Narrative:

On dec/sun/95, a friend and I prepared to depart slc. My friend was along to act as a safety pilot. I needed to get current and the instrument practice is good for me. We both performed the preflight inspection. We confirmed the elapsed start time prior to departure. Additionally, we visually checked the fuel to confirm the tanks were topped and that we were departing with the full 24.5 gals usable. This aircraft burns approximately 6 gals per hour. My friend (PNF) was acting as the safety pilot for me. My friend is a 200 hour private pilot ready to take his instrument check ride. I have flown and instructed him for over 40 hours and trusted his capabilities. I wanted to get and remain instrument current and used portions of the flight for the instrument currency practice. We had a mutual agreement that the safety pilot would be the PIC while the other is under the hood. At approximately 1 hour into the flight I asked my friend to look in the rental book and find the start time. I have flown close to 40 hours with this friend and trusted his capabilities to look in a book and get the time. My friend told me that the start time was 5.5. He took 5.5 and added 3 hours to it and planned to depart the area to return to the airport at 8.5 on the hobbs (time meter). He counted the ticks and at 8.5 on the hobbs departed for the airport. As we crossed over the top of the airport the controller said to descend to pattern altitude and start a downwind to runway 17. As I was turning left base to final runway 17 I noticed that the engine power began to surge from high to low. I pointed the nose at the airport and attained emergency descent speed. I pushed the mixture rich and pulled the carburetor heat on. The problem continued and began to get worse. I told the control tower that I had a problem. I then verified that gas was on, mixture rich and carburetor heat on, and primer locked and magnetos on both, throttle full power. I thought that I had blown a jug because I knew I had enough fuel on board. I should land with 1/2 hour of fuel on board. I then glanced at the fuel gauges. I noted that they looked very close to empty. At this point I thought it could be fuel starvation. I wondered if the hobbs time that my friend gave me was correct. I was still playing with the throttle and found by pure chance that when the throttle was advanced that the engine would give a surge of power. I began to pump the throttle which did give me additional power. I thought I would make it to the runway. I continued to pump the throttle until it no longer seemed to help. I was about 200 ft short of the runway and a dirt road which ran the perimeter of the airport was in reach. I landed on the dirt road. The aircraft sustained no damage nor did my friend or I. Upon landing and stopping the aircraft the engine was still running. I called the control tower and reported that we were down and on the perimeter road. They asked if I could get to a taxiway. I replied yes and I began to taxi to a taxiway. We stopped on the taxiway and waited for airport police, while waiting I wanted to check how long we had flown, I asked my friend for the rental book. I looked inside and found the hobbs start was 4.8 not 5.5 as my friend told me prior. We had flown .7 longer than I planned. Airport police met me at the taxiway. I shut the engine down. I gave them my information. They asked if I needed any further assistance. I said 'no,' they allowed me to taxi away. I started the engine and proceeded to the hangar. I then ran the engine up to see if I could replicate the problem. I could not. I then logged in the discrepancy log 'rough engine, seemed like the magnetos' dated dec/xx/95. The problem occurred because I allowed a pilot other than myself to take responsibility for finding the hobbs time. I trusted my friend when I should have not. I should have looked in the book myself. The problem could have further been avoided by using more than 1 device to determine the time in flight. However, the only reason we did not land off the field is because I did follow the 1/2 hour reserve requirement. I am pretty sure that this was fuel starvation. All the indications point to this, but I don't understand why the engine was running on thegnd after landing. Another contributing factor is that I usually fly an airplane with a timer in it and this day I was in a different airplane. I also forgot my watch. I also was angered about slc landing procedures. When you come in to land they make you descend and drag you out away from the airport. If they would allow a descent and let you remain close to the airport then we would have landed on the runway without a problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMALL ACFT PLT, RELYING