Narrative:

On feb/xx/95, after making a night VFR landing in a sikorsky S76B helicopter, I had to maneuver to avoid a taxiing airplane while at a hover. The maneuver caused the tail boom to contact the taxiway resulting in scraped paint on the helicopter and a bruised ego. I was at the left seat controls of the helicopter, and had been cleared to land at runway 30 and taxiway C, our normally requested landing target. While clearing the runway and preparing to touch down beyond the taxiway C hold line, the right seat pilot alerted me to a jetstream turboprop to port. The jetstream was taxiing along taxiway B, which parallels runway 30, toward taxiway C. Neither I or the right seat pilot had seen this aircraft during the approach due to a number of factors which I will describe later in the report. Surprised at seeing the aircraft for the first time and at such close proximity, I immediately maneuvered to stop my forward progress. Since I was descending for a forward hover at a low power setting and a low altitude, my maneuver, an application of power by increasing collective pitch and an aft movement of the cyclic pitch stick, resulted in a nose-high attitude and the tail cone striking the taxiway surface. My power application increased my hovering altitude and I back-hovered clear of the jetstream's path. Fortunately, the jetstream pilot observed the situation and had stopped. The fact that I did not see that there was an aircraft taxiing along taxiway B toward taxiway C is most disturbing to me. It was an exceptionally clear night and traffic was light. In reconstructing the sequence leading to the incident I came to the following conclusions: 1) a strong left crosswind, causing a crab angle on approach, and the relatively steep approach angle that I use for noise abatement, required me to lean forward and to the left in order to see the runway intersection that was the approach target. This landing confign placed the instrument panel and the lower sill of the windshield in a position to block, completely, my view of the parallel taxiway B. At the bottom of the approach, my peripheral vision did not pick up the jetstream's lights or its movement due to the floodlights from the north hangar, lights from the interior of the hangar (the hangar doors were open) and a fuel truck that was servicing an aircraft on their ramp. 2) there is a grey area in defining when a helicopter has landed. Many helicopters have skid landing gear and are required to hover- taxi to parking areas. Although the S76B can ground-taxi on wheels, pilots are accustomed to exercising their option to either hover-taxi or to ground-taxi in areas that pose no gust hazard to airplanes, buildings, ground vehicles or people. I was cleared to land to runway 30 and taxiway C. I opted to allow the helicopter to weathercock into the crosswind, to line up on taxiway C, and to hover-taxi clear of the runway, unaware of the taxiing jetstream. 3) as a dual rated pilot, I know that clearing a runway means taxiing beyond the hold-short line on the feeder taxiway. Because of the distance between runway 30 and the parallel taxiway B, any aircraft that clears the runway beyond the taxiway hold-short line at taxiway C will block the intersection of txwys B and C. 4) it is my understanding that the tower is not required to alert us to taxiing aircraft unless they observe or have issued a clearance that has a potential for conflict. At mmu, we are accustomed to the tower alerting us to taxiing aircraft even when they pose no potential for conflict. In any case, the tower did not alert us to the presence of the taxiing jetstream. There are procedures that we as helicopter pilots can adopt that may eliminate incidents of this kind. The understanding that helicopters are more flexible in their operational capabilities has led pilots to opt for 'efficient' flying at airports in order not to impact on the flow of fixed wing traffic. In fact, at all of the metropolitan airports in the region, we are asked regularly to make adjustments and deviations which are safe and well within helicopter operating limits for that purpose. However, as with any aviation operation, it is worth a second look to see what can be improved. In 30 yrs and 12000 hours of flying, this was the first time that I was surprised by an 'unknown' aircraft in a taxiing situation. In this case, there was no compelling reason to expedite clearing the runway since there was no aircraft on final or in position awaiting takeoff clearance. This 'efficiency' was the last link in the chain that led to this incident. Touching down on the runway and ground-taxiing clear would have given me time to observe the presence of the jetstream even with the other factors that existed. In the future, when flying a wheeled helicopter, I will ground-taxi clear of runways as a normal procedure, unless requested to expedite.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HELI HOVER TAXI AVOIDING OTHER ACFT STRIKES TAIL BOOM.

