Narrative:

We had just arrived at the airport and landed on the east runway. After deplaning and enplaning passenger, we were set to go. The ATIS had reported clear skies, 25 mi visibility, a temperature of 98 degree and southerly winds, 180 degree 10 KTS. I had planned for a runway 15 departure and the atogs, actual takeoff gross weight were well within limits. During pushback and engine start, the captain remarked that he'd like to depart on runway 26. We had done that very thing the evening before and the operation worked beautifully. However that had been late at night and there wasn't much traffic. This was early evening and it was busy and I never dreamed that tower would approve a westerly departure, hence, no planned or anticipated runway 26 departure, when he remarked a second time that he'd like a runway 26 departure, I asked ground if a runway 26 departure was feasible. Much to our surprise, the ground controller said 'yes' and switched us to tower. I had just completed the after start checklist when tower cleared us on to the runway and cleared us for takeoff immediately. The distance from our pushed back position to the takeoff spot was about 500 ft, so we expeditiously completed the pre takeoff checklist both above and below the line. Although it was not my leg, I still managed a quick look at the impact of the new runway and its effect on our departure, both normal and in the event of an engine failure. I also noted and set the new changed departure frequency into the 'on-deck' selector and finally, in response to the captain's query, quickly checked the ATOG figures to ascertain that we were indeed legal to takeoff. (We had a southerly wind which gave us a headwind component which caused the captain to consider the runway in the first place.) by this time, the power was coming up and we were on our way. After takeoff and during the climb out, I began to rechk our numbers and I discovered that we had exceeded the runway atogw for the new runway. I was appalled at my utter failure to read the ATOG chart correctly, in my haste to complete all my tasks (push back to airborne took 6 mins). I read the wrong column which caused me to think we were within ATOG limits when, in fact, we were not. Prevention 1) better advance preparation 2) a change in plans should warrant a second look at everything 3) slow down. Supplemental information from acn 314806: first officer was asked if we 'could do it' meaning, are we legal and under the gross takeoff weight to use the runway. The first officer looked up the data (I personally saw him use the proper performance page) and announced 'yes.' the bottom line in the matter is the first officer just messed up. All procedures were followed correctly. Due diligence with normal double checks. No shortcuts were made of any kind. This mistake would have resulted in an overrun of the runway only if the absolute worse case accelerate stop abort situation occurred. No danger was involved in a single engine takeoff (go) let alone normal 2 engine takeoff.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG TKOF DATA USED FOR WT, GO NO GO COMPUTATIONS.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST ARRIVED AT THE ARPT AND LANDED ON THE E RWY. AFTER DEPLANING AND ENPLANING PAX, WE WERE SET TO GO. THE ATIS HAD RPTED CLR SKIES, 25 MI VISIBILITY, A TEMP OF 98 DEG AND SOUTHERLY WINDS, 180 DEG 10 KTS. I HAD PLANNED FOR A RWY 15 DEP AND THE ATOGS, ACTUAL TKOF GROSS WT WERE WELL WITHIN LIMITS. DURING PUSHBACK AND ENG START, THE CAPT REMARKED THAT HE'D LIKE TO DEPART ON RWY 26. WE HAD DONE THAT VERY THING THE EVENING BEFORE AND THE OP WORKED BEAUTIFULLY. HOWEVER THAT HAD BEEN LATE AT NIGHT AND THERE WASN'T MUCH TFC. THIS WAS EARLY EVENING AND IT WAS BUSY AND I NEVER DREAMED THAT TWR WOULD APPROVE A WESTERLY DEP, HENCE, NO PLANNED OR ANTICIPATED RWY 26 DEP, WHEN HE REMARKED A SECOND TIME THAT HE'D LIKE A RWY 26 DEP, I ASKED GND IF A RWY 26 DEP WAS FEASIBLE. MUCH TO OUR SURPRISE, THE GND CTLR SAID 'YES' AND SWITCHED US TO TWR. I HAD JUST COMPLETED THE AFTER START CHKLIST WHEN TWR CLRED US ON TO THE RWY AND CLRED US FOR TKOF IMMEDIATELY. THE DISTANCE FROM OUR PUSHED BACK POS TO THE TKOF SPOT WAS ABOUT 500 FT, SO WE EXPEDITIOUSLY COMPLETED THE PRE TKOF CHKLIST BOTH ABOVE AND BELOW THE LINE. ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT MY LEG, I STILL MANAGED A QUICK LOOK AT THE IMPACT OF THE NEW RWY AND ITS EFFECT ON OUR DEP, BOTH NORMAL AND IN THE EVENT OF AN ENG FAILURE. I ALSO NOTED AND SET THE NEW CHANGED DEP FREQ INTO THE 'ON-DECK' SELECTOR AND FINALLY, IN RESPONSE TO THE CAPT'S QUERY, QUICKLY CHKED THE ATOG FIGURES TO ASCERTAIN THAT WE WERE INDEED LEGAL TO TKOF. (WE HAD A SOUTHERLY WIND WHICH GAVE US A HEADWIND COMPONENT WHICH CAUSED THE CAPT TO CONSIDER THE RWY IN THE FIRST PLACE.) BY THIS TIME, THE PWR WAS COMING UP AND WE WERE ON OUR WAY. AFTER TKOF AND DURING THE CLBOUT, I BEGAN TO RECHK OUR NUMBERS AND I DISCOVERED THAT WE HAD EXCEEDED THE RWY ATOGW FOR THE NEW RWY. I WAS APPALLED AT MY UTTER FAILURE TO READ THE ATOG CHART CORRECTLY, IN MY HASTE TO COMPLETE ALL MY TASKS (PUSH BACK TO AIRBORNE TOOK 6 MINS). I READ THE WRONG COLUMN WHICH CAUSED ME TO THINK WE WERE WITHIN ATOG LIMITS WHEN, IN FACT, WE WERE NOT. PREVENTION 1) BETTER ADVANCE PREPARATION 2) A CHANGE IN PLANS SHOULD WARRANT A SECOND LOOK AT EVERYTHING 3) SLOW DOWN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 314806: FO WAS ASKED IF WE 'COULD DO IT' MEANING, ARE WE LEGAL AND UNDER THE GROSS TKOF WT TO USE THE RWY. THE FO LOOKED UP THE DATA (I PERSONALLY SAW HIM USE THE PROPER PERFORMANCE PAGE) AND ANNOUNCED 'YES.' THE BOTTOM LINE IN THE MATTER IS THE FO JUST MESSED UP. ALL PROCS WERE FOLLOWED CORRECTLY. DUE DILIGENCE WITH NORMAL DOUBLE CHKS. NO SHORTCUTS WERE MADE OF ANY KIND. THIS MISTAKE WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN OVERRUN OF THE RWY ONLY IF THE ABSOLUTE WORSE CASE ACCELERATE STOP ABORT SIT OCCURRED. NO DANGER WAS INVOLVED IN A SINGLE ENG TKOF (GO) LET ALONE NORMAL 2 ENG TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.