Narrative:

The copilot read the aircraft checklist and also handled all ATC communications. We taxied for departure on runway 18, and completed the before takeoff portion of the checklist while holding short of the runway, at which time the copilot reported to the tower that we were 'ready for takeoff.' while this was happening I briefed the passenger for takeoff. When I had finished, the copilot told me 'we're cleared to go.' we taxied onto the runway, he read the lineup portion of the checklist, and I acknowledged his call outs. At the end of the checklist I asked 'all set?' he replied 'we're ready,' and we commenced the takeoff roll and departed the airport. At approximately 200 ft AGL, the tower controller said 'small transport where are you going?' and I realized that all was not as it should be. We had not received takeoff clearance, but clearance to 'taxi into position and hold,' as was determined by further communication with the tower controller. The flight continued in an otherwise normal fashion, we were 'handed off' to cgx departure control, who gave us a revised heading and altitude, and we flew on to our destination, mkg. This is another example of missed or improper communications between crew members. Since I did not actually hear the clearance that we were given, being involved with briefing the passenger, I should have verified that we had actually received that clearance, instead of having assumed that we had, based upon the copilot saying that we 'cleared to go,' when he actually meant, 'go onto the runway.' also, when he agreed with my question, 'we all set?' it confirmed to me that we were cleared for takeoff. After the flight had ended and we were reconstructing the chain of events that contributed to this incident, we did come to some conclusions. The first was that at no time was the flight in any danger, the WX being VFR and there being no other traffic in the area. Also, we both agreed that, since we had not flown with each other before, we should have been extra vigilant, especially in the areas of communication and coordination of cockpit duties. Personally, I believe that we learn invaluable lessons from mistakes such as these, and I know that because of this incident, I will never line up for takeoff on a runway without recalling what happened on this day, and knowing positively that I have takeoff clearance before I advance those throttles.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN SMT TWIN TOOK OFF WITHOUT CLRNC AFTER BEING CLRED INTO POS ONLY.

Narrative: THE COPLT READ THE ACFT CHKLIST AND ALSO HANDLED ALL ATC COMS. WE TAXIED FOR DEP ON RWY 18, AND COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF PORTION OF THE CHKLIST WHILE HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY, AT WHICH TIME THE COPLT RPTED TO THE TWR THAT WE WERE 'READY FOR TKOF.' WHILE THIS WAS HAPPENING I BRIEFED THE PAX FOR TKOF. WHEN I HAD FINISHED, THE COPLT TOLD ME 'WE'RE CLRED TO GO.' WE TAXIED ONTO THE RWY, HE READ THE LINEUP PORTION OF THE CHKLIST, AND I ACKNOWLEDGED HIS CALL OUTS. AT THE END OF THE CHKLIST I ASKED 'ALL SET?' HE REPLIED 'WE'RE READY,' AND WE COMMENCED THE TKOF ROLL AND DEPARTED THE ARPT. AT APPROX 200 FT AGL, THE TWR CTLR SAID 'SMT WHERE ARE YOU GOING?' AND I REALIZED THAT ALL WAS NOT AS IT SHOULD BE. WE HAD NOT RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC, BUT CLRNC TO 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD,' AS WAS DETERMINED BY FURTHER COM WITH THE TWR CTLR. THE FLT CONTINUED IN AN OTHERWISE NORMAL FASHION, WE WERE 'HANDED OFF' TO CGX DEP CTL, WHO GAVE US A REVISED HDG AND ALT, AND WE FLEW ON TO OUR DEST, MKG. THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF MISSED OR IMPROPER COMS BETWEEN CREW MEMBERS. SINCE I DID NOT ACTUALLY HEAR THE CLRNC THAT WE WERE GIVEN, BEING INVOLVED WITH BRIEFING THE PAX, I SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED THAT WE HAD ACTUALLY RECEIVED THAT CLRNC, INSTEAD OF HAVING ASSUMED THAT WE HAD, BASED UPON THE COPLT SAYING THAT WE 'CLRED TO GO,' WHEN HE ACTUALLY MEANT, 'GO ONTO THE RWY.' ALSO, WHEN HE AGREED WITH MY QUESTION, 'WE ALL SET?' IT CONFIRMED TO ME THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. AFTER THE FLT HAD ENDED AND WE WERE RECONSTRUCTING THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT, WE DID COME TO SOME CONCLUSIONS. THE FIRST WAS THAT AT NO TIME WAS THE FLT IN ANY DANGER, THE WX BEING VFR AND THERE BEING NO OTHER TFC IN THE AREA. ALSO, WE BOTH AGREED THAT, SINCE WE HAD NOT FLOWN WITH EACH OTHER BEFORE, WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXTRA VIGILANT, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREAS OF COM AND COORD OF COCKPIT DUTIES. PERSONALLY, I BELIEVE THAT WE LEARN INVALUABLE LESSONS FROM MISTAKES SUCH AS THESE, AND I KNOW THAT BECAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT, I WILL NEVER LINE UP FOR TKOF ON A RWY WITHOUT RECALLING WHAT HAPPENED ON THIS DAY, AND KNOWING POSITIVELY THAT I HAVE TKOF CLRNC BEFORE I ADVANCE THOSE THROTTLES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.