Narrative: ON FEB/XX/95, AFTER MAKING A NIGHT VFR LNDG IN A SIKORSKY S76B HELI, I HAD TO MANEUVER TO AVOID A TAXIING AIRPLANE WHILE AT A HOVER. THE MANEUVER CAUSED THE TAIL BOOM TO CONTACT THE TXWY RESULTING IN SCRAPED PAINT ON THE HELI AND A BRUISED EGO. I WAS AT THE L SEAT CTLS OF THE HELI, AND HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND AT RWY 30 AND TXWY C, OUR NORMALLY REQUESTED LNDG TARGET. WHILE CLRING THE RWY AND PREPARING TO TOUCH DOWN BEYOND THE TXWY C HOLD LINE, THE R SEAT PLT ALERTED ME TO A JETSTREAM TURBOPROP TO PORT. THE JETSTREAM WAS TAXIING ALONG TXWY B, WHICH PARALLELS RWY 30, TOWARD TXWY C. NEITHER I OR THE R SEAT PLT HAD SEEN THIS ACFT DURING THE APCH DUE TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH I WILL DESCRIBE LATER IN THE RPT. SURPRISED AT SEEING THE ACFT FOR THE FIRST TIME AND AT SUCH CLOSE PROX, I IMMEDIATELY MANEUVERED TO STOP MY FORWARD PROGRESS. SINCE I WAS DSNDING FOR A FORWARD HOVER AT A LOW PWR SETTING AND A LOW ALT, MY MANEUVER, AN APPLICATION OF PWR BY INCREASING COLLECTIVE PITCH AND AN AFT MOVEMENT OF THE CYCLIC PITCH STICK, RESULTED IN A NOSE-HIGH ATTITUDE AND THE TAIL CONE STRIKING THE TXWY SURFACE. MY PWR APPLICATION INCREASED MY HOVERING ALT AND I BACK-HOVERED CLR OF THE JETSTREAM'S PATH. FORTUNATELY, THE JETSTREAM PLT OBSERVED THE SIT AND HAD STOPPED. THE FACT THAT I DID NOT SEE THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT TAXIING ALONG TXWY B TOWARD TXWY C IS MOST DISTURBING TO ME. IT WAS AN EXCEPTIONALLY CLR NIGHT AND TFC WAS LIGHT. IN RECONSTRUCTING THE SEQUENCE LEADING TO THE INCIDENT I CAME TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: 1) A STRONG L XWIND, CAUSING A CRAB ANGLE ON APCH, AND THE RELATIVELY STEEP APCH ANGLE THAT I USE FOR NOISE ABATEMENT, REQUIRED ME TO LEAN FORWARD AND TO THE L IN ORDER TO SEE THE RWY INTXN THAT WAS THE APCH TARGET. THIS LNDG CONFIGN PLACED THE INST PANEL AND THE LOWER SILL OF THE WINDSHIELD IN A POS TO BLOCK, COMPLETELY, MY VIEW OF THE PARALLEL TXWY B. AT THE BOTTOM OF THE APCH, MY PERIPHERAL VISION DID NOT PICK UP THE JETSTREAM'S LIGHTS OR ITS MOVEMENT DUE TO THE FLOODLIGHTS FROM THE NORTH HANGAR, LIGHTS FROM THE INTERIOR OF THE HANGAR (THE HANGAR DOORS WERE OPEN) AND A FUEL TRUCK THAT WAS SERVICING AN ACFT ON THEIR RAMP. 2) THERE IS A GREY AREA IN DEFINING WHEN A HELI HAS LANDED. MANY HELIS HAVE SKID LNDG GEAR AND ARE REQUIRED TO HOVER- TAXI TO PARKING AREAS. ALTHOUGH THE S76B CAN GND-TAXI ON WHEELS, PLTS ARE ACCUSTOMED TO EXERCISING THEIR OPTION TO EITHER HOVER-TAXI OR TO GND-TAXI IN AREAS THAT POSE NO GUST HAZARD TO AIRPLANES, BUILDINGS, GND VEHICLES OR PEOPLE. I WAS CLRED TO LAND TO RWY 30 AND TXWY C. I OPTED TO ALLOW THE HELI TO WEATHERCOCK INTO THE XWIND, TO LINE UP ON TXWY C, AND TO HOVER-TAXI CLR OF THE RWY, UNAWARE OF THE TAXIING JETSTREAM. 3) AS A DUAL RATED PLT, I KNOW THAT CLRING A RWY MEANS TAXIING BEYOND THE HOLD-SHORT LINE ON THE FEEDER TXWY. BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE BTWN RWY 30 AND THE PARALLEL TXWY B, ANY ACFT THAT CLRS THE RWY BEYOND THE TXWY HOLD-SHORT LINE AT TXWY C WILL BLOCK THE INTXN OF TXWYS B AND C. 4) IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TWR IS NOT REQUIRED TO ALERT US TO TAXIING ACFT UNLESS THEY OBSERVE OR HAVE ISSUED A CLRNC THAT HAS A POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT. AT MMU, WE ARE ACCUSTOMED TO THE TWR ALERTING US TO TAXIING ACFT EVEN WHEN THEY POSE NO POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT. IN ANY CASE, THE TWR DID NOT ALERT US TO THE PRESENCE OF THE TAXIING JETSTREAM. THERE ARE PROCS THAT WE AS HELI PLTS CAN ADOPT THAT MAY ELIMINATE INCIDENTS OF THIS KIND. THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HELIS ARE MORE FLEXIBLE IN THEIR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES HAS LED PLTS TO OPT FOR 'EFFICIENT' FLYING AT ARPTS IN ORDER NOT TO IMPACT ON THE FLOW OF FIXED WING TFC. IN FACT, AT ALL OF THE METROPOLITAN ARPTS IN THE REGION, WE ARE ASKED REGULARLY TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS AND DEVS WHICH ARE SAFE AND WELL WITHIN HELI OPERATING LIMITS FOR THAT PURPOSE. HOWEVER, AS WITH ANY AVIATION OP, IT IS WORTH A SECOND LOOK TO SEE WHAT CAN BE IMPROVED. IN 30 YRS AND 12000 HRS OF FLYING, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT I WAS SURPRISED BY AN 'UNKNOWN' ACFT IN A TAXIING SIT. IN THIS CASE, THERE WAS NO COMPELLING REASON TO EXPEDITE CLRING THE RWY SINCE THERE WAS NO ACFT ON FINAL OR IN POS AWAITING TKOF CLRNC. THIS 'EFFICIENCY' WAS THE LAST LINK IN THE CHAIN THAT LED TO THIS INCIDENT. TOUCHING DOWN ON THE RWY AND GND-TAXIING CLR WOULD HAVE GIVEN ME TIME TO OBSERVE THE PRESENCE OF THE JETSTREAM EVEN WITH THE OTHER FACTORS THAT EXISTED. IN THE FUTURE, WHEN FLYING A WHEELED HELI, I WILL GND-TAXI CLR OF RWYS AS A NORMAL PROC, UNLESS REQUESTED TO EXPEDITE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.