Narrative:

We departed ind for stl and en route was given holding about 65 mi from stl for about 25 mins. Stl was experiencing snow and strong winds from the north and northwest with varying ceilings and visibilities. We were cleared out of holding and put in sequence for landing. About 30 mi from the field we were given delaying vectors because of an incident on the runway. We later found out that an MD80 had apparently aborted a takeoff and had slid sideways on runway 30L. There were no problems other than the plane was on the runway and it would take some time to tow the plane from the runway and runway 30L would be closed until this could be accomplished. In the meantime, stl runway ground crews were clearing and sanding runway 30R. We were never actually in another holding pattern because stl opened runway 30R fairly quickly and we basically were just vectored back to a downwind for an approach. We were #2 on the approach behind an air carrier flight. We got several wind readings from the tower. It changed to 360 degrees 20 KTS with no gusts and I believe another at 350 degrees at 20 KTS. The tower also had advised that runway 30R had 1/4 inch packed snow, had been sanded and a braking action report of 'poor' by an airport vehicle. We were concerned with the crosswind component because our company has a steady crosswind component limit of 10 KTS with a braking action report of 'poor.' we elected to continue the approach because the wind trend appeared to be a little more northwest and perhaps a little less velocity. We continued our approach and started relying on our inertial reference system for wind information. The IRS gives us the most up to date wind and is instantaneous and would be better than any further wind checks from the tower. The first officer and I were both in agreement that if the crosswind component was not within 10 KTS at the decision ht, that we would miss the approach and proceed to the alternate. The first officer calls, 'minimums' at decision ht and if the captain has not called 'landing' at this point the first officer automatically makes a missed approach. I went outside and had the runway in sight. We were lined up with the centerline of the runway and I judged by the angle of the nose that we were within the 10 KTS crosswind limit. I called 'landing' and proceeded to land on runway 30R. The landing was right on centerline and at the 1000 ft point. After the nosewheel was on the ground I applied the reverse thrust slowly, making sure there was no adverse yaw associated with its application. I started reducing the reverse thrust at 80 KTS and applied light braking at about 60 KTS. I got some releases on the anti-skid system and would agree that the braking was 'poor.' the tower asked if we could turn off at taxiway G. We said that we could and we made the turn off the runway easily. We had a very slow taxi speed at this point anticipating that the taxiway had not been cleaned. I believe that the tower wanted us to make that turn because the next taxiway would have put us in a position of conflict with the disabled aircraft on the other runway. The tower instructed us to contact ground control. The ground controller asked us for a braking report. The first officer reported that it was 'poor.' the airport manager also got on the frequency and was asking questions about braking action and the control inputs. I thought that the additional questions by the airport manager were somewhat distracting. I think the information required could have been gotten more efficiently by the ground controller. I do appreciate the airport manager's desire and need for immediate information in order to make a decision concerning keeping the airport open or not. I believe the airport manager decided to close the airport while we were taxiing to the gate. We taxied to the gate without further incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ON APCH ISSUED BRAKING ACTION POOR. PLANS ACCORDINGLY AND LNDG EXCELLENT. MANY QUESTIONS ON GND FREQ BY ARPT MGR ARE DISTRACTING.