Narrative:

While taxiing for departure on the #2 engine only, we received the taxi clearance 'taxi via taxiway C and taxiway K, hold short runway 5.' as we taxied eastbound on taxiway C we completed the taxi checklist. Subsequently, a sabreliner appeared ahead of us taxiing from our left to right on taxiway B. We then received the clearance 'follow the sabreliner, cross runway 5, taxi to runway 34,' and we watched the sabreliner taxi via taxiway B, runway 16, runway 23, and turn left on taxiway K. Our taxi checklist complete, the copilot started the #1 engine as we approached the intersection of taxiway C and taxiway K. The action of starting the engine faulted the AC wild #2 generator, causing failure of the hydraulic system supplying the normal brakes. This occurred just prior to my applying the brakes for the 60 degree right turn to taxiway K. After realizing that the normal brakes were ineffective, I applied the emergency brakes but our momentum carried us onto runway 34 which was the active runway. The ground controller simply said 'oh you missed it, turn right on runway 23 and left on taxiway K,' which we did. The start sequence having been completed, the AC wild system was automatically reset restoring the normal brakes. We taxied without further incident. I attribute the cause to a series of decisions and occurrences, the removal of any one of which would have prevented the incident. Had we started the engine at any other time than the critical time that we chose, had the AC wild #2 not dropped off-line which neither of us had observed before, had we been at a lighter weight, then it would not have been a problem. Corrective action for this would be to anticipate the loss of normal braking at any time during taxi, and particularly during engine start. The taxi should be planned accordingly with caution exercised in the vicinity of active runways as at providence, ri, where the taxiway C to taxiway K intersection is a very short distance from the runway 16/34.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB. ENG START DISRUPTED ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT CAUSING BRAKE FAILURE. RWY INCURSION.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING FOR DEP ON THE #2 ENG ONLY, WE RECEIVED THE TAXI CLRNC 'TAXI VIA TXWY C AND TXWY K, HOLD SHORT RWY 5.' AS WE TAXIED EBOUND ON TXWY C WE COMPLETED THE TAXI CHKLIST. SUBSEQUENTLY, A SABRELINER APPEARED AHEAD OF US TAXIING FROM OUR L TO R ON TXWY B. WE THEN RECEIVED THE CLRNC 'FOLLOW THE SABRELINER, CROSS RWY 5, TAXI TO RWY 34,' AND WE WATCHED THE SABRELINER TAXI VIA TXWY B, RWY 16, RWY 23, AND TURN L ON TXWY K. OUR TAXI CHKLIST COMPLETE, THE COPLT STARTED THE #1 ENG AS WE APCHED THE INTXN OF TXWY C AND TXWY K. THE ACTION OF STARTING THE ENG FAULTED THE AC WILD #2 GENERATOR, CAUSING FAILURE OF THE HYD SYS SUPPLYING THE NORMAL BRAKES. THIS OCCURRED JUST PRIOR TO MY APPLYING THE BRAKES FOR THE 60 DEG R TURN TO TXWY K. AFTER REALIZING THAT THE NORMAL BRAKES WERE INEFFECTIVE, I APPLIED THE EMER BRAKES BUT OUR MOMENTUM CARRIED US ONTO RWY 34 WHICH WAS THE ACTIVE RWY. THE GND CTLR SIMPLY SAID 'OH YOU MISSED IT, TURN R ON RWY 23 AND L ON TXWY K,' WHICH WE DID. THE START SEQUENCE HAVING BEEN COMPLETED, THE AC WILD SYS WAS AUTOMATICALLY RESET RESTORING THE NORMAL BRAKES. WE TAXIED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I ATTRIBUTE THE CAUSE TO A SERIES OF DECISIONS AND OCCURRENCES, THE REMOVAL OF ANY ONE OF WHICH WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE INCIDENT. HAD WE STARTED THE ENG AT ANY OTHER TIME THAN THE CRITICAL TIME THAT WE CHOSE, HAD THE AC WILD #2 NOT DROPPED OFF-LINE WHICH NEITHER OF US HAD OBSERVED BEFORE, HAD WE BEEN AT A LIGHTER WT, THEN IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROB. CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THIS WOULD BE TO ANTICIPATE THE LOSS OF NORMAL BRAKING AT ANY TIME DURING TAXI, AND PARTICULARLY DURING ENG START. THE TAXI SHOULD BE PLANNED ACCORDINGLY WITH CAUTION EXERCISED IN THE VICINITY OF ACTIVE RWYS AS AT PROVIDENCE, RI, WHERE THE TXWY C TO TXWY K INTXN IS A VERY SHORT DISTANCE FROM THE RWY 16/34.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.