Narrative:

On flight from cmh to dca, while climbing out of FL250, our engine bleeds (both engines) closed and would not reopen. This was due to the captain turning on the wing anti-ice and starting a chain reaction that led to a loss of pressurization in the cabin. As the cabin altitude climbed above 7500 ft (we were climbing to FL270) we put on our oxygen masks and asked for immediate descent from center. Center said they could only clear us to FL210. I then declared an emergency and asked for at least 15000 ft. Center said no, only to FL210 because of traffic. I then said we are declaring an emergency and are going to 15000 ft, so do what you need to. It took 3 tries for ATC to clear us down, but eventually they did. The captain deployed the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin and no injuries resulted. We then returned to cmh at 10000 ft without any further trouble. One mistake I made was not squawking 7700. I think this might have helped me with ATC. I think the captain could have taken a little more time in deciding which switches to move, but overall, he did a nice job. However, I never should have had to fight with ATC to get down in this situation! They could have turned us away from a conflict if they needed to. Also, we were not informed from maintenance that this aircraft (an A320) had a long history of bleed trouble. Our #2 high- pressure bleed was MEL'ed, but that was all we knew about. Maintenance needs to keep the pilots more in the loop! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: aircraft confirmed as an A320. The aircraft had been dispatched with the #2 engine high-pressure bleed inoperative and put on the MEL. But, the inoperative high-pressure bleed procedures for using wing anti-ice were not adequately presented to the flight crew. The procedure, with the inoperative bleed, when turning on wing anti-ice calls for first turning off the associated air conditioning pack. The inbound flight crew had briefed the reporter flight crew that they had some difficulty with the anti-ice valves and cycling them sometimes helps. So, the reporter captain and first officer decided to cycle the anti-ice valves during the climb out. However, they failed to first turn off the pack prior to turning on the wing anti-ice. That resulted in, first the #1 bleed cycling off then on and then the #2 bleed cycled, but then both bleeds went to off and could not be reset until on the ground. Additionally, the flight crew tried to use the APU bleed for pressurization, but were unable and, at FL250, should have been able to use that bleed. Then, the flight crew noticed the cabin climbing rapidly so manually deployed the oxygen masks. Reporter faulted the ECAM presentation when dealing with the pressure problem. In order to work out the bleed problem, the bleed page had to be selected on the ECAM, but the upper ECAM does not show the pressurization, and in order to know what was happening with the pressure, they had to switch back and forth between the pressure and engine bleed page on the ECAM. Reporter says it would be beneficial to include the cabin pressure on the upper ECAM at all times such as other information which is continuously displayed. After the flight crew deployed the oxygen masks they noticed an 'electrical burning' smell as did the flight attendants. The reporter first officer went back to investigate what they thought was a fire and he found the source of the smoke odor was the oxygen generators which had been activated by the passenger. The entire cabin smelled and reporter says that some of the passenger were upset by it. After they parked the first officer was making a phone call and heard one of his passenger on the phone next to him state, 'I never listen to the emergency instructions, so when the masks dropped, I didn't know what to do, from now on I'm going to pay attention to the emergency briefing.' reporter says that postflt follow up with maintenance revealed that, when the computers lock out the bleeds, as they did in this case, they can be reset only on the ground. Though it was another incident, the reporter relayed another A320 depressurization within his company. In that case the outflow valve went to full open at high altitude, and when the flight crew tried to gain manual control of the outflow valve it would not work. They were unable to control the valve or the cabin and made an emergency descent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB. BOTH ENG BLEEDS CLOSED AND COULD NOT BE REOPENED. ACFT STARTED DEPRESSURIZING, OXYGEN MASKS WERE DEPLOYED. FLC REQUESTED LOWER ALT FROM ATC WHO WOULD NOT APPROVE IT DUE TO TFC. RPTR DECLARED EMER FOR DSCNT AND STILL ATC WOULD NOT CLR THEM. FINALLY THE CTLR REALIZED IT WAS AN EMER AND PROVIDED CLRNC.

