Narrative:

The event occurred during a microgravity mission where new parabolic trajectories and pilot procedures were being evaluated. The DC9 was inadvertently flown out of the franklin MOA airspace because the pilots were distracted from a normal routine, and navigation equipment was not readily interpreted in a timely manner. The only other aircraft in the immediate vicinity was an air carrier DC10 at FL310, and we were at approximately FL240 at the time. We had visual contact with the DC10 at all times. The DC9 had been cleared by ZOB to operate within the confines of the franklin MOA between FL180 and FL390. As usual, our instructions were to call cleveland when ready to depart the airspace. We are not required to remain with center while in the franklin, however as a matter of procedure, we usually keep our radio tuned to their frequency with the volume turned down. Just prior to the spillout, we had already performed a number of parabolic maneuvers, while heading towards the southeast. At 22 mi off the bad axe VOR, we were about 10 mi from the southeast boundary, and I called for a turn back to the northwest. At this time, the captain was in the left seat, I was in the right seat, and the third pilot was in the jumpseat. As the captain began to set up for the turn, a conversation was initiated by one of the crewmembers. This conversation distracted us from making the immediate turn as called for, and was perhaps a min or two long. As a result, we resumed the evaluation, intent on completing the task. A short time later I checked DME off bad axe, and noted that it was searching (unlocked). The third pilot then noted a flashing message on the right side GPS. I looked again at the DME, and after several seconds it locked, showing 52 mi. I told the captain to begin an immediate turn to the northwest, called center after turning the volume back up, and told the controller that we appeared to be out of the MOA. I also told him that we may have had a navigation problem since the DME was locking/unlocking, and I was unable to immediately interpret the GPS. Center confirmed that we were out of the airspace. I estimated that we were around FL240 when we began the turn to the northwest. I looked up and saw an airliner several thousand ft above and pointed it out to the crew. We maintained visual contact with the aircraft while completing the turn. I told center that we would continue our descent and level at FL220, and proceed back into the area. ZOB concurred. Back in the area we were asked to call center after landing because of the deviation from the MOA. I immediately implemented the following corrective actions: obtained a discrete UHF frequency of 309.9 MHZ, which we will have turned up over the cockpit intercom, and will monitor throughout all microgravity operations. I believe that our own intercom traffic at the time of incident probably blocked center's attempts to call us when they saw that we were flying out of our airspace. We will obtain a moving map display GPS system which will graphically show a birds- eye view of the aircraft position in the MOA. The trimble system we have used in the past only display CDI type information and are difficult to readily interpret when maneuvering in an irregularly shaped area. Our SOP's are being revised to emphasize situational awareness when navigating within special use airspace. Specific limitations on trajectory initiation within 15 mi of area boundaries are established, along with turn around criteria to ensure that airspace boundaries are not violated. Intercom procedures and the need to minimize talk over this system will be discussed and reinforced in all future crew briefings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE -- A FLT TEST ACFT OPERATING IN A MOA SPILLS OUT INTO CLASS 'A' AIRSPACE.

