Narrative:

The mission was 'air combat' flown by a demonstration company. The flight consisted of aircraft #1 (potential new instructor on orientation flight/company instructor) and aircraft #2 (customer/company instructor). Flight profile consisted of takeoff, join-up, in-trail gunsight tracking exercises, practice basic fighter maneuvers, 4 air combat maneuvering engagements and return to base. All was uneventful up to in-trail gunsight tracking exercise. #2 was in lead with #1 1000 ft trail, #2 started easy s- turns to allow #1 tracking exercise. #1 closed to about 400 ft and eased off to the right. The potential new instructor was flying the aircraft. As #2 started a right turn, #1 was closing to about 200 ft as if on a re-join line. The pilot flying increased bank to stay on the inside of the turn and lost sight of #2 aircraft. As the instructor of #1 aircraft came on the controls to effect evasive action, the 2 aircraft collided. Both aircraft remained flyable and returned to north las vegas airport for straight-in lndgs. Human factors involved: aircraft #1, PF experienced pilot, ATP, over 500 hours acrobatic instruction and formation experience. Introduction to company as instructor. PNF (company instructor), retired air force fighter pilot. Over 4000 hours time, 2000 hours instructor time. ATP, airline pilot. Aircraft #2, company instructor. Over 2500 hours fighter and instructor experience. Customer, no aviation experience. It is the responsibility of the #1 aircraft to maintain separation (500 ft bubble) during this maneuver. PF maneuvered too close and then, instead of reducing bank and power to pass below and behind at depiction #4, he increased bank (to stay on inside of turn), lost sight, and failed to take proper action. PNF allowed PF to go too far and place him in position where he could not see aircraft #2, because of the perceived experienced level of PF and the desire to observe his reaction to the closure problem. PNF gave range estimates and warning 'don't hit the guy' (as a chuckle), but did not give specific, directive commands until too late. Instructor came on the control with the perceived time to be able to climb and pull to ensure flight path deconfliction. As the instructor came on the controls, he made a call to the #2 aircraft to 'roll out' and then the collision occurred. Too little reaction, too late. Lessons learned: aircraft #1 -- PF: never lose sight of the aircraft you are maneuvering off of. When flying 2 aircraft maneuvers, mentally review or brief planned actions for closure problems and how to avoid conflicts. Swallow pride and if unsure, ask questions. PNF: it always seems the most dangerous sits occur with 2 experienced pilots at the controls. As the instructor there is a fine line between observing the actions/reactions of a candidate instructor and maintaining safety of flight. In this situation, the instructor allowed the events to occur until he could not salvage the situation. Aircraft #2 instructor: in my opinion, not directly responsible for this incident, but from a 'defensive flying' perspective, a couple of things to learn: anytime an aircraft is maneuvering near you/off of you, strive to keep him in sight, ie, never trust anyone. Whenever initiating turns, as in this case reversing direction of turn, clear your flight path to the inside of the turn. Management: decision to fill the 'empty seat' with a non-customer was based on the perception to keep the 'fight' equal for the customer and the desire to obtain additional instructors. Overall a sound decision, however it was a last minute change and the instructor candidate did not receive a briefing on the planned maneuvers. The instructor of aircraft #1 found this out at the aircraft and was going to demonstrate each maneuver prior to letting the candidate fly. In retrospect, management and instructor pilot should have insisted he receive a normal mission briefing prior to flying his first ride. Conclusion: 4 people are very lucky to be alive to pass this information along so others may learn. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is currently an aircraft pilot flying the B737. He is a retiredmil fighter pilot with about 4000 hours in tactical aircraft. He was originally the lead aircraft, then switched to the wing position when the incident occurred. He readily admits that he ran into the other aircraft. There were no injuries. The reporter's aircraft received a damaged wingtip, the other aircraft received skin damage to the wing. There was an FAA investigation which resulted in no action. The official determination was 'incident.' the reporter also admits that he did not take over the controls of the aircraft soon enough.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MID AIR COLLISION BTWN 2 ACFT DOING AN AIR COMBAT MANEUVER DEMONSTRATION AND TRAINING.

