Narrative:

I was performing a 'stage check' for a japanese national candidate for the commercial multi-engine rating. The stage check was to determine if the candidate was ready for the chkride. The candidate had about 20-30 hours of multi-engine training time. Being a japanese national, he spoke english with an accent. However, prior to takeoff, I determined that we could understand each other. En route to wheeler army airfield, I thought the candidate told me that he was going to climb to 3500 ft. Upon reaching altitude, he reported '3500 ft.' a few mins later, I quickly glanced at the altimeter and saw that we were still in a climb to what I initially thought was 3900 ft. At this time, I turned off the fuel to the right engine and expected the candidate to recover and restart the engine. However, I then noticed that we appeared to be lower than normal. I checked the altimeter and noted to my dismay that we were at 2800 ft. What had happened was the japanese candidate, who spoke with an accent, had told me that he was going to climb to 2500 ft, not 3500 ft as I had believed he had said. Unfortunately, his '2' and '3' numbers sounded very similar, especially through our headsets. I had simply assumed that we were at 3500 ft and misread the altimeter in my quick glance. The candidate appeared to be confused in identing and securing the 'dead' right engine. He feathered the correct right engine but then followed this with the mistake of throttling back the 'good' left engine. This loss of power caused the aircraft to rapidly descend. I immediately pushed the throttle back in but we had already lost a lot of altitude. After repeatedly giving instructions, it appeared that the candidate was totally confused and not able to comply. I took over the controls, turned to the field and set up for an emergency landing at wheeler. I was able to maintain altitude and continued to try to start the engine. While on extended left base to the runway, we were able to get the right engine to restart. We entered a climb and continued our flight. The rest of the flight was uneventful. I learned several things from this flight. I will always check and rechk the altimeter and outside visual cues before shutting down the engine. Part of my problem was that I had thought I heard something (ie, 3500 ft versus 2500 ft) and assumed it was correct. I did not really check the altimeter and outside visual cues to verify the information. The next mistake I made was waiting too long before taking control of the aircraft. Despite repeated instructions from me, the candidate was unable to perform the required procedure and in fact, contributed to our descent. I should have not waited until we lost valuable altitude and should have initiated corrective action much sooner.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR WITH MULTI-ENG STUDENT HAS ENG PROBS AT LOW ALT.

Narrative: I WAS PERFORMING A 'STAGE CHK' FOR A JAPANESE NATIONAL CANDIDATE FOR THE COMMERCIAL MULTI-ENG RATING. THE STAGE CHK WAS TO DETERMINE IF THE CANDIDATE WAS READY FOR THE CHKRIDE. THE CANDIDATE HAD ABOUT 20-30 HRS OF MULTI-ENG TRAINING TIME. BEING A JAPANESE NATIONAL, HE SPOKE ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT. HOWEVER, PRIOR TO TKOF, I DETERMINED THAT WE COULD UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. ENRTE TO WHEELER ARMY AIRFIELD, I THOUGHT THE CANDIDATE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO CLB TO 3500 FT. UPON REACHING ALT, HE RPTED '3500 FT.' A FEW MINS LATER, I QUICKLY GLANCED AT THE ALTIMETER AND SAW THAT WE WERE STILL IN A CLB TO WHAT I INITIALLY THOUGHT WAS 3900 FT. AT THIS TIME, I TURNED OFF THE FUEL TO THE R ENG AND EXPECTED THE CANDIDATE TO RECOVER AND RESTART THE ENG. HOWEVER, I THEN NOTICED THAT WE APPEARED TO BE LOWER THAN NORMAL. I CHKED THE ALTIMETER AND NOTED TO MY DISMAY THAT WE WERE AT 2800 FT. WHAT HAD HAPPENED WAS THE JAPANESE CANDIDATE, WHO SPOKE WITH AN ACCENT, HAD TOLD ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO CLB TO 2500 FT, NOT 3500 FT AS I HAD BELIEVED HE HAD SAID. UNFORTUNATELY, HIS '2' AND '3' NUMBERS SOUNDED VERY SIMILAR, ESPECIALLY THROUGH OUR HEADSETS. I HAD SIMPLY ASSUMED THAT WE WERE AT 3500 FT AND MISREAD THE ALTIMETER IN MY QUICK GLANCE. THE CANDIDATE APPEARED TO BE CONFUSED IN IDENTING AND SECURING THE 'DEAD' R ENG. HE FEATHERED THE CORRECT R ENG BUT THEN FOLLOWED THIS WITH THE MISTAKE OF THROTTLING BACK THE 'GOOD' L ENG. THIS LOSS OF PWR CAUSED THE ACFT TO RAPIDLY DSND. I IMMEDIATELY PUSHED THE THROTTLE BACK IN BUT WE HAD ALREADY LOST A LOT OF ALT. AFTER REPEATEDLY GIVING INSTRUCTIONS, IT APPEARED THAT THE CANDIDATE WAS TOTALLY CONFUSED AND NOT ABLE TO COMPLY. I TOOK OVER THE CTLS, TURNED TO THE FIELD AND SET UP FOR AN EMER LNDG AT WHEELER. I WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN ALT AND CONTINUED TO TRY TO START THE ENG. WHILE ON EXTENDED L BASE TO THE RWY, WE WERE ABLE TO GET THE R ENG TO RESTART. WE ENTERED A CLB AND CONTINUED OUR FLT. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. I LEARNED SEVERAL THINGS FROM THIS FLT. I WILL ALWAYS CHK AND RECHK THE ALTIMETER AND OUTSIDE VISUAL CUES BEFORE SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG. PART OF MY PROB WAS THAT I HAD THOUGHT I HEARD SOMETHING (IE, 3500 FT VERSUS 2500 FT) AND ASSUMED IT WAS CORRECT. I DID NOT REALLY CHK THE ALTIMETER AND OUTSIDE VISUAL CUES TO VERIFY THE INFO. THE NEXT MISTAKE I MADE WAS WAITING TOO LONG BEFORE TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT. DESPITE REPEATED INSTRUCTIONS FROM ME, THE CANDIDATE WAS UNABLE TO PERFORM THE REQUIRED PROC AND IN FACT, CONTRIBUTED TO OUR DSCNT. I SHOULD HAVE NOT WAITED UNTIL WE LOST VALUABLE ALT AND SHOULD HAVE INITIATED CORRECTIVE ACTION MUCH SOONER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.