Narrative: THE EVENT OCCURRED DURING A MICROGRAVITY MISSION WHERE NEW PARABOLIC TRAJECTORIES AND PLT PROCS WERE BEING EVALUATED. THE DC9 WAS INADVERTENTLY FLOWN OUT OF THE FRANKLIN MOA AIRSPACE BECAUSE THE PLTS WERE DISTRACTED FROM A NORMAL ROUTINE, AND NAV EQUIP WAS NOT READILY INTERPRETED IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE ONLY OTHER ACFT IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY WAS AN ACR DC10 AT FL310, AND WE WERE AT APPROX FL240 AT THE TIME. WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE DC10 AT ALL TIMES. THE DC9 HAD BEEN CLRED BY ZOB TO OPERATE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE FRANKLIN MOA BTWN FL180 AND FL390. AS USUAL, OUR INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CALL CLEVELAND WHEN READY TO DEPART THE AIRSPACE. WE ARE NOT REQUIRED TO REMAIN WITH CTR WHILE IN THE FRANKLIN, HOWEVER AS A MATTER OF PROC, WE USUALLY KEEP OUR RADIO TUNED TO THEIR FREQ WITH THE VOLUME TURNED DOWN. JUST PRIOR TO THE SPILLOUT, WE HAD ALREADY PERFORMED A NUMBER OF PARABOLIC MANEUVERS, WHILE HDG TOWARDS THE SE. AT 22 MI OFF THE BAD AXE VOR, WE WERE ABOUT 10 MI FROM THE SE BOUNDARY, AND I CALLED FOR A TURN BACK TO THE NW. AT THIS TIME, THE CAPT WAS IN THE L SEAT, I WAS IN THE R SEAT, AND THE THIRD PLT WAS IN THE JUMPSEAT. AS THE CAPT BEGAN TO SET UP FOR THE TURN, A CONVERSATION WAS INITIATED BY ONE OF THE CREWMEMBERS. THIS CONVERSATION DISTRACTED US FROM MAKING THE IMMEDIATE TURN AS CALLED FOR, AND WAS PERHAPS A MIN OR TWO LONG. AS A RESULT, WE RESUMED THE EVALUATION, INTENT ON COMPLETING THE TASK. A SHORT TIME LATER I CHKED DME OFF BAD AXE, AND NOTED THAT IT WAS SEARCHING (UNLOCKED). THE THIRD PLT THEN NOTED A FLASHING MESSAGE ON THE R SIDE GPS. I LOOKED AGAIN AT THE DME, AND AFTER SEVERAL SECONDS IT LOCKED, SHOWING 52 MI. I TOLD THE CAPT TO BEGIN AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO THE NW, CALLED CTR AFTER TURNING THE VOLUME BACK UP, AND TOLD THE CTLR THAT WE APPEARED TO BE OUT OF THE MOA. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WE MAY HAVE HAD A NAV PROB SINCE THE DME WAS LOCKING/UNLOCKING, AND I WAS UNABLE TO IMMEDIATELY INTERPRET THE GPS. CTR CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE OUT OF THE AIRSPACE. I ESTIMATED THAT WE WERE AROUND FL240 WHEN WE BEGAN THE TURN TO THE NW. I LOOKED UP AND SAW AN AIRLINER SEVERAL THOUSAND FT ABOVE AND POINTED IT OUT TO THE CREW. WE MAINTAINED VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ACFT WHILE COMPLETING THE TURN. I TOLD CTR THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE OUR DSCNT AND LEVEL AT FL220, AND PROCEED BACK INTO THE AREA. ZOB CONCURRED. BACK IN THE AREA WE WERE ASKED TO CALL CTR AFTER LNDG BECAUSE OF THE DEV FROM THE MOA. I IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTED THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: OBTAINED A DISCRETE UHF FREQ OF 309.9 MHZ, WHICH WE WILL HAVE TURNED UP OVER THE COCKPIT INTERCOM, AND WILL MONITOR THROUGHOUT ALL MICROGRAVITY OPS. I BELIEVE THAT OUR OWN INTERCOM TFC AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT PROBABLY BLOCKED CTR'S ATTEMPTS TO CALL US WHEN THEY SAW THAT WE WERE FLYING OUT OF OUR AIRSPACE. WE WILL OBTAIN A MOVING MAP DISPLAY GPS SYS WHICH WILL GRAPHICALLY SHOW A BIRDS- EYE VIEW OF THE ACFT POS IN THE MOA. THE TRIMBLE SYS WE HAVE USED IN THE PAST ONLY DISPLAY CDI TYPE INFO AND ARE DIFFICULT TO READILY INTERPRET WHEN MANEUVERING IN AN IRREGULARLY SHAPED AREA. OUR SOP'S ARE BEING REVISED TO EMPHASIZE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WHEN NAVING WITHIN SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE. SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON TRAJECTORY INITIATION WITHIN 15 MI OF AREA BOUNDARIES ARE ESTABLISHED, ALONG WITH TURN AROUND CRITERIA TO ENSURE THAT AIRSPACE BOUNDARIES ARE NOT VIOLATED. INTERCOM PROCS AND THE NEED TO MINIMIZE TALK OVER THIS SYS WILL BE DISCUSSED AND REINFORCED IN ALL FUTURE CREW BRIEFINGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.