Narrative:

Normal flight from mkg to dtw. Final checks completed. At 500 ft AGL, 2 red hydraulic warning lights appear on panel and hydraulic gauge goes to zero. I immediately told first officer to release mechanical uplocks for gear as a precaution. As he's doing this ATC tells us, 'cleared to land runway 21L, hold short runway 27L.' smoke begins billowing into airplane. First officer tells ATC unable hold short and smoke in airplane. Keep in mind a go around is not an option because if I have to shut an engine down, it's all over, with gear and flaps stuck down. I told first officer dump cabin and bleeds off and fresh air for override. I'm flying airplane, can't see anything, too much smoke in cockpit and cabin. Landed safely. Did emergency shutdown and passenger evacuate/evacuation. No passenger injured. However, ATC calls and asks, why couldn't I hold short of runway 27L? I'm sure, with no hydraulics and smoke billowing into cabin. Found ruptured forward hydraulic line burst, sending flammable fluid into flammable drain, and out of airplane where it was sucked into cooling turbine and engine. Airplane was covered in red hydraulic fluid. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter's primary concern with this incident involved the location of one of the flammable fluid drains on the swearingen FA22. One of the forward drains is located under the captain's seat on the left side of the aircraft belly. As a result of the aircraft's pitch attitude during approach, the fluid exited through this forward drain and followed the airflow into the air cycle machine and engine. The fluid's entry into the acm caused smoke, and its engine coating and ingestion placed the aircraft at risk to fire. FA22 red hydraulic lights indicate system pressure and the hydraulic gauge indicates fluid quantity. The lights and quantity indicated that the aircraft experienced a total loss of hydraulics. Procedural response was to release the mechanical uplocks to ensure gear extension. Gear, then, would lock in extended position with over-ctring locks. Reporter also stated that the flight crew could not communicate easily with ATC as a result of frequency congestion associated with crash, fire, and rescue response. Captain stated that he flew the airplane first, choosing not to become involved with the radio communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMOKE ASSOCIATED WITH SMOLDERING HYD FLUID HYD FAILURE ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND CABIN OF AN FA22. CRASH, FIRE, AND RESCUE RESPONSE. ACFT EQUIP PROB HYD FAILURE. ACFT POS ALT FINAL APCH.

Narrative: NORMAL FLT FROM MKG TO DTW. FINAL CHKS COMPLETED. AT 500 FT AGL, 2 RED HYD WARNING LIGHTS APPEAR ON PANEL AND HYD GAUGE GOES TO ZERO. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD FO TO RELEASE MECHANICAL UPLOCKS FOR GEAR AS A PRECAUTION. AS HE'S DOING THIS ATC TELLS US, 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 21L, HOLD SHORT RWY 27L.' SMOKE BEGINS BILLOWING INTO AIRPLANE. FO TELLS ATC UNABLE HOLD SHORT AND SMOKE IN AIRPLANE. KEEP IN MIND A GAR IS NOT AN OPTION BECAUSE IF I HAVE TO SHUT AN ENG DOWN, IT'S ALL OVER, WITH GEAR AND FLAPS STUCK DOWN. I TOLD FO DUMP CABIN AND BLEEDS OFF AND FRESH AIR FOR OVERRIDE. I'M FLYING AIRPLANE, CAN'T SEE ANYTHING, TOO MUCH SMOKE IN COCKPIT AND CABIN. LANDED SAFELY. DID EMER SHUTDOWN AND PAX EVAC. NO PAX INJURED. HOWEVER, ATC CALLS AND ASKS, WHY COULDN'T I HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L? I'M SURE, WITH NO HYDS AND SMOKE BILLOWING INTO CABIN. FOUND RUPTURED FORWARD HYD LINE BURST, SENDING FLAMMABLE FLUID INTO FLAMMABLE DRAIN, AND OUT OF AIRPLANE WHERE IT WAS SUCKED INTO COOLING TURBINE AND ENG. AIRPLANE WAS COVERED IN RED HYD FLUID. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR'S PRIMARY CONCERN WITH THIS INCIDENT INVOLVED THE LOCATION OF ONE OF THE FLAMMABLE FLUID DRAINS ON THE SWEARINGEN FA22. ONE OF THE FORWARD DRAINS IS LOCATED UNDER THE CAPT'S SEAT ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT BELLY. AS A RESULT OF THE ACFT'S PITCH ATTITUDE DURING APCH, THE FLUID EXITED THROUGH THIS FORWARD DRAIN AND FOLLOWED THE AIRFLOW INTO THE AIR CYCLE MACHINE AND ENG. THE FLUID'S ENTRY INTO THE ACM CAUSED SMOKE, AND ITS ENG COATING AND INGESTION PLACED THE ACFT AT RISK TO FIRE. FA22 RED HYD LIGHTS INDICATE SYS PRESSURE AND THE HYD GAUGE INDICATES FLUID QUANTITY. THE LIGHTS AND QUANTITY INDICATED THAT THE ACFT EXPERIENCED A TOTAL LOSS OF HYDS. PROCEDURAL RESPONSE WAS TO RELEASE THE MECHANICAL UPLOCKS TO ENSURE GEAR EXTENSION. GEAR, THEN, WOULD LOCK IN EXTENDED POS WITH OVER-CTRING LOCKS. RPTR ALSO STATED THAT THE FLC COULD NOT COMMUNICATE EASILY WITH ATC AS A RESULT OF FREQ CONGESTION ASSOCIATED WITH CRASH, FIRE, AND RESCUE RESPONSE. CAPT STATED THAT HE FLEW THE AIRPLANE FIRST, CHOOSING NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE RADIO COM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.