURN AT TXWY T10 A TURN L ON TXWY M AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27.' THE FO INSTINCTIVELY READ BACK THE CLRNC. THE CAPT STATED (TO THE FO) 'WE CAN'T DO THAT, TELL THEM WE CAN'T DO THAT.' THE FO XMITTED: 'WE HAVE GONE BY THE TXWY HERE.' THE TWR DID NOT RESPOND. THE CAPT STATED (TO THE FO) MAKE SURE THEY KNOW WE PASSED TXWY T10. THE FO ATTEMPTED TO MAKE THIS XMISSION BUT OTHER XMISSIONS WERE BEING MADE ON THE FREQ. AS WE ROLLED TO THE END OF THE RWY WE HEARD AN ACR Y ACFT QUESTIONING WHY AN ACFT HAD TAXIED THROUGH HIS RWY. AFTER TURNING OFF THE RWY WE CONTACTED GND. AFTER ISSUING THE TAXI CLRNC GND ASKED US TO CALL THEM ON THE PHONE. DURING THE PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE TWR SUPVR I ASKED HIM WHY HE HAD CLRED ANOTHER ACFT FOR TKOF WHILE I WAS STILL ROLLING OUT ON MY ACTIVE RWY. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO THIS QUESTION: 'UNDER THE PROGRAM THAT IS IN EFFECT WE ARE AUTH TO ISSUE A TKOF CLRNC TO AN ACFT ON RWY 27 WHEN WE JUDGE YOUR SPD IS SLOW ENOUGH.' I INFORMED HIM THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THAT THEY WERE CAPABLE OF JUDGING WHEN MY ACFT WAS AT A SAFE SPD ON A WET RWY. I FURTHER INFORMED HIM THAT UNDER THE BRAKING CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY WE COULD HAVE MADE THE TXWY T10 TURNOFF AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT BE ISSUING THAT CLRNC TO A DC8. HIS REPLY WAS 'WELL YOU ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC DIDN'T YOU.' I INFORMED HIM THAT THE CLRNC WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BUT THEN WE INFORMED YOU THAT WE HAD PASSED THE TXWY AND YOU GAVE US NO RESPONSE. I ALSO INQUIRED WHY HE HAD NOT ISSUED A CLRNC ON FINAL REGARDING A SHORT LNDG OR THAT THE FULL LENGTH OF THE RWY WAS NOT AVAILABLE. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT AUTH TO GIVE THAT CLRNC. HE THEN STATED 'WELL OKAY WE WILL TAKE IT FROM HERE, WE HAVE TO LISTEN TO THE TAPES.' THE PROGRAM OF SIMULTANEOUS TKOF AND LNDG ON RWYS 14 AND 27 AT CHICAGO O'HARE, AS IT IS CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTED, IS AN UNSAFE AND OUTRIGHT HAZARDOUS OP. THIS OP SHOULD BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY PENDING A SAFETY REVIEW. AIR TFC CTLRS ARE NOT QUALIFIED, AUTH OR TRAINED TO MAKE DECISIONS RELATING TO THE SAFE OP OF INDIVIDUAL ACFT. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED OR OTHERWISE ALLOWED TO DO SO. WHEN A GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS ARE ALLOWED TO ASSUME CRITICAL, SAFETY RELATED TASKS FOR WHICH THEY ARE NOT TRAINED OR QUALIFIED, THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE BECOMES A MATTER OF CHANCE. CLRING AN ACFT FOR TKOF ON RWY 27 WITH AN ACFT STILL ROLLING OUT ON RWY 14R (REGARDLESS OF WHAT JUDGEMENTS WERE MADE REGARDING ACFT SPD) WAS A CRITICAL AND POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS ERROR. FAILURE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH BOTH RWY SURFACES AFTER ISSUING THESE UNSAFE CLRNCS DEMONSTRATES AN INEXCUSABLE LEVEL OF COMPLACENCY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.