Narrative:

Shortly after lift-off from runway 17, captain's (PF) EFIS pfd/nd both indicated attitude/heading input failure. Captain retained control of the aircraft and elected to return, teardrop- style, for landing on runway 35. During short pattern, first officer accomplished after takeoff checklist and before landing check. Landing was uneventful. After clearing the runway, captain recycled alternating current power to the EFIS system, which immediately reset, and functioned normally. A call was placed to dispatch through the operations agent. A discussion ensued concerning the occurrence, and the possible need for re-release. In the end it was decided by dispatch and captain that flight could proceed normally. The remainder of flight was uneventful. Upon arrival at ord, chief pilot took captain into office and advised him that he had failed to report a maintenance discrepancy, and failed to have it cleared by maintenance. Contributing factors: this make of aircraft is very prone to sudden, spurious electrical problems, nearly all of them, as this one was, are easily remedied by deselecting and reapplying power to the offending system. Thus, company pilots are in the habit of doing this first, ignoring the discrepancy if it can be cleared quickly. Dispatch had no problem in authorizing the flight. This gave crew more reason to believe the continuance of flight was legitimate. Finally, the captain has a rather hurried style, forcing ground crew and flight crew alike to adjust to his pace. This hurrying sometimes compromises sops, which can cause difficulty for crew members. As an experienced first officer, I normally 'ride herd' on new capts, and I am very familiar with the aircraft and SOP. In this instance, after captain's abrupt decision to return and land for a not immediately critical failure, I was 'along for the ride' and I made the mistake of not asserting myself to captain and assuring that all the required actions had been accomplished. While I carefully assured all safety-of-flight items were cared for, I did not give the same attention to the safety of my career!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER TKOF, CAPT'S EFIS PFD ND INDICATED ATTITUDE HEADING FAILURE. CAPT ELECTED TO RETURN TO LAND. AFTER LNDG, PWR WAS RECYCLED WHICH CORRECTED THE PROB, BUT THE CAPT FAILED TO GET THE DISCREPANCY CLRED BY MAINT. HE WAS COUNSELED BY HIS CHIEF PLT.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER LIFT-OFF FROM RWY 17, CAPT'S (PF) EFIS PFD/ND BOTH INDICATED ATTITUDE/HDG INPUT FAILURE. CAPT RETAINED CTL OF THE ACFT AND ELECTED TO RETURN, TEARDROP- STYLE, FOR LNDG ON RWY 35. DURING SHORT PATTERN, FO ACCOMPLISHED AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND BEFORE LNDG CHK. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, CAPT RECYCLED ALTERNATING CURRENT PWR TO THE EFIS SYS, WHICH IMMEDIATELY RESET, AND FUNCTIONED NORMALLY. A CALL WAS PLACED TO DISPATCH THROUGH THE OPS AGENT. A DISCUSSION ENSUED CONCERNING THE OCCURRENCE, AND THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR RE-RELEASE. IN THE END IT WAS DECIDED BY DISPATCH AND CAPT THAT FLT COULD PROCEED NORMALLY. THE REMAINDER OF FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. UPON ARR AT ORD, CHIEF PLT TOOK CAPT INTO OFFICE AND ADVISED HIM THAT HE HAD FAILED TO RPT A MAINT DISCREPANCY, AND FAILED TO HAVE IT CLRED BY MAINT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THIS MAKE OF ACFT IS VERY PRONE TO SUDDEN, SPURIOUS ELECTRICAL PROBS, NEARLY ALL OF THEM, AS THIS ONE WAS, ARE EASILY REMEDIED BY DESELECTING AND REAPPLYING PWR TO THE OFFENDING SYS. THUS, COMPANY PLTS ARE IN THE HABIT OF DOING THIS FIRST, IGNORING THE DISCREPANCY IF IT CAN BE CLRED QUICKLY. DISPATCH HAD NO PROB IN AUTHORIZING THE FLT. THIS GAVE CREW MORE REASON TO BELIEVE THE CONTINUANCE OF FLT WAS LEGITIMATE. FINALLY, THE CAPT HAS A RATHER HURRIED STYLE, FORCING GND CREW AND FLT CREW ALIKE TO ADJUST TO HIS PACE. THIS HURRYING SOMETIMES COMPROMISES SOPS, WHICH CAN CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR CREW MEMBERS. AS AN EXPERIENCED FO, I NORMALLY 'RIDE HERD' ON NEW CAPTS, AND I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ACFT AND SOP. IN THIS INSTANCE, AFTER CAPT'S ABRUPT DECISION TO RETURN AND LAND FOR A NOT IMMEDIATELY CRITICAL FAILURE, I WAS 'ALONG FOR THE RIDE' AND I MADE THE MISTAKE OF NOT ASSERTING MYSELF TO CAPT AND ASSURING THAT ALL THE REQUIRED ACTIONS HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. WHILE I CAREFULLY ASSURED ALL SAFETY-OF-FLT ITEMS WERE CARED FOR, I DID NOT GIVE THE SAME ATTN TO THE SAFETY OF MY CAREER!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.