Air carrier flight crew crosses an active runway without permission. Flight crew was distraction by ...

Attributes
ACN	320219
Time
Date	199511
Day	Sat
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : pbi
State Reference	FL
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : hou
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	Other Other
Flight Phase	ground other : taxi
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : instrument
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 120 flight time total : 8500 flight time type : 3600
ASRS Report	320219
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 5500 flight time type : 2000
ASRS Report	320215
Events
Anomaly	incursion : runway other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other controllera other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	faa : reviewed incident with flight crew
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

It was our first flight of the day on day 4. During pushback we started the left engine for the single engine taxi. The engine started but the temperature peaked very near the maximum. Immediately after engine start, the first officer called for taxi. The taxi instructions were to 'taxi to runway 9L, hold short of runway 13.' after reading back the clearance, including the hold short instructions, the first officer questioned the departure runway since runway 27R was indicated for departure on the ATIS. This resulted in a conversation with ground control indicating that the airport had been turned around and relaying the new winds. As we turned out of the ramp area, passing around the firehouse, we were able to see the departure end of runway 9L. It appeared that we would be #1 for takeoff. The first officer sensing a need to get the second engine started in time for a proper warm up before departure, began turning the right engine. He simultaneously began reading the taxi checklist. I asked him to delay the checklist until after engine start so he could devote his attention to the engine. I was also concerned about the start egt on the left engine and was watching the right engine start. I diverted my attention from the taxiway and our taxi instructions. As we were approaching the intersection of the taxiway and runway 13, I looked up and saw the runway marker. I then looked to the approach end and saw the landing lights of an aircraft on final. Seeing the aircraft I remembered my 'hold short' clearance. At this point, with the right engine just started (both engines running) and close to the runway, I made the decision that it would not be possible to stop without encroaching on the runway. I added power on the left engine only (the right engine had just spooled up to idle power) and continued across the runway. The light twin did not touch down until we were well clear of the runway, although, I'm sure he was not comfortable with our crossing and possible jet blast. At this time the ground controller noticed our position and reminded us that our clearance was to hold short of runway 13. The copilot issued our apologies and we continued, healthy, though somewhat shaken because of the serious error I had just made. Our later discussion of the situation brought to light our several errors and the need to keep our attention focused on the primary duties at hand. The first officer was planning on a straight, short taxi, expecting runway 27 because of the ATIS. He reacted more to the change than to the 'hold short' part of the clearance. That part did not impact me either since I was still concerned over the high start egt of the left engine. As we taxied and he began the start of the right engine, I was concerned that he was doing too much when he also began the taxi checklist. When I asked him to delay the checklist and tried to explain why, this diverted my thought process further from the job at hand of safely taxiing and complying with the clrncs.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLC CROSSES AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT PERMISSION. FLC WAS DISTR BY ROUTINE TASKS. FLC PROMISE TO KEEP THEIR ATTENTION ON THE PRIMARY DUTIES AT HAND.

Narrative: IT WAS OUR FIRST FLT OF THE DAY ON DAY 4. DURING PUSHBACK WE STARTED THE L ENG FOR THE SINGLE ENG TAXI. THE ENG STARTED BUT THE TEMP PEAKED VERY NEAR THE MAX. IMMEDIATELY AFTER ENG START, THE FO CALLED FOR TAXI. THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO 'TAXI TO RWY 9L, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 13.' AFTER READING BACK THE CLRNC, INCLUDING THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS, THE FO QUESTIONED THE DEP RWY SINCE RWY 27R WAS INDICATED FOR DEP ON THE ATIS. THIS RESULTED IN A CONVERSATION WITH GND CTL INDICATING THAT THE ARPT HAD BEEN TURNED AROUND AND RELAYING THE NEW WINDS. AS WE TURNED OUT OF THE RAMP AREA, PASSING AROUND THE FIREHOUSE, WE WERE ABLE TO SEE THE DEP END OF RWY 9L. IT APPEARED THAT WE WOULD BE #1 FOR TKOF. THE FO SENSING A NEED TO GET THE SECOND ENG STARTED IN TIME FOR A PROPER WARM UP BEFORE DEP, BEGAN TURNING THE R ENG. HE SIMULTANEOUSLY BEGAN READING THE TAXI CHKLIST. I ASKED HIM TO DELAY THE CHKLIST UNTIL AFTER ENG START SO HE COULD DEVOTE HIS ATTENTION TO THE ENG. I WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE START EGT ON THE L ENG AND WAS WATCHING THE R ENG START. I DIVERTED MY ATTENTION FROM THE TXWY AND OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. AS WE WERE APCHING THE INTXN OF THE TXWY AND RWY 13, I LOOKED UP AND SAW THE RWY MARKER. I THEN LOOKED TO THE APCH END AND SAW THE LNDG LIGHTS OF AN ACFT ON FINAL. SEEING THE ACFT I REMEMBERED MY 'HOLD SHORT' CLRNC. AT THIS POINT, WITH THE R ENG JUST STARTED (BOTH ENGS RUNNING) AND CLOSE TO THE RWY, I MADE THE DECISION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO STOP WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE RWY. I ADDED PWR ON THE L ENG ONLY (THE R ENG HAD JUST SPOOLED UP TO IDLE PWR) AND CONTINUED ACROSS THE RWY. THE LIGHT TWIN DID NOT TOUCH DOWN UNTIL WE WERE WELL CLR OF THE RWY, ALTHOUGH, I'M SURE HE WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH OUR XING AND POSSIBLE JET BLAST. AT THIS TIME THE GND CTLR NOTICED OUR POSITION AND REMINDED US THAT OUR CLRNC WAS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 13. THE COPLT ISSUED OUR APOLOGIES AND WE CONTINUED, HEALTHY, THOUGH SOMEWHAT SHAKEN BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS ERROR I HAD JUST MADE. OUR LATER DISCUSSION OF THE SIT BROUGHT TO LIGHT OUR SEVERAL ERRORS AND THE NEED TO KEEP OUR ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE PRIMARY DUTIES AT HAND. THE FO WAS PLANNING ON A STRAIGHT, SHORT TAXI, EXPECTING RWY 27 BECAUSE OF THE ATIS. HE REACTED MORE TO THE CHANGE THAN TO THE 'HOLD SHORT' PART OF THE CLRNC. THAT PART DID NOT IMPACT ME EITHER SINCE I WAS STILL CONCERNED OVER THE HIGH START EGT OF THE L ENG. AS WE TAXIED AND HE BEGAN THE START OF THE R ENG, I WAS CONCERNED THAT HE WAS DOING TOO MUCH WHEN HE ALSO BEGAN THE TAXI CHKLIST. WHEN I ASKED HIM TO DELAY THE CHKLIST AND TRIED TO EXPLAIN WHY, THIS DIVERTED MY THOUGHT PROCESS FURTHER FROM THE JOB AT HAND OF SAFELY TAXIING AND COMPLYING WITH THE CLRNCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Air carrier flight crew crosses an active runway without permission. Flight crew was distraction by routine tasks. Flight crew promise to keep their attention on the primary duties at hand.