Narrative:

Reported flight into prohibited area (P-40). Inadvertent error in navigation which, in hindsight, could have been prevented at many steps in the chain of events. Ie: 1) plan route with much more leeway to restr area, 2) clrer definition of responsibility when 2 pilots are sharing navigation and communications, and 3) ask for VFR flight following and appropriate vectors. Requested leesburg to activate our VFR flight plan. Leesburg opened the flight plan, and asked if we wanted VFR flight following. Denied request. We then reconsidered and decided to request flight following. Leesburg responded with aircraft number xyz instead of yxz. I tried to correct this north number discrepancy and had difficulty in successfully communicating the correction. Contacted leesburg and requested the ZDC frequency. Had difficulty hearing leesburg. Kept getting double voice in reception and may have had audio on for both dulles and leesburg. Asked about 3 times until I was sure I copied the correct frequency. ZDC assigned a second frequency for ZDC (I don't know frequency), asked to 'contact in about 5 mi as you are passing camp david.' (in hindsight this would have been the time to request vectors around camp david if I was close to the perimeter. Confusion in the cockpit, with the redundant radios overriding each other, and concern for correct communication diverted my attention from navigation and contributed to the possible navigation error.) contacted ZDC on new frequency and requested VFR flight advisories. They gave us a new squawk code. A few mins later, ZDC requested I call an assigned telephone number after landing. (I didn't know why, but appreciated not having to worry about that while flying.) diverted to carlisle due to snow squalls and requested vectors to carlisle. Landed, closed the flight plan, and called ZDC. This was the first I heard of the possible incursion into P-40. I then began to review the entire flight to understand the possible errors. One further insight is that this has demonstrated the advantage in securing instrument flight instruction. I am now planning on working toward an instrument ticket to further assure safe and legal flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOW TIME, INEXPERIENCED PLT ERRONEOUSLY PENETRATED PROHIBITED AREA P-40 WHEN ON VFR FLT PLAN.

Narrative: RPTED FLT INTO PROHIBITED AREA (P-40). INADVERTENT ERROR IN NAV WHICH, IN HINDSIGHT, COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED AT MANY STEPS IN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS. IE: 1) PLAN RTE WITH MUCH MORE LEEWAY TO RESTR AREA, 2) CLRER DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITY WHEN 2 PLTS ARE SHARING NAV AND COMS, AND 3) ASK FOR VFR FLT FOLLOWING AND APPROPRIATE VECTORS. REQUESTED LEESBURG TO ACTIVATE OUR VFR FLT PLAN. LEESBURG OPENED THE FLT PLAN, AND ASKED IF WE WANTED VFR FLT FOLLOWING. DENIED REQUEST. WE THEN RECONSIDERED AND DECIDED TO REQUEST FLT FOLLOWING. LEESBURG RESPONDED WITH ACFT NUMBER XYZ INSTEAD OF YXZ. I TRIED TO CORRECT THIS N NUMBER DISCREPANCY AND HAD DIFFICULTY IN SUCCESSFULLY COMMUNICATING THE CORRECTION. CONTACTED LEESBURG AND REQUESTED THE ZDC FREQ. HAD DIFFICULTY HEARING LEESBURG. KEPT GETTING DOUBLE VOICE IN RECEPTION AND MAY HAVE HAD AUDIO ON FOR BOTH DULLES AND LEESBURG. ASKED ABOUT 3 TIMES UNTIL I WAS SURE I COPIED THE CORRECT FREQ. ZDC ASSIGNED A SECOND FREQ FOR ZDC (I DON'T KNOW FREQ), ASKED TO 'CONTACT IN ABOUT 5 MI AS YOU ARE PASSING CAMP DAVID.' (IN HINDSIGHT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE TIME TO REQUEST VECTORS AROUND CAMP DAVID IF I WAS CLOSE TO THE PERIMETER. CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT, WITH THE REDUNDANT RADIOS OVERRIDING EACH OTHER, AND CONCERN FOR CORRECT COM DIVERTED MY ATTN FROM NAV AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE POSSIBLE NAV ERROR.) CONTACTED ZDC ON NEW FREQ AND REQUESTED VFR FLT ADVISORIES. THEY GAVE US A NEW SQUAWK CODE. A FEW MINS LATER, ZDC REQUESTED I CALL AN ASSIGNED TELEPHONE NUMBER AFTER LNDG. (I DIDN'T KNOW WHY, BUT APPRECIATED NOT HAVING TO WORRY ABOUT THAT WHILE FLYING.) DIVERTED TO CARLISLE DUE TO SNOW SQUALLS AND REQUESTED VECTORS TO CARLISLE. LANDED, CLOSED THE FLT PLAN, AND CALLED ZDC. THIS WAS THE FIRST I HEARD OF THE POSSIBLE INCURSION INTO P-40. I THEN BEGAN TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE FLT TO UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBLE ERRORS. ONE FURTHER INSIGHT IS THAT THIS HAS DEMONSTRATED THE ADVANTAGE IN SECURING INST FLT INSTRUCTION. I AM NOW PLANNING ON WORKING TOWARD AN INST TICKET TO FURTHER ASSURE SAFE AND LEGAL FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.