Narrative:

Approach into mci at night. ATIS reports 3200 ft overcast 4 mi visibility in light snow and blowing snow winds 270 degrees at 26 KTS gusting to 32 KTS. Braking on runway 1L and 1R poor, on runway 27 fair. We briefed localizer back course runway 27 and began the approach. First officer of 7 months flying what was advertised as VFR. I did have to coach some and had to help the first officer with power several times. He did a poor job of intercepting the back course and I had to coach him to be more aggressive. When he was finally more aggressive we had flaps 25 degrees on descent to minimums when he made an aggressive turn the wrong way. I had the field in sight and I took the aircraft. We got 1 1/2 DOT deflection on the localizer and were not at minimums and we encountered some windshear. After I felt comfortable that the aircraft was safe and the shear was over, we continued the approach. My first officer did not respond to any further commands so I had to move flaps myself -- not our normal procedure but necessary at the time. At no time did we have full scale localizer deflection nor descend below minimums until we could make a safe transition to landing. The field was in sight at the time of the descent and FAA inspector was on the jumpseat. Upon exiting aircraft he made no comments just wanted to shake my hand. I wanted to strangle my first officer. I think I would have failed CRM. I notified my company and told them the scenario and told them we would both go to training if required. The first officer will retrain. Flight was third flight on second day of a 3 day pairing. Fatigue not an issue. WX VFR although it was not as good as ATIS reported. More like 2000 ft overcast and 1 3/4 mi visibility in light blowing snow. Not horrible. First officer did not understand jet engines and the power curve and did not understand localizer back course approachs. He was transitioning from 17 years on a P3. I have recommended to the company and they have agreed to more training for this first officer and for all future first officer's on these topics. I, of course, would prefer that non precision approachs not be flown at all by acrs, especially when dollars exist in the federal budget for airport improvements.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FO WAS FLYING AN UNSTABILIZED LOC BACK COURSE APCH. WHEN HE MADE A CORRECTION IN THE WRONG DIRECTION, THE CAPT TOOK THE ACFT AWAY FROM THE FO. THE FO WOULD NOT RESPOND TO FURTHER COMMANDS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE COMPANY AND THE FO WAS SENT BACK TO RETRAIN.

Narrative: APCH INTO MCI AT NIGHT. ATIS RPTS 3200 FT OVCST 4 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT SNOW AND BLOWING SNOW WINDS 270 DEGS AT 26 KTS GUSTING TO 32 KTS. BRAKING ON RWY 1L AND 1R POOR, ON RWY 27 FAIR. WE BRIEFED LOC BACK COURSE RWY 27 AND BEGAN THE APCH. FO OF 7 MONTHS FLYING WHAT WAS ADVERTISED AS VFR. I DID HAVE TO COACH SOME AND HAD TO HELP THE FO WITH PWR SEVERAL TIMES. HE DID A POOR JOB OF INTERCEPTING THE BACK COURSE AND I HAD TO COACH HIM TO BE MORE AGGRESSIVE. WHEN HE WAS FINALLY MORE AGGRESSIVE WE HAD FLAPS 25 DEGS ON DSCNT TO MINIMUMS WHEN HE MADE AN AGGRESSIVE TURN THE WRONG WAY. I HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND I TOOK THE ACFT. WE GOT 1 1/2 DOT DEFLECTION ON THE LOC AND WERE NOT AT MINIMUMS AND WE ENCOUNTERED SOME WINDSHEAR. AFTER I FELT COMFORTABLE THAT THE ACFT WAS SAFE AND THE SHEAR WAS OVER, WE CONTINUED THE APCH. MY FO DID NOT RESPOND TO ANY FURTHER COMMANDS SO I HAD TO MOVE FLAPS MYSELF -- NOT OUR NORMAL PROC BUT NECESSARY AT THE TIME. AT NO TIME DID WE HAVE FULL SCALE LOC DEFLECTION NOR DSND BELOW MINIMUMS UNTIL WE COULD MAKE A SAFE TRANSITION TO LNDG. THE FIELD WAS IN SIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE DSCNT AND FAA INSPECTOR WAS ON THE JUMPSEAT. UPON EXITING ACFT HE MADE NO COMMENTS JUST WANTED TO SHAKE MY HAND. I WANTED TO STRANGLE MY FO. I THINK I WOULD HAVE FAILED CRM. I NOTIFIED MY COMPANY AND TOLD THEM THE SCENARIO AND TOLD THEM WE WOULD BOTH GO TO TRAINING IF REQUIRED. THE FO WILL RETRAIN. FLT WAS THIRD FLT ON SECOND DAY OF A 3 DAY PAIRING. FATIGUE NOT AN ISSUE. WX VFR ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT AS GOOD AS ATIS RPTED. MORE LIKE 2000 FT OVCST AND 1 3/4 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT BLOWING SNOW. NOT HORRIBLE. FO DID NOT UNDERSTAND JET ENGS AND THE PWR CURVE AND DID NOT UNDERSTAND LOC BACK COURSE APCHS. HE WAS TRANSITIONING FROM 17 YEARS ON A P3. I HAVE RECOMMENDED TO THE COMPANY AND THEY HAVE AGREED TO MORE TRAINING FOR THIS FO AND FOR ALL FUTURE FO'S ON THESE TOPICS. I, OF COURSE, WOULD PREFER THAT NON PRECISION APCHS NOT BE FLOWN AT ALL BY ACRS, ESPECIALLY WHEN DOLLARS EXIST IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET FOR ARPT IMPROVEMENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.