Narrative:

At departure time present WX approximately 1000 ft overcast 2 mi snow. Forecast at time of arrival was to be the same. Upon receiving ATIS at klamath falls WX had deteriorated to 800 ft overcast 1/2 mi snow and fog, and runway lights were notamed as being obscured by snow. This NOTAM had been in effect for 7 days already, and past experience showed that the lights were only partially obscured. The captain decided that we would conduct a captain monitored approach. I (first officer) would fly the approach and the captain would land the plane, assuming the runway environment was visible. Upon reaching MDA on the VOR/DME 14 approach the captain said landing my airplane (a standard operating procedure call). I transferred control to the captain. When I looked up he started his descent from MDA to land the airplane, I never once saw any part of the runway environment. I saw only lights glowing through the fog and snow. About approximately 5 seconds of staring and trying to locate the runway, I saw a street light, below us. I then said 'look out for the street lights below us.' the captain hesitated and momentarily leveled off and then he called missed approach and the appropriate calls for that maneuver. Upon pitching up I then saw the rabbit lights off our left side at a distance of 1/2 to 1 mi away. We were nowhere near the runway. We diverted to medford after that with no further problems. The captain told me later that he did make a mistake and said he really thought he saw the runway environment. To prevent something like this is to make sure you actually have the runway environment in sight, also use the DME to judge the actual distance to the runway. We were still about 1.5 DME from our missed approach point so the captain should and could have used that to help in identng the actual distance to the runway and use that to aid you in identing the runway environment. Also klamath falls should remove snow far enough away from the runway lights so they can be distinctly visible. And also the captain did listen to his first officer which allowed a safe missed approach. The captain monitored approach system works great. However there has to be real trust in each other and there really is not much room in any error from any crew member.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE ATIS RPTED VIS 1/2 MI FOR THE VOR DME APCH TO RWY 14 LMT WHICH WAS BELOW MINIMUMS. THE FLC DECIDED THE FO WOULD FLY THE INSTS TO THE POINT THE CAPT HAS THE RWY IN SIGHT AND THE CAPT WILL VISUALLY LAND THE AIRPLANE FROM THAT POINT ON. THE CAPT MISIDENTIFIED STREET LIGHTS FOR RWY LIGHTS ABOUT 1 MI FROM THE ARPT. THE FO RECOGNIZED THE STREET LIGHTS. THE CAPT PULLED UP, SAW THE APCH LIGHTS BUT DIVERTED TO MEDFORD.

Narrative: AT DEP TIME PRESENT WX APPROX 1000 FT OVCST 2 MI SNOW. FORECAST AT TIME OF ARR WAS TO BE THE SAME. UPON RECEIVING ATIS AT KLAMATH FALLS WX HAD DETERIORATED TO 800 FT OVCST 1/2 MI SNOW AND FOG, AND RWY LIGHTS WERE NOTAMED AS BEING OBSCURED BY SNOW. THIS NOTAM HAD BEEN IN EFFECT FOR 7 DAYS ALREADY, AND PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT THE LIGHTS WERE ONLY PARTIALLY OBSCURED. THE CAPT DECIDED THAT WE WOULD CONDUCT A CAPT MONITORED APCH. I (FO) WOULD FLY THE APCH AND THE CAPT WOULD LAND THE PLANE, ASSUMING THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS VISIBLE. UPON REACHING MDA ON THE VOR/DME 14 APCH THE CAPT SAID LNDG MY AIRPLANE (A STANDARD OPERATING PROC CALL). I TRANSFERRED CTL TO THE CAPT. WHEN I LOOKED UP HE STARTED HIS DSCNT FROM MDA TO LAND THE AIRPLANE, I NEVER ONCE SAW ANY PART OF THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. I SAW ONLY LIGHTS GLOWING THROUGH THE FOG AND SNOW. ABOUT APPROX 5 SECONDS OF STARING AND TRYING TO LOCATE THE RWY, I SAW A STREET LIGHT, BELOW US. I THEN SAID 'LOOK OUT FOR THE STREET LIGHTS BELOW US.' THE CAPT HESITATED AND MOMENTARILY LEVELED OFF AND THEN HE CALLED MISSED APCH AND THE APPROPRIATE CALLS FOR THAT MANEUVER. UPON PITCHING UP I THEN SAW THE RABBIT LIGHTS OFF OUR L SIDE AT A DISTANCE OF 1/2 TO 1 MI AWAY. WE WERE NOWHERE NEAR THE RWY. WE DIVERTED TO MEDFORD AFTER THAT WITH NO FURTHER PROBS. THE CAPT TOLD ME LATER THAT HE DID MAKE A MISTAKE AND SAID HE REALLY THOUGHT HE SAW THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. TO PREVENT SOMETHING LIKE THIS IS TO MAKE SURE YOU ACTUALLY HAVE THE RWY ENVIRONMENT IN SIGHT, ALSO USE THE DME TO JUDGE THE ACTUAL DISTANCE TO THE RWY. WE WERE STILL ABOUT 1.5 DME FROM OUR MISSED APCH POINT SO THE CAPT SHOULD AND COULD HAVE USED THAT TO HELP IN IDENTNG THE ACTUAL DISTANCE TO THE RWY AND USE THAT TO AID YOU IN IDENTING THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. ALSO KLAMATH FALLS SHOULD REMOVE SNOW FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM THE RWY LIGHTS SO THEY CAN BE DISTINCTLY VISIBLE. AND ALSO THE CAPT DID LISTEN TO HIS FO WHICH ALLOWED A SAFE MISSED APCH. THE CAPT MONITORED APCH SYS WORKS GREAT. HOWEVER THERE HAS TO BE REAL TRUST IN EACH OTHER AND THERE REALLY IS NOT MUCH ROOM IN ANY ERROR FROM ANY CREW MEMBER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.