Narrative: THE MISSION WAS 'AIR COMBAT' FLOWN BY A DEMONSTRATION COMPANY. THE FLT CONSISTED OF ACFT #1 (POTENTIAL NEW INSTRUCTOR ON ORIENTATION FLT/COMPANY INSTRUCTOR) AND ACFT #2 (CUSTOMER/COMPANY INSTRUCTOR). FLT PROFILE CONSISTED OF TKOF, JOIN-UP, IN-TRAIL GUNSIGHT TRACKING EXERCISES, PRACTICE BASIC FIGHTER MANEUVERS, 4 AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING ENGAGEMENTS AND RETURN TO BASE. ALL WAS UNEVENTFUL UP TO IN-TRAIL GUNSIGHT TRACKING EXERCISE. #2 WAS IN LEAD WITH #1 1000 FT TRAIL, #2 STARTED EASY S- TURNS TO ALLOW #1 TRACKING EXERCISE. #1 CLOSED TO ABOUT 400 FT AND EASED OFF TO THE R. THE POTENTIAL NEW INSTRUCTOR WAS FLYING THE ACFT. AS #2 STARTED A R TURN, #1 WAS CLOSING TO ABOUT 200 FT AS IF ON A RE-JOIN LINE. THE PLT FLYING INCREASED BANK TO STAY ON THE INSIDE OF THE TURN AND LOST SIGHT OF #2 ACFT. AS THE INSTRUCTOR OF #1 ACFT CAME ON THE CTLS TO EFFECT EVASIVE ACTION, THE 2 ACFT COLLIDED. BOTH ACFT REMAINED FLYABLE AND RETURNED TO NORTH LAS VEGAS ARPT FOR STRAIGHT-IN LNDGS. HUMAN FACTORS INVOLVED: ACFT #1, PF EXPERIENCED PLT, ATP, OVER 500 HRS ACROBATIC INSTRUCTION AND FORMATION EXPERIENCE. INTRODUCTION TO COMPANY AS INSTRUCTOR. PNF (COMPANY INSTRUCTOR), RETIRED AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLT. OVER 4000 HRS TIME, 2000 HRS INSTRUCTOR TIME. ATP, AIRLINE PLT. ACFT #2, COMPANY INSTRUCTOR. OVER 2500 HRS FIGHTER AND INSTRUCTOR EXPERIENCE. CUSTOMER, NO AVIATION EXPERIENCE. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE #1 ACFT TO MAINTAIN SEPARATION (500 FT BUBBLE) DURING THIS MANEUVER. PF MANEUVERED TOO CLOSE AND THEN, INSTEAD OF REDUCING BANK AND PWR TO PASS BELOW AND BEHIND AT DEPICTION #4, HE INCREASED BANK (TO STAY ON INSIDE OF TURN), LOST SIGHT, AND FAILED TO TAKE PROPER ACTION. PNF ALLOWED PF TO GO TOO FAR AND PLACE HIM IN POS WHERE HE COULD NOT SEE ACFT #2, BECAUSE OF THE PERCEIVED EXPERIENCED LEVEL OF PF AND THE DESIRE TO OBSERVE HIS REACTION TO THE CLOSURE PROB. PNF GAVE RANGE ESTIMATES AND WARNING 'DON'T HIT THE GUY' (AS A CHUCKLE), BUT DID NOT GIVE SPECIFIC, DIRECTIVE COMMANDS UNTIL TOO LATE. INSTRUCTOR CAME ON THE CTL WITH THE PERCEIVED TIME TO BE ABLE TO CLB AND PULL TO ENSURE FLT PATH DECONFLICTION. AS THE INSTRUCTOR CAME ON THE CTLS, HE MADE A CALL TO THE #2 ACFT TO 'ROLL OUT' AND THEN THE COLLISION OCCURRED. TOO LITTLE REACTION, TOO LATE. LESSONS LEARNED: ACFT #1 -- PF: NEVER LOSE SIGHT OF THE ACFT YOU ARE MANEUVERING OFF OF. WHEN FLYING 2 ACFT MANEUVERS, MENTALLY REVIEW OR BRIEF PLANNED ACTIONS FOR CLOSURE PROBS AND HOW TO AVOID CONFLICTS. SWALLOW PRIDE AND IF UNSURE, ASK QUESTIONS. PNF: IT ALWAYS SEEMS THE MOST DANGEROUS SITS OCCUR WITH 2 EXPERIENCED PLTS AT THE CTLS. AS THE INSTRUCTOR THERE IS A FINE LINE BTWN OBSERVING THE ACTIONS/REACTIONS OF A CANDIDATE INSTRUCTOR AND MAINTAINING SAFETY OF FLT. IN THIS SIT, THE INSTRUCTOR ALLOWED THE EVENTS TO OCCUR UNTIL HE COULD NOT SALVAGE THE SIT. ACFT #2 INSTRUCTOR: IN MY OPINION, NOT DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS INCIDENT, BUT FROM A 'DEFENSIVE FLYING' PERSPECTIVE, A COUPLE OF THINGS TO LEARN: ANYTIME AN ACFT IS MANEUVERING NEAR YOU/OFF OF YOU, STRIVE TO KEEP HIM IN SIGHT, IE, NEVER TRUST ANYONE. WHENEVER INITIATING TURNS, AS IN THIS CASE REVERSING DIRECTION OF TURN, CLR YOUR FLT PATH TO THE INSIDE OF THE TURN. MANAGEMENT: DECISION TO FILL THE 'EMPTY SEAT' WITH A NON-CUSTOMER WAS BASED ON THE PERCEPTION TO KEEP THE 'FIGHT' EQUAL FOR THE CUSTOMER AND THE DESIRE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTORS. OVERALL A SOUND DECISION, HOWEVER IT WAS A LAST MINUTE CHANGE AND THE INSTRUCTOR CANDIDATE DID NOT RECEIVE A BRIEFING ON THE PLANNED MANEUVERS. THE INSTRUCTOR OF ACFT #1 FOUND THIS OUT AT THE ACFT AND WAS GOING TO DEMONSTRATE EACH MANEUVER PRIOR TO LETTING THE CANDIDATE FLY. IN RETROSPECT, MGMNT AND INSTRUCTOR PLT SHOULD HAVE INSISTED HE RECEIVE A NORMAL MISSION BRIEFING PRIOR TO FLYING HIS FIRST RIDE. CONCLUSION: 4 PEOPLE ARE VERY LUCKY TO BE ALIVE TO PASS THIS INFO ALONG SO OTHERS MAY LEARN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS CURRENTLY AN ACFT PLT FLYING THE B737. HE IS A RETIREDMIL FIGHTER PLT WITH ABOUT 4000 HRS IN TACTICAL ACFT. HE WAS ORIGINALLY THE LEAD ACFT, THEN SWITCHED TO THE WING POS WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. HE READILY ADMITS THAT HE RAN INTO THE OTHER ACFT. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE RPTR'S ACFT RECEIVED A DAMAGED WINGTIP, THE OTHER ACFT RECEIVED SKIN DAMAGE TO THE WING. THERE WAS AN FAA INVESTIGATION WHICH RESULTED IN NO ACTION. THE OFFICIAL DETERMINATION WAS 'INCIDENT.' THE RPTR ALSO ADMITS THAT HE DID NOT TAKE OVER THE CTLS OF THE ACFT SOON ENOUGH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.