ON OBSERVER PLT TO COMPUTE PROPER FUEL TIME. NEITHER NOTICED FUEL GAUGES READING EMPTY AND ACFT FORCED TO LAND OFF ARPT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: ON DEC/SUN/95, A FRIEND AND I PREPARED TO DEPART SLC. MY FRIEND WAS ALONG TO ACT AS A SAFETY PLT. I NEEDED TO GET CURRENT AND THE INST PRACTICE IS GOOD FOR ME. WE BOTH PERFORMED THE PREFLT INSPECTION. WE CONFIRMED THE ELAPSED START TIME PRIOR TO DEP. ADDITIONALLY, WE VISUALLY CHKED THE FUEL TO CONFIRM THE TANKS WERE TOPPED AND THAT WE WERE DEPARTING WITH THE FULL 24.5 GALS USABLE. THIS ACFT BURNS APPROX 6 GALS PER HR. MY FRIEND (PNF) WAS ACTING AS THE SAFETY PLT FOR ME. MY FRIEND IS A 200 HR PVT PLT READY TO TAKE HIS INST CHK RIDE. I HAVE FLOWN AND INSTRUCTED HIM FOR OVER 40 HRS AND TRUSTED HIS CAPABILITIES. I WANTED TO GET AND REMAIN INST CURRENT AND USED PORTIONS OF THE FLT FOR THE INST CURRENCY PRACTICE. WE HAD A MUTUAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SAFETY PLT WOULD BE THE PIC WHILE THE OTHER IS UNDER THE HOOD. AT APPROX 1 HR INTO THE FLT I ASKED MY FRIEND TO LOOK IN THE RENTAL BOOK AND FIND THE START TIME. I HAVE FLOWN CLOSE TO 40 HRS WITH THIS FRIEND AND TRUSTED HIS CAPABILITIES TO LOOK IN A BOOK AND GET THE TIME. MY FRIEND TOLD ME THAT THE START TIME WAS 5.5. HE TOOK 5.5 AND ADDED 3 HRS TO IT AND PLANNED TO DEPART THE AREA TO RETURN TO THE ARPT AT 8.5 ON THE HOBBS (TIME METER). HE COUNTED THE TICKS AND AT 8.5 ON THE HOBBS DEPARTED FOR THE ARPT. AS WE CROSSED OVER THE TOP OF THE ARPT THE CTLR SAID TO DSND TO PATTERN ALT AND START A DOWNWIND TO RWY 17. AS I WAS TURNING L BASE TO FINAL RWY 17 I NOTICED THAT THE ENG PWR BEGAN TO SURGE FROM HIGH TO LOW. I POINTED THE NOSE AT THE ARPT AND ATTAINED EMER DSCNT SPD. I PUSHED THE MIXTURE RICH AND PULLED THE CARB HEAT ON. THE PROB CONTINUED AND BEGAN TO GET WORSE. I TOLD THE CTL TWR THAT I HAD A PROB. I THEN VERIFIED THAT GAS WAS ON, MIXTURE RICH AND CARB HEAT ON, AND PRIMER LOCKED AND MAGNETOS ON BOTH, THROTTLE FULL PWR. I THOUGHT THAT I HAD BLOWN A JUG BECAUSE I KNEW I HAD ENOUGH FUEL ON BOARD. I SHOULD LAND WITH 1/2 HR OF FUEL ON BOARD. I THEN GLANCED AT THE FUEL GAUGES. I NOTED THAT THEY LOOKED VERY CLOSE TO EMPTY. AT THIS POINT I THOUGHT IT COULD BE FUEL STARVATION. I WONDERED IF THE HOBBS TIME THAT MY FRIEND GAVE ME WAS CORRECT. I WAS STILL PLAYING WITH THE THROTTLE AND FOUND BY PURE CHANCE THAT WHEN THE THROTTLE WAS ADVANCED THAT THE ENG WOULD GIVE A SURGE OF PWR. I BEGAN TO PUMP THE THROTTLE WHICH DID GIVE ME ADDITIONAL PWR. I THOUGHT I WOULD MAKE IT TO THE RWY. I CONTINUED TO PUMP THE THROTTLE UNTIL IT NO LONGER SEEMED TO HELP. I WAS ABOUT 200 FT SHORT OF THE RWY AND A DIRT ROAD WHICH RAN THE PERIMETER OF THE ARPT WAS IN REACH. I LANDED ON THE DIRT ROAD. THE ACFT SUSTAINED NO DAMAGE NOR DID MY FRIEND OR I. UPON LNDG AND STOPPING THE ACFT THE ENG WAS STILL RUNNING. I CALLED THE CTL TWR AND RPTED THAT WE WERE DOWN AND ON THE PERIMETER ROAD. THEY ASKED IF I COULD GET TO A TXWY. I REPLIED YES AND I BEGAN TO TAXI TO A TXWY. WE STOPPED ON THE TXWY AND WAITED FOR ARPT POLICE, WHILE WAITING I WANTED TO CHK HOW LONG WE HAD FLOWN, I ASKED MY FRIEND FOR THE RENTAL BOOK. I LOOKED INSIDE AND FOUND THE HOBBS START WAS 4.8 NOT 5.5 AS MY FRIEND TOLD ME PRIOR. WE HAD FLOWN .7 LONGER THAN I PLANNED. ARPT POLICE MET ME AT THE TXWY. I SHUT THE ENG DOWN. I GAVE THEM MY INFO. THEY ASKED IF I NEEDED ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE. I SAID 'NO,' THEY ALLOWED ME TO TAXI AWAY. I STARTED THE ENG AND PROCEEDED TO THE HANGAR. I THEN RAN THE ENG UP TO SEE IF I COULD REPLICATE THE PROB. I COULD NOT. I THEN LOGGED IN THE DISCREPANCY LOG 'ROUGH ENG, SEEMED LIKE THE MAGNETOS' DATED DEC/XX/95. THE PROB OCCURRED BECAUSE I ALLOWED A PLT OTHER THAN MYSELF TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING THE HOBBS TIME. I TRUSTED MY FRIEND WHEN I SHOULD HAVE NOT. I SHOULD HAVE LOOKED IN THE BOOK MYSELF. THE PROB COULD HAVE FURTHER BEEN AVOIDED BY USING MORE THAN 1 DEVICE TO DETERMINE THE TIME IN FLT. HOWEVER, THE ONLY REASON WE DID NOT LAND OFF THE FIELD IS BECAUSE I DID FOLLOW THE 1/2 HR RESERVE REQUIREMENT. I AM PRETTY SURE THAT THIS WAS FUEL STARVATION. ALL THE INDICATIONS POINT TO THIS, BUT I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE ENG WAS RUNNING ON THEGND AFTER LNDG. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THAT I USUALLY FLY AN AIRPLANE WITH A TIMER IN IT AND THIS DAY I WAS IN A DIFFERENT AIRPLANE. I ALSO FORGOT MY WATCH. I ALSO WAS ANGERED ABOUT SLC LNDG PROCS. WHEN YOU COME IN TO LAND THEY MAKE YOU DSND AND DRAG YOU OUT AWAY FROM THE ARPT. IF THEY WOULD ALLOW A DSCNT AND LET YOU REMAIN CLOSE TO THE ARPT THEN WE WOULD HAVE LANDED ON THE RWY WITHOUT A PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.