Narrative:

Runway overrun occurrence of jan/96. Upper cumberland regional airport (srb), sparta, tn. Happened on jan/fri/96 at XA00 on runway 04 at the upper cumberland regional airport (srb) in sparta, tn. A 1970 amd falcon 20, as operated on the far part 135 certificate of company since aug/94. At the time of the aforementioned occurrence, aircraft satisfactorily met all regulatory requirements of far part 135. The enroute portion of the flight was uneventful. The WX was clear up until 150 mi of srb and aircraft experienced good tailwinds throughout the flight. The last AWOS WX prior to commencement of the srb NDB approach at srb was 1200 ft broken, 4 mi of visibility and calm winds. Concurrently, with the last AWOS WX, the sic tried to contact unicom but there was no answer. While at 2000 ft MSL, the flight crew acquired a visual sighting of the runway and the runway environment with said contact being maintained, on a continuous basis, all the way until landing. Aircraft completed the approach to runway 04 by flying down the length of the runway at 2000 ft MSL (circling approach) and turned to left downwind. A further turn to left base was made and aircraft was set up for a 1 1/2 mi final. The final approach was commenced 1 1/2 mi from runway 04. The vref was 120 KTS, and the PIC maintained a clear, unobstructed view of the PAPI. Landing weight was 21700 pounds. The temperature was 50 degrees and the dewpoint was 49 degrees, with calm winds. Runway 04 at srb was noted to be 5003 ft with no obstructions. The standby hydraulic pump had been armed at the IAF as a backup for brakes and steering. Further, the antiskid system was checked on the prelndg checklist with 2 green lights. Touched down on runway 04 at 118 KTS, approximately 400 ft down the runway, adjacent to PAPI. On touchdown, the speed brakes were deployed and the brakes were applied. However, neither the PIC nor the sic felt any braking action. Although the PIC has been into srb approximately 6 times previously and usually made the first turn off (approximately 2000 ft down the runway), on this occasion, he passed the intersection at just under 100 KTS. At this point he shutdown the right engine and maintained pressure on the brakes. With approximately 1500 ft of runway left, the PIC shut down the left engine, said decision(south) being motivated by a desire to stop the aircraft as well as preventing any possible engine fire. With approximately 1000 ft of runway left, the sic stated that aircraft was still going 60 KTS. It was not until the aircraft was actually passing over the numbers of the departure end of the runway that they first felt the grabbing action of the brakes. Aircraft entered the over-run area at approximately 40 KTS. Then, as best he could, the PIC maintained control during the 150 ft slide into the mud so as not to go into a gully on the right-hand side. Ms. X indicated that she was working on accounting books at the airport at the time of occurrence. Unfortunately, she did not hear the initial unicom call-up by the sic, otherwise she would have had the opportunity to tell aircraft that it had been raining for a period of time that evening and such precipitation had terminated just prior to captain commencing his NDB approach at srb. However, she heard aircraft pass overhead in the course of the NDB approach. Captain X landed his convair 640 on runway 4 at srb approximately 15 mins after. He was more than a bit concerned, after seeing aircraft in the mud at the departure end of the runway, so he gave an unsolicited statement to both flight crew members in the terminal building. He stated that he used the entire length of the runway in order to stop and he also had the benefit of reverse thrust. He doesn't know whether he was, likewise, subjected to viscous hydroplaning but it was entirely possible due to the landing performance of his aircraft. He stated that he would be more than willing to give such a statement to the FAA. The PIC exited the plane first, followed by the sic. He found that the mains were down approximately 4 inches in the mud and the nosewheel was halfway down in the mud. In post-flting the airplane, the PIC got up on the right wing and found no visible signs of mud or damage in the right engine. He slid over the roof of the fuselage and checked the left engine, and again, everything looked fine except for some mud on the cowling. Overall, the aircraft looked like it had suffered no damage. Since then, the aircraft was pulled out of the mud, had the mud power-washed off and was checked by competent maintenance personnel from FBO. This inspection confirmed the original visual inspection of captain in that aircraft had suffered no damage whatsoever. Accordingly, FAA inspector released the aircraft and it was flown back to yip without the need for any type of ferry permit. Based upon the facts and circumstances as described herein, the undersigned flight crew members think that the aircraft was subjected to a viscous hydroplaning situation. Please note that the runway at the cumberland regional airport is not grooved nor was it contoured for proper drain-off following precipitation even though the airport manager states the runway was recently crowned and widened by 20 ft. Both flight crew members indicate that there was no way that they could have seen or anticipated these conditions since neither the NWS WX forecast nor AWOS indicated any form of precipitation at srb and furthermore, the srb runway is a black asphalt surface and it is impossible to tell whether it is wet or not.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POSSIBLE HYDROPLANING ON LNDG, BUT FAA INVESTIGATION REQUIRED FLC FOR PART 609 COMPETENCY EXAM. ACFT EXITED END OF RWY WHEN OSTENSIBLY NO BRAKING ACTION OCCURRED AND BOTH ENGS WERE SHUT DOWN ON ROLLOUT.

