Narrative:

At 14000 ft MSL the AT42, in cruise flight, indicated a master warning for electrical smoke. We donned oxygen masks and goggles and declared an emergency with ATC. We requested vectors to the nearest airport which was 25 mi northwest of our position. The captain (PNF) executed the checklist and notified the flight attendant of our problem. She told us there was smoke in the cabin also. Approximately 5 mi out of binghamton the airplane began to buffet and shake, and the left engine failed. The captain secured the left engine. We attempted to lower the gear on a 2 mi final and it failed to extend. We executed a single-engine go around and circled to land. I manually lowered the gear and we landed at bgm. We executed the ground evacuation procedure and secured the airplane. We notified our company immediately of our problem. Using the oxygen masks in the ATR and trying to communicate with multiple failures is an emergency in itself. There should be a better oxygen system for communication because the masks were the largest distraction in the event. All passenger and crew were unharmed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the master warning for electrical smoke had the crew believing that they were having an electrical problem. They were following the checklist line items and load shedding when the engine failed. The PF states that he thought the airplane was coming apart. It turned out, the smoke was not electrical smoke, and there was no electrical problem. The electric compartment smoke detection was activated by smoke that resulted from leaking oil that was sucked into the inlet. The oil leak came from the compressor turbine bearing ceasing. The gear, of course, wouldn't extend because the electrical system had essentially been shut down. (The gear is electrically actuated and hydraulically controled.) first officer reports that the single-engine go around went as trained, but emphasized, again, that the oxygen masks were a big distraction and interfered with crew performance. The headsets would not fit with the mask, so time was lost in transitioning to the speakers, and dealing with the intracockpit communication noise associated problems. Reporter feels that if his training had been done in the simulator, instead of the aircraft, there would not have been a problem with the use of the crew oxygen masks.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AT42 ENG FAILURE WAS PRECEDED BY FALSE ELECTRICAL SMOKE INDICATIONS. FLC'S CHKLIST RESPONSE OF LOAD SHEDDING CONTRIBUTED TO GEAR EXTENSION FAILURE, AND RESULTING GAR. ACFT EQUIP PROB COMPRESSOR BEARING FAILURE AND SUBSEQUENT ENG FAILURE. EMER DECLARED.

Narrative: AT 14000 FT MSL THE AT42, IN CRUISE FLT, INDICATED A MASTER WARNING FOR ELECTRICAL SMOKE. WE DONNED OXYGEN MASKS AND GOGGLES AND DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC. WE REQUESTED VECTORS TO THE NEAREST ARPT WHICH WAS 25 MI NW OF OUR POS. THE CAPT (PNF) EXECUTED THE CHKLIST AND NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANT OF OUR PROB. SHE TOLD US THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN ALSO. APPROX 5 MI OUT OF BINGHAMTON THE AIRPLANE BEGAN TO BUFFET AND SHAKE, AND THE L ENG FAILED. THE CAPT SECURED THE L ENG. WE ATTEMPTED TO LOWER THE GEAR ON A 2 MI FINAL AND IT FAILED TO EXTEND. WE EXECUTED A SINGLE-ENG GAR AND CIRCLED TO LAND. I MANUALLY LOWERED THE GEAR AND WE LANDED AT BGM. WE EXECUTED THE GND EVACUATION PROC AND SECURED THE AIRPLANE. WE NOTIFIED OUR COMPANY IMMEDIATELY OF OUR PROB. USING THE OXYGEN MASKS IN THE ATR AND TRYING TO COMMUNICATE WITH MULTIPLE FAILURES IS AN EMER IN ITSELF. THERE SHOULD BE A BETTER OXYGEN SYS FOR COM BECAUSE THE MASKS WERE THE LARGEST DISTR IN THE EVENT. ALL PAX AND CREW WERE UNHARMED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE MASTER WARNING FOR ELECTRICAL SMOKE HAD THE CREW BELIEVING THAT THEY WERE HAVING AN ELECTRICAL PROB. THEY WERE FOLLOWING THE CHKLIST LINE ITEMS AND LOAD SHEDDING WHEN THE ENG FAILED. THE PF STATES THAT HE THOUGHT THE AIRPLANE WAS COMING APART. IT TURNED OUT, THE SMOKE WAS NOT ELECTRICAL SMOKE, AND THERE WAS NO ELECTRICAL PROB. THE ELECTRIC COMPARTMENT SMOKE DETECTION WAS ACTIVATED BY SMOKE THAT RESULTED FROM LEAKING OIL THAT WAS SUCKED INTO THE INLET. THE OIL LEAK CAME FROM THE COMPRESSOR TURBINE BEARING CEASING. THE GEAR, OF COURSE, WOULDN'T EXTEND BECAUSE THE ELECTRICAL SYS HAD ESSENTIALLY BEEN SHUT DOWN. (THE GEAR IS ELECTRICALLY ACTUATED AND HYDRAULICALLY CTLED.) FO RPTS THAT THE SINGLE-ENG GAR WENT AS TRAINED, BUT EMPHASIZED, AGAIN, THAT THE OXYGEN MASKS WERE A BIG DISTR AND INTERFERED WITH CREW PERFORMANCE. THE HEADSETS WOULD NOT FIT WITH THE MASK, SO TIME WAS LOST IN TRANSITIONING TO THE SPEAKERS, AND DEALING WITH THE INTRACOCKPIT COM NOISE ASSOCIATED PROBS. RPTR FEELS THAT IF HIS TRAINING HAD BEEN DONE IN THE SIMULATOR, INSTEAD OF THE ACFT, THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROB WITH THE USE OF THE CREW OXYGEN MASKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.