Narrative:

This incident occurred in a B737-200. The inbound crew had written up the throttles for being out of alignment, over one knob difference at takeoff and at cruise. Maintenance worked on the problem before we took the airplane in denver. After an hour delay, and an engine run-up, maintenance said that they had fixed the problem but that they wanted an outbound crew comment. Engine start and taxi out were normal. The right air conditioning pack didn't seem to be putting out cold air, so we were slightly distracted (temperature was 90 degrees and the cabin was very hot). We were quickly cleared for takeoff and started the takeoff roll. As the first officer pushed up the throttles, it was apparent that the throttles weren't matched. The computed maximum power was 2.15 EPR. #2 engine produced maximum power at approximately the normal throttle position. #1 engine power was lower than #2 at the same throttle position, so I concentrated on matching the EPR by pushing up the #1 throttle. After several tries, I had pushed #1 up to the stops, and the engine was only indicating 2.11 EPR. I glanced at the airspeed and saw that we were around 110 KTS, well into the high speed regime. Since runway 8 has 12000 ft, we had plenty of runway remaining for the rest of the takeoff. I elected not to abort at that high of an airspeed and continue the takeoff. Looking back on it, we should not have taken off. The #1 engine was unable to produce maximum power. I took too long trying to match the engines and we were in the high speed regime before I noticed that we could not get 2.15 EPR out of #1 engine. I had placed too much confidence in the mechanic's report that the problem had been fixed. I had also allowed myself to become distracted by the apparent weakness of the right pack. I should have been quicker with the discovery of the engine problem, and quicker in deciding to abort.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MLG TOOK OFF WITH LESS THAN MAX ALLOWABLE PWR FROM ONE ENG DUE TO MISALIGNED THROTTLES.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED IN A B737-200. THE INBOUND CREW HAD WRITTEN UP THE THROTTLES FOR BEING OUT OF ALIGNMENT, OVER ONE KNOB DIFFERENCE AT TKOF AND AT CRUISE. MAINT WORKED ON THE PROB BEFORE WE TOOK THE AIRPLANE IN DENVER. AFTER AN HR DELAY, AND AN ENG RUN-UP, MAINT SAID THAT THEY HAD FIXED THE PROB BUT THAT THEY WANTED AN OUTBOUND CREW COMMENT. ENG START AND TAXI OUT WERE NORMAL. THE R AIR CONDITIONING PACK DIDN'T SEEM TO BE PUTTING OUT COLD AIR, SO WE WERE SLIGHTLY DISTRACTED (TEMP WAS 90 DEGS AND THE CABIN WAS VERY HOT). WE WERE QUICKLY CLRED FOR TKOF AND STARTED THE TKOF ROLL. AS THE FO PUSHED UP THE THROTTLES, IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE THROTTLES WEREN'T MATCHED. THE COMPUTED MAX PWR WAS 2.15 EPR. #2 ENG PRODUCED MAX PWR AT APPROX THE NORMAL THROTTLE POS. #1 ENG PWR WAS LOWER THAN #2 AT THE SAME THROTTLE POS, SO I CONCENTRATED ON MATCHING THE EPR BY PUSHING UP THE #1 THROTTLE. AFTER SEVERAL TRIES, I HAD PUSHED #1 UP TO THE STOPS, AND THE ENG WAS ONLY INDICATING 2.11 EPR. I GLANCED AT THE AIRSPD AND SAW THAT WE WERE AROUND 110 KTS, WELL INTO THE HIGH SPD REGIME. SINCE RWY 8 HAS 12000 FT, WE HAD PLENTY OF RWY REMAINING FOR THE REST OF THE TKOF. I ELECTED NOT TO ABORT AT THAT HIGH OF AN AIRSPD AND CONTINUE THE TKOF. LOOKING BACK ON IT, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN OFF. THE #1 ENG WAS UNABLE TO PRODUCE MAX PWR. I TOOK TOO LONG TRYING TO MATCH THE ENGS AND WE WERE IN THE HIGH SPD REGIME BEFORE I NOTICED THAT WE COULD NOT GET 2.15 EPR OUT OF #1 ENG. I HAD PLACED TOO MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THE MECH'S RPT THAT THE PROB HAD BEEN FIXED. I HAD ALSO ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME DISTRACTED BY THE APPARENT WEAKNESS OF THE R PACK. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN QUICKER WITH THE DISCOVERY OF THE ENG PROB, AND QUICKER IN DECIDING TO ABORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.