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED IND FOR STL AND ENRTE WAS GIVEN HOLDING ABOUT 65 MI FROM STL FOR ABOUT 25 MINS. STL WAS EXPERIENCING SNOW AND STRONG WINDS FROM THE N AND NW WITH VARYING CEILINGS AND VISIBILITIES. WE WERE CLRED OUT OF HOLDING AND PUT IN SEQUENCE FOR LNDG. ABOUT 30 MI FROM THE FIELD WE WERE GIVEN DELAYING VECTORS BECAUSE OF AN INCIDENT ON THE RWY. WE LATER FOUND OUT THAT AN MD80 HAD APPARENTLY ABORTED A TKOF AND HAD SLID SIDEWAYS ON RWY 30L. THERE WERE NO PROBS OTHER THAN THE PLANE WAS ON THE RWY AND IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO TOW THE PLANE FROM THE RWY AND RWY 30L WOULD BE CLOSED UNTIL THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. IN THE MEANTIME, STL RWY GND CREWS WERE CLRING AND SANDING RWY 30R. WE WERE NEVER ACTUALLY IN ANOTHER HOLDING PATTERN BECAUSE STL OPENED RWY 30R FAIRLY QUICKLY AND WE BASICALLY WERE JUST VECTORED BACK TO A DOWNWIND FOR AN APCH. WE WERE #2 ON THE APCH BEHIND AN ACR FLT. WE GOT SEVERAL WIND READINGS FROM THE TWR. IT CHANGED TO 360 DEGS 20 KTS WITH NO GUSTS AND I BELIEVE ANOTHER AT 350 DEGS AT 20 KTS. THE TWR ALSO HAD ADVISED THAT RWY 30R HAD 1/4 INCH PACKED SNOW, HAD BEEN SANDED AND A BRAKING ACTION RPT OF 'POOR' BY AN ARPT VEHICLE. WE WERE CONCERNED WITH THE XWIND COMPONENT BECAUSE OUR COMPANY HAS A STEADY XWIND COMPONENT LIMIT OF 10 KTS WITH A BRAKING ACTION RPT OF 'POOR.' WE ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH BECAUSE THE WIND TREND APPEARED TO BE A LITTLE MORE NW AND PERHAPS A LITTLE LESS VELOCITY. WE CONTINUED OUR APCH AND STARTED RELYING ON OUR INERTIAL REF SYS FOR WIND INFO. THE IRS GIVES US THE MOST UP TO DATE WIND AND IS INSTANTANEOUS AND WOULD BE BETTER THAN ANY FURTHER WIND CHKS FROM THE TWR. THE FO AND I WERE BOTH IN AGREEMENT THAT IF THE XWIND COMPONENT WAS NOT WITHIN 10 KTS AT THE DECISION HT, THAT WE WOULD MISS THE APCH AND PROCEED TO THE ALTERNATE. THE FO CALLS, 'MINIMUMS' AT DECISION HT AND IF THE CAPT HAS NOT CALLED 'LNDG' AT THIS POINT THE FO AUTOMATICALLY MAKES A MISSED APCH. I WENT OUTSIDE AND HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. WE WERE LINED UP WITH THE CTRLINE OF THE RWY AND I JUDGED BY THE ANGLE OF THE NOSE THAT WE WERE WITHIN THE 10 KTS XWIND LIMIT. I CALLED 'LNDG' AND PROCEEDED TO LAND ON RWY 30R. THE LNDG WAS RIGHT ON CTRLINE AND AT THE 1000 FT POINT. AFTER THE NOSEWHEEL WAS ON THE GND I APPLIED THE REVERSE THRUST SLOWLY, MAKING SURE THERE WAS NO ADVERSE YAW ASSOCIATED WITH ITS APPLICATION. I STARTED REDUCING THE REVERSE THRUST AT 80 KTS AND APPLIED LIGHT BRAKING AT ABOUT 60 KTS. I GOT SOME RELEASES ON THE ANTI-SKID SYS AND WOULD AGREE THAT THE BRAKING WAS 'POOR.' THE TWR ASKED IF WE COULD TURN OFF AT TXWY G. WE SAID THAT WE COULD AND WE MADE THE TURN OFF THE RWY EASILY. WE HAD A VERY SLOW TAXI SPD AT THIS POINT ANTICIPATING THAT THE TXWY HAD NOT BEEN CLEANED. I BELIEVE THAT THE TWR WANTED US TO MAKE THAT TURN BECAUSE THE NEXT TXWY WOULD HAVE PUT US IN A POS OF CONFLICT WITH THE DISABLED ACFT ON THE OTHER RWY. THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT GND CTL. THE GND CTLR ASKED US FOR A BRAKING RPT. THE FO RPTED THAT IT WAS 'POOR.' THE ARPT MGR ALSO GOT ON THE FREQ AND WAS ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT BRAKING ACTION AND THE CTL INPUTS. I THOUGHT THAT THE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS BY THE ARPT MGR WERE SOMEWHAT DISTRACTING. I THINK THE INFO REQUIRED COULD HAVE BEEN GOTTEN MORE EFFICIENTLY BY THE GND CTLR. I DO APPRECIATE THE ARPT MGR'S DESIRE AND NEED FOR IMMEDIATE INFO IN ORDER TO MAKE A DECISION CONCERNING KEEPING THE ARPT OPEN OR NOT. I BELIEVE THE ARPT MGR DECIDED TO CLOSE THE ARPT WHILE WE WERE TAXIING TO THE GATE. WE TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.