Narrative:

Our aircraft, a BA31, was being operated as a revenue generating flight from visalia, ca, to merced, ca. This flight was the first officer's leg and I was handling the radio communications. During this flight, there were 5 passenger aboard. After successfully completing an approach and landing to the merced airport runway 30 in night visual conditions, another aircraft departed the opposing runway 12 prior to our having exited the runway in use. The closest point of approach between the aircraft was no greater than 15 ft with a speed differential estimated at 90 KTS. Fortunately no contact was made between aircraft, however, one of the passenger was justifiably upset. Prior to landing we had descended through an overcast layer at 4600 ft during the visual approach. The visual approach was supplemented by the runway 30 ILS approach. The initial CTAF call was made at 7 DME on the localizer to the local traffic. There initially was a garbled transmission over the frequency, and I requested a re-transmission from the other party. The response came from a cargo flight that was taxiing out to runway 12. Just prior to the flare, another aircraft announced its intentions of departing runway 12. I immediately informed the other aircraft that we were on short final landing runway 30 and asked the other aircraft to hold short, which he said he would do. After landing, the captain announced that (due to the aircraft holding short blocking the taxiway) we would complete a 180 degree turn on the runway and exit midfield. After turning around to the right, and while the aircraft was offset to the terminal side of the centerline, shortly thereafter, a WW24 passed the aircraft off the right wing. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter (a BA31 captain) states that he feels fortunate that he happened to be taxiing on the left side of the runway, preparing to exit onto the taxiway. A passenger on the BA31 was markedly upset by the close call and told the captain that if he wasn't going to do something about it, that he (passenger) would take it up with the FAA. 2 months after this incident, the reporter was contacted by the FAA. It is his understanding that the WW24 flight crew is being questioned as a result of the passenger complaint. The reporter feels that this was an example of the importance of the use of standard phraseology. Here, communicating 'clear of the active,' and of course, waiting for that call before takeoff, would have altered the event which followed. Supplemental information from acn 326244: rain had been falling, and traffic had been landing and taking off to the south all day. The PNF called stockton for clearance while the PF monitored the advisory frequency. The clearance was received at the hold line for runway 12 and the flight released for takeoff. A commuter flight had just landed on runway 30 and the PF contacted the aircraft and offered to clear the taxiway. The commuter pilot acknowledged and we moved to the far right of the runway so that he had room to exit at the end. We then understood him to say that he was exiting at taxiway 'name?' while appearing to turn off at an exit further down the runway. The PF, the PNF and the passenger, who had a clear view, all observed the commuter aircraft turn off and lost sight of it as it appeared to leave runway. As we started to add power for takeoff we passed the commuter. The commuter was completely invisible from the rear and we did not see him until we were beside him. Our passenger and the PNF both thought that the commuter was on the taxiway as we passed it. There was between 50-100 ft clearance between the aircraft. Observations: 1) it is usual to try to keep radio communications to a minimum, however, in the future we will confirm that we clearly understand other aircraft and that they understand our intent. We will then reconfirm with the other aircraft. 2) visibility of aircraft at night, on the ground, from the rear could surely be improved. Some aircraft, like this commuter, have no strobes or rotating beacons visible from the rear on the ground. 3) unusual conditions require extraordinary care and attention. Uncontrolled airports present more unusual and unpredictable sits. Supplemental information from acn 326232: as PNF I was involved in getting our clearance and pretkof checklists as we taxied out to runway 12 at merced. After we were cleared for departure I heard the PF talking to a landing commuter aircraft and watched the aircraft, which had landed on runway 30, turn off the runway. The PF made the advisory frequency announcement that we were taking off on runway 12 at merced and started our takeoff roll. I saw the commuter aircraft pass to our left on the parallel taxiway. The PF advised me that he thought the commuter had still been on the runway and after our initial contact with stockton asked for the center telephone number so that we could contact them and through them, the commuter crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FLC OF A WW24 DEPARTED WHILE A COMMUTER BA31 WAS STILL TAXIING TO CLR THE RWY. THE WW24 MISSED THE BA31 BY APPROX 15 FT. TKOF ON OCCUPIED RWY.

