Narrative:

After a freight drop-off at ysn, I moved from my position of required sic (first officer) to the jump seat for the part 91 flight back to home base, at the captain's request. The communication-instrument multi rated observer on the far part 135 freight flight to ysn took over as sic for the part 91 return flight. At ysn, we were talking with canadian FSS on field, using airport advisory service. In a hurry to get off the ground as usual, the captain and sic were hurrying through checklists while I was settled into the observer's seat, locked into takeoff position, facing away from the cockpit. This was one of 2 position of the jump seat, the other facing the cockpit but producing very close quarters in the cockpit. Our clearance was to depart runway 24 I believe, as part of the IFR clearance, 'cleared to yip via..., routing..., depart runway 24 on runway heading radar vectors on course, etc.' the captain taxied onto the runway and the sic made the takeoff. The captain always taxies, due to the tiller being on the left side only. After takeoff, the captain and sic remarked that the runway seemed much shorter than the depicted 5000 ft. About this time FSS told us we had departed runway 01, which (I believe that was the runway) had only 2000 ft. Our aircraft is a STOL aircraft, so the takeoff was not a problem. During climb out, while discussing the mix-up on takeoff, and also while trying to figure out our routing using an NDB airway, which we are not used to, the sic (who was PF) climbed to 8600 ft before the captain caught it. We immediately descended to our cleared altitude of 8000 ft. In both events, I was in the jump seat, facing the cargo compartment. I do not believe I am legally responsible for either event, but had I positioned the jump seat to face the cockpit, I probably could have noticed and idented both incidents before they happened. I will do so in future similar circumstances. Although with the seat in that position, the cockpit is cluttered, a 3RD set of eyes unconcerned with checklists or navigation would be excellent insurance. What caused the first event was rushing through the checklists and hurrying to get in the air. The second was merely caused by both pilots becoming too concerned with navigation that should have been figured out prior to takeoff. More time must be spent on the ground to assure correct taxi paths and also to contemplate routing and clearance ahead of time, when there is much less workload on the pilots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY TRANSGRESSION, ALT BUST. NON TWR ARPT. NON RADAR DEP PROC.

Narrative: AFTER A FREIGHT DROP-OFF AT YSN, I MOVED FROM MY POS OF REQUIRED SIC (FO) TO THE JUMP SEAT FOR THE PART 91 FLT BACK TO HOME BASE, AT THE CAPT'S REQUEST. THE COM-INST MULTI RATED OBSERVER ON THE FAR PART 135 FREIGHT FLT TO YSN TOOK OVER AS SIC FOR THE PART 91 RETURN FLT. AT YSN, WE WERE TALKING WITH CANADIAN FSS ON FIELD, USING ARPT ADVISORY SVC. IN A HURRY TO GET OFF THE GND AS USUAL, THE CAPT AND SIC WERE HURRYING THROUGH CHKLISTS WHILE I WAS SETTLED INTO THE OBSERVER'S SEAT, LOCKED INTO TKOF POS, FACING AWAY FROM THE COCKPIT. THIS WAS ONE OF 2 POS OF THE JUMP SEAT, THE OTHER FACING THE COCKPIT BUT PRODUCING VERY CLOSE QUARTERS IN THE COCKPIT. OUR CLRNC WAS TO DEPART RWY 24 I BELIEVE, AS PART OF THE IFR CLRNC, 'CLRED TO YIP VIA..., ROUTING..., DEPART RWY 24 ON RWY HDG RADAR VECTORS ON COURSE, ETC.' THE CAPT TAXIED ONTO THE RWY AND THE SIC MADE THE TKOF. THE CAPT ALWAYS TAXIES, DUE TO THE TILLER BEING ON THE L SIDE ONLY. AFTER TKOF, THE CAPT AND SIC REMARKED THAT THE RWY SEEMED MUCH SHORTER THAN THE DEPICTED 5000 FT. ABOUT THIS TIME FSS TOLD US WE HAD DEPARTED RWY 01, WHICH (I BELIEVE THAT WAS THE RWY) HAD ONLY 2000 FT. OUR ACFT IS A STOL ACFT, SO THE TKOF WAS NOT A PROB. DURING CLBOUT, WHILE DISCUSSING THE MIX-UP ON TKOF, AND ALSO WHILE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT OUR ROUTING USING AN NDB AIRWAY, WHICH WE ARE NOT USED TO, THE SIC (WHO WAS PF) CLBED TO 8600 FT BEFORE THE CAPT CAUGHT IT. WE IMMEDIATELY DSNDED TO OUR CLRED ALT OF 8000 FT. IN BOTH EVENTS, I WAS IN THE JUMP SEAT, FACING THE CARGO COMPARTMENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE I AM LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR EITHER EVENT, BUT HAD I POSITIONED THE JUMP SEAT TO FACE THE COCKPIT, I PROBABLY COULD HAVE NOTICED AND IDENTED BOTH INCIDENTS BEFORE THEY HAPPENED. I WILL DO SO IN FUTURE SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. ALTHOUGH WITH THE SEAT IN THAT POS, THE COCKPIT IS CLUTTERED, A 3RD SET OF EYES UNCONCERNED WITH CHKLISTS OR NAV WOULD BE EXCELLENT INSURANCE. WHAT CAUSED THE FIRST EVENT WAS RUSHING THROUGH THE CHKLISTS AND HURRYING TO GET IN THE AIR. THE SECOND WAS MERELY CAUSED BY BOTH PLTS BECOMING TOO CONCERNED WITH NAV THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIGURED OUT PRIOR TO TKOF. MORE TIME MUST BE SPENT ON THE GND TO ASSURE CORRECT TAXI PATHS AND ALSO TO CONTEMPLATE ROUTING AND CLRNC AHEAD OF TIME, WHEN THERE IS MUCH LESS WORKLOAD ON THE PLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.