Narrative: RWY OVERRUN OCCURRENCE OF JAN/96. UPPER CUMBERLAND REGIONAL ARPT (SRB), SPARTA, TN. HAPPENED ON JAN/FRI/96 AT XA00 ON RWY 04 AT THE UPPER CUMBERLAND REGIONAL ARPT (SRB) IN SPARTA, TN. A 1970 AMD FALCON 20, AS OPERATED ON THE FAR PART 135 CERTIFICATE OF COMPANY SINCE AUG/94. AT THE TIME OF THE AFOREMENTIONED OCCURRENCE, ACFT SATISFACTORILY MET ALL REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS OF FAR PART 135. THE ENROUTE PORTION OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE WX WAS CLR UP UNTIL 150 MI OF SRB AND ACFT EXPERIENCED GOOD TAILWINDS THROUGHOUT THE FLT. THE LAST AWOS WX PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF THE SRB NDB APCH AT SRB WAS 1200 FT BROKEN, 4 MI OF VISIBILITY AND CALM WINDS. CONCURRENTLY, WITH THE LAST AWOS WX, THE SIC TRIED TO CONTACT UNICOM BUT THERE WAS NO ANSWER. WHILE AT 2000 FT MSL, THE FLC ACQUIRED A VISUAL SIGHTING OF THE RWY AND THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WITH SAID CONTACT BEING MAINTAINED, ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS, ALL THE WAY UNTIL LNDG. ACFT COMPLETED THE APCH TO RWY 04 BY FLYING DOWN THE LENGTH OF THE RWY AT 2000 FT MSL (CIRCLING APCH) AND TURNED TO L DOWNWIND. A FURTHER TURN TO L BASE WAS MADE AND ACFT WAS SET UP FOR A 1 1/2 MI FINAL. THE FINAL APCH WAS COMMENCED 1 1/2 MI FROM RWY 04. THE VREF WAS 120 KTS, AND THE PIC MAINTAINED A CLR, UNOBSTRUCTED VIEW OF THE PAPI. LNDG WT WAS 21700 LBS. THE TEMP WAS 50 DEGS AND THE DEWPOINT WAS 49 DEGS, WITH CALM WINDS. RWY 04 AT SRB WAS NOTED TO BE 5003 FT WITH NO OBSTRUCTIONS. THE STANDBY HYD PUMP HAD BEEN ARMED AT THE IAF AS A BACKUP FOR BRAKES AND STEERING. FURTHER, THE ANTISKID SYS WAS CHKED ON THE PRELNDG CHKLIST WITH 2 GREEN LIGHTS. TOUCHED DOWN ON RWY 04 AT 118 KTS, APPROX 400 FT DOWN THE RWY, ADJACENT TO PAPI. ON TOUCHDOWN, THE SPD BRAKES WERE DEPLOYED AND THE BRAKES WERE APPLIED. HOWEVER, NEITHER THE PIC NOR THE SIC FELT ANY BRAKING ACTION. ALTHOUGH THE PIC HAS BEEN INTO SRB APPROX 6 TIMES PREVIOUSLY AND USUALLY MADE THE FIRST TURN OFF (APPROX 2000 FT DOWN THE RWY), ON THIS OCCASION, HE PASSED THE INTXN AT JUST UNDER 100 KTS. AT THIS POINT HE SHUTDOWN THE R ENG AND MAINTAINED PRESSURE ON THE BRAKES. WITH APPROX 1500 FT OF RWY LEFT, THE PIC SHUT DOWN THE L ENG, SAID DECISION(S) BEING MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO STOP THE ACFT AS WELL AS PREVENTING ANY POSSIBLE ENG FIRE. WITH APPROX 1000 FT OF RWY LEFT, THE SIC STATED THAT ACFT WAS STILL GOING 60 KTS. IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE ACFT WAS ACTUALLY PASSING OVER THE NUMBERS OF THE DEP END OF THE RWY THAT THEY FIRST FELT THE GRABBING ACTION OF THE BRAKES. ACFT ENTERED THE OVER-RUN AREA AT APPROX 40 KTS. THEN, AS BEST HE COULD, THE PIC MAINTAINED CTL DURING THE 150 FT SLIDE INTO THE MUD SO AS NOT TO GO INTO A GULLY ON THE RIGHT-HAND SIDE. MS. X INDICATED THAT SHE WAS