Narrative: OUR ACFT, A BA31, WAS BEING OPERATED AS A REVENUE GENERATING FLT FROM VISALIA, CA, TO MERCED, CA. THIS FLT WAS THE FO'S LEG AND I WAS HANDLING THE RADIO COMS. DURING THIS FLT, THERE WERE 5 PAX ABOARD. AFTER SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETING AN APCH AND LNDG TO THE MERCED ARPT RWY 30 IN NIGHT VISUAL CONDITIONS, ANOTHER ACFT DEPARTED THE OPPOSING RWY 12 PRIOR TO OUR HAVING EXITED THE RWY IN USE. THE CLOSEST POINT OF APCH BTWN THE ACFT WAS NO GREATER THAN 15 FT WITH A SPD DIFFERENTIAL ESTIMATED AT 90 KTS. FORTUNATELY NO CONTACT WAS MADE BTWN ACFT, HOWEVER, ONE OF THE PAX WAS JUSTIFIABLY UPSET. PRIOR TO LNDG WE HAD DSNDED THROUGH AN OVCST LAYER AT 4600 FT DURING THE VISUAL APCH. THE VISUAL APCH WAS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE RWY 30 ILS APCH. THE INITIAL CTAF CALL WAS MADE AT 7 DME ON THE LOC TO THE LCL TFC. THERE INITIALLY WAS A GARBLED XMISSION OVER THE FREQ, AND I REQUESTED A RE-XMISSION FROM THE OTHER PARTY. THE RESPONSE CAME FROM A CARGO FLT THAT WAS TAXIING OUT TO RWY 12. JUST PRIOR TO THE FLARE, ANOTHER ACFT ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTIONS OF DEPARTING RWY 12. I IMMEDIATELY INFORMED THE OTHER ACFT THAT WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL LNDG RWY 30 AND ASKED THE OTHER ACFT TO HOLD SHORT, WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD DO. AFTER LNDG, THE CAPT ANNOUNCED THAT (DUE TO THE ACFT HOLDING SHORT BLOCKING THE TXWY) WE WOULD COMPLETE A 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY AND EXIT MIDFIELD. AFTER TURNING AROUND TO THE R, AND WHILE THE ACFT WAS OFFSET TO THE TERMINAL SIDE OF THE CTRLINE, SHORTLY THEREAFTER, A WW24 PASSED THE ACFT OFF THE R WING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR (A BA31 CAPT) STATES THAT HE FEELS FORTUNATE THAT HE HAPPENED TO BE TAXIING ON THE L SIDE OF THE RWY, PREPARING TO EXIT ONTO THE TXWY. A PAX ON THE BA31 WAS MARKEDLY UPSET BY THE CLOSE CALL AND TOLD THE CAPT THAT IF HE WASN'T GOING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT, THAT HE (PAX) WOULD TAKE IT UP WITH THE FAA. 2 MONTHS AFTER THIS INCIDENT, THE RPTR WAS CONTACTED BY THE FAA. IT IS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WW24 FLC IS BEING QUESTIONED AS A RESULT OF THE PAX COMPLAINT. THE RPTR FEELS THAT THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE USE OF STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY. HERE, COMMUNICATING 'CLR OF THE ACTIVE,' AND OF COURSE, WAITING FOR THAT CALL BEFORE TKOF, WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE EVENT WHICH FOLLOWED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 326244: RAIN HAD BEEN FALLING, AND TFC HAD BEEN LNDG AND TAKING OFF TO THE S ALL DAY. THE PNF CALLED STOCKTON FOR CLRNC WHILE THE PF MONITORED THE ADVISORY FREQ. THE CLRNC WAS RECEIVED AT THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 12 AND THE FLT RELEASED FOR TKOF. A COMMUTER FLT HAD JUST LANDED ON RWY 30 AND THE PF CONTACTED THE ACFT AND OFFERED TO CLR THE TXWY. THE COMMUTER PLT ACKNOWLEDGED AND WE MOVED TO THE FAR R OF THE RWY SO THAT HE HAD ROOM TO EXIT AT THE END. WE THEN UNDERSTOOD HIM TO SAY THAT HE WAS EXITING AT TXWY 'NAME?' WHILE APPEARING TO TURN OFF AT AN EXIT FURTHER DOWN THE RWY. THE PF, THE PNF AND THE PAX, WHO HAD A CLR VIEW, ALL OBSERVED THE COMMUTER ACFT TURN OFF AND LOST SIGHT OF IT AS IT APPEARED TO LEAVE RWY. AS WE STARTED TO ADD PWR FOR TKOF WE PASSED THE COMMUTER. THE COMMUTER WAS COMPLETELY INVISIBLE FROM THE REAR AND WE DID NOT SEE HIM UNTIL WE WERE BESIDE HIM. OUR PAX AND THE PNF BOTH THOUGHT THAT THE COMMUTER WAS ON THE TXWY AS WE PASSED IT. THERE WAS BTWN 50-100 FT CLRNC BTWN THE ACFT. OBSERVATIONS: 1) IT IS USUAL TO TRY TO KEEP RADIO COMS TO A MINIMUM, HOWEVER, IN THE FUTURE WE WILL CONFIRM THAT WE CLRLY UNDERSTAND OTHER ACFT AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND OUR INTENT. WE WILL THEN RECONFIRM WITH THE OTHER ACFT. 2) VISIBILITY OF ACFT AT NIGHT, ON THE GND, FROM THE REAR COULD SURELY BE IMPROVED. SOME ACFT, LIKE THIS COMMUTER, HAVE NO STROBES OR ROTATING BEACONS VISIBLE FROM THE REAR ON THE GND. 3) UNUSUAL CONDITIONS REQUIRE EXTRAORDINARY CARE AND ATTN. UNCTLED ARPTS PRESENT MORE UNUSUAL AND UNPREDICTABLE SITS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 326232: AS PNF I WAS INVOLVED IN GETTING OUR CLRNC AND PRETKOF CHKLISTS AS WE TAXIED OUT TO RWY 12 AT MERCED. AFTER WE WERE CLRED FOR DEP I HEARD THE PF TALKING TO A LNDG COMMUTER ACFT AND WATCHED THE ACFT, WHICH HAD LANDED ON RWY 30, TURN OFF THE RWY. THE PF MADE THE ADVISORY FREQ ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE WERE TAKING OFF ON RWY 12 AT MERCED AND STARTED OUR TKOF ROLL. I SAW THE COMMUTER ACFT PASS TO OUR L ON THE PARALLEL TXWY. THE PF ADVISED ME THAT HE THOUGHT THE COMMUTER HAD STILL BEEN ON THE RWY AND AFTER OUR INITIAL CONTACT WITH STOCKTON ASKED FOR THE CTR TELEPHONE NUMBER SO THAT WE COULD CONTACT THEM AND THROUGH THEM, THE COMMUTER CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.