Narrative: ON FLT FROM CMH TO DCA, WHILE CLBING OUT OF FL250, OUR ENG BLEEDS (BOTH ENGS) CLOSED AND WOULD NOT REOPEN. THIS WAS DUE TO THE CAPT TURNING ON THE WING ANTI-ICE AND STARTING A CHAIN REACTION THAT LED TO A LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION IN THE CABIN. AS THE CABIN ALT CLBED ABOVE 7500 FT (WE WERE CLBING TO FL270) WE PUT ON OUR OXYGEN MASKS AND ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE DSCNT FROM CTR. CTR SAID THEY COULD ONLY CLR US TO FL210. I THEN DECLARED AN EMER AND ASKED FOR AT LEAST 15000 FT. CTR SAID NO, ONLY TO FL210 BECAUSE OF TFC. I THEN SAID WE ARE DECLARING AN EMER AND ARE GOING TO 15000 FT, SO DO WHAT YOU NEED TO. IT TOOK 3 TRIES FOR ATC TO CLR US DOWN, BUT EVENTUALLY THEY DID. THE CAPT DEPLOYED THE OXYGEN MASKS IN THE PAX CABIN AND NO INJURIES RESULTED. WE THEN RETURNED TO CMH AT 10000 FT WITHOUT ANY FURTHER TROUBLE. ONE MISTAKE I MADE WAS NOT SQUAWKING 7700. I THINK THIS MIGHT HAVE HELPED ME WITH ATC. I THINK THE CAPT COULD HAVE TAKEN A LITTLE MORE TIME IN DECIDING WHICH SWITCHES TO MOVE, BUT OVERALL, HE DID A NICE JOB. HOWEVER, I NEVER SHOULD HAVE HAD TO FIGHT WITH ATC TO GET DOWN IN THIS SIT! THEY COULD HAVE TURNED US AWAY FROM A CONFLICT IF THEY NEEDED TO. ALSO, WE WERE NOT INFORMED FROM MAINT THAT THIS ACFT (AN A320) HAD A LONG HISTORY OF BLEED TROUBLE. OUR #2 HIGH- PRESSURE BLEED WAS MEL'ED, BUT THAT WAS ALL WE KNEW ABOUT. MAINT NEEDS TO KEEP THE PLTS MORE IN THE LOOP! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ACFT CONFIRMED AS AN A320. THE ACFT HAD BEEN DISPATCHED WITH THE #2 ENG HIGH-PRESSURE BLEED INOP AND PUT ON THE MEL. BUT, THE INOP HIGH-PRESSURE BLEED PROCS FOR USING WING ANTI-ICE WERE NOT ADEQUATELY PRESENTED TO THE FLC. THE PROC, WITH THE INOP BLEED, WHEN TURNING ON WING ANTI-ICE CALLS FOR FIRST TURNING OFF THE ASSOCIATED AIR CONDITIONING PACK. THE INBOUND FLC HAD BRIEFED THE RPTR FLC THAT THEY HAD SOME DIFFICULTY WITH THE ANTI-ICE VALVES AND CYCLING THEM SOMETIMES HELPS. SO, THE RPTR CAPT AND FO DECIDED TO CYCLE THE ANTI-ICE VALVES DURING THE CLBOUT. HOWEVER, THEY FAILED TO FIRST TURN OFF THE PACK PRIOR TO TURNING ON THE WING ANTI-ICE. THAT RESULTED IN, FIRST THE #1 BLEED CYCLING OFF THEN ON AND THEN THE #2 BLEED CYCLED, BUT THEN BOTH BLEEDS WENT TO OFF AND COULD NOT BE RESET UNTIL ON THE GND. ADDITIONALLY, THE FLC TRIED TO USE THE APU BLEED FOR PRESSURIZATION, BUT WERE UNABLE AND, AT FL250, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO USE THAT BLEED. THEN, THE FLC NOTICED THE CABIN CLBING RAPIDLY SO MANUALLY DEPLOYED THE OXYGEN MASKS. RPTR FAULTED THE ECAM PRESENTATION WHEN DEALING WITH THE PRESSURE PROB. IN ORDER TO WORK OUT THE BLEED PROB, THE BLEED PAGE HAD TO BE SELECTED ON THE ECAM, BUT THE UPPER ECAM DOES NOT SHOW THE PRESSURIZATION, AND IN ORDER TO KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING WITH THE PRESSURE, THEY HAD TO SWITCH BACK AND FORTH BTWN THE PRESSURE AND ENG BLEED PAGE ON THE ECAM. RPTR SAYS IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO INCLUDE THE CABIN PRESSURE ON THE UPPER ECAM AT ALL TIMES SUCH AS OTHER INFO WHICH IS CONTINUOUSLY DISPLAYED. AFTER THE FLC DEPLOYED THE OXYGEN MASKS THEY NOTICED AN 'ELECTRICAL BURNING' SMELL AS DID THE FLT ATTENDANTS. THE RPTR FO WENT BACK TO INVESTIGATE WHAT THEY THOUGHT WAS A FIRE AND HE FOUND THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE ODOR WAS THE OXYGEN GENERATORS WHICH HAD BEEN ACTIVATED BY THE PAX. THE ENTIRE CABIN SMELLED AND RPTR SAYS THAT SOME OF THE PAX WERE UPSET BY IT. AFTER THEY PARKED THE FO WAS MAKING A PHONE CALL AND HEARD ONE OF HIS PAX ON THE PHONE NEXT TO HIM STATE, 'I NEVER LISTEN TO THE EMER INSTRUCTIONS, SO WHEN THE MASKS DROPPED, I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO, FROM NOW ON I'M GOING TO PAY ATTN TO THE EMER BRIEFING.' RPTR SAYS THAT POSTFLT FOLLOW UP WITH MAINT REVEALED THAT, WHEN THE COMPUTERS LOCK OUT THE BLEEDS, AS THEY DID IN THIS CASE, THEY CAN BE RESET ONLY ON THE GND. THOUGH IT WAS ANOTHER INCIDENT, THE RPTR RELAYED ANOTHER A320 DEPRESSURIZATION WITHIN HIS COMPANY. IN THAT CASE THE OUTFLOW VALVE WENT TO FULL OPEN AT HIGH ALT, AND WHEN THE FLC TRIED TO GAIN MANUAL CTL OF THE OUTFLOW VALVE IT WOULD NOT WORK. THEY WERE UNABLE TO CTL THE VALVE OR THE CABIN AND MADE AN EMER DSCNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.