WORKING ON ACCOUNTING BOOKS AT THE ARPT AT THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE. UNFORTUNATELY, SHE DID NOT HEAR THE INITIAL UNICOM CALL-UP BY THE SIC, OTHERWISE SHE WOULD HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL ACFT THAT IT HAD BEEN RAINING FOR A PERIOD OF TIME THAT EVENING AND SUCH PRECIPITATION HAD TERMINATED JUST PRIOR TO CAPT COMMENCING HIS NDB APCH AT SRB. HOWEVER, SHE HEARD ACFT PASS OVERHEAD IN THE COURSE OF THE NDB APCH. CAPT X LANDED HIS CONVAIR 640 ON RWY 4 AT SRB APPROX 15 MINS AFTER. HE WAS MORE THAN A BIT CONCERNED, AFTER SEEING ACFT IN THE MUD AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY, SO HE GAVE AN UNSOLICITED STATEMENT TO BOTH FLT CREW MEMBERS IN THE TERMINAL BUILDING. HE STATED THAT HE USED THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE RWY IN ORDER TO STOP AND HE ALSO HAD THE BENEFIT OF REVERSE THRUST. HE DOESN'T KNOW WHETHER HE WAS, LIKEWISE, SUBJECTED TO VISCOUS HYDROPLANING BUT IT WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE DUE TO THE LNDG PERFORMANCE OF HIS ACFT. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD BE MORE THAN WILLING TO GIVE SUCH A STATEMENT TO THE FAA. THE PIC EXITED THE PLANE FIRST, FOLLOWED BY THE SIC. HE FOUND THAT THE MAINS WERE DOWN APPROX 4 INCHES IN THE MUD AND THE NOSEWHEEL WAS HALFWAY DOWN IN THE MUD. IN POST-FLTING THE AIRPLANE, THE PIC GOT UP ON THE R WING AND FOUND NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF MUD OR DAMAGE IN THE R ENG. HE SLID OVER THE ROOF OF THE FUSELAGE AND CHKED THE L ENG, AND AGAIN, EVERYTHING LOOKED FINE EXCEPT FOR SOME MUD ON THE COWLING. OVERALL, THE ACFT LOOKED LIKE IT HAD SUFFERED NO DAMAGE. SINCE THEN, THE ACFT WAS PULLED OUT OF THE MUD, HAD THE MUD POWER-WASHED OFF AND WAS CHKED BY COMPETENT MAINT PERSONNEL FROM FBO. THIS INSPECTION CONFIRMED THE ORIGINAL VISUAL INSPECTION OF CAPT IN THAT ACFT HAD SUFFERED NO DAMAGE WHATSOEVER. ACCORDINGLY, FAA INSPECTOR RELEASED THE ACFT AND IT WAS FLOWN BACK TO YIP WITHOUT THE NEED FOR ANY TYPE OF FERRY PERMIT. BASED UPON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AS DESCRIBED HEREIN, THE UNDERSIGNED FLT CREW MEMBERS THINK THAT THE ACFT WAS SUBJECTED TO A VISCOUS HYDROPLANING SIT. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE RWY AT THE CUMBERLAND REGIONAL ARPT IS NOT GROOVED NOR WAS IT CONTOURED FOR PROPER DRAIN-OFF FOLLOWING PRECIPITATION EVEN THOUGH THE ARPT MGR STATES THE RWY WAS RECENTLY CROWNED AND WIDENED BY 20 FT. BOTH FLT CREW MEMBERS INDICATE THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THAT THEY COULD HAVE SEEN OR ANTICIPATED THESE CONDITIONS SINCE NEITHER THE NWS WX FORECAST NOR AWOS INDICATED ANY FORM OF PRECIPITATION AT SRB AND FURTHERMORE, THE SRB RWY IS A BLACK ASPHALT SURFACE AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL WHETHER IT IS WET OR NOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.