A B727 flight crew was cleared for an approach that they legally could not fly without ATC radar ass...

Attributes
ACN	339452
Time
Date	199607
Day	Fri
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : ord
State Reference	IL
Altitude	msl bound lower : 4000 msl bound upper : 4000
Environment
Flight Conditions	Mixed
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : ord
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	enroute : on vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : cfi pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 3500
ASRS Report	339452
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : far other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	other
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	ATC Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	other
Situations
ATC Facility	procedure or policy : unspecified

Narrative:

We were being vectored for the localizer runway 27L approach at chicago O'hare airport. The GS was reported OTS on the ATIS. Although this is not designated a localizer and DME approach on the commercially published IAP chart, localizer DME was needed to identify the step-down fixes, except for the OM. Several aircraft ahead reported the DME OTS. ATC acknowledged this, but continued to clear aircraft for the approach, as though oblivious to the fact that DME was necessary to descend for landing. The same condition existed for our approach. ATC was so overloaded they could not receive our advisory that the DME was out or our request to call the initial step-down fix. Fortunately there was a break in the ceiling and we were able to descend visually and clear of the clouds. This appears to be a situation where a controller who is very competent at controling planes is unfamiliar with our end of the equation and cannot meet our needs. The controller was also overloaded, and therefore a breakdown in communication took place so that importance of the DME requirement never registered. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter believes that this problem was exacerbated by a communications gap. ATC may not have taken any action to change the situation because they are either unaware of the particular needs associated with each type of aircraft equipment or they are getting used to the newer generation aircraft with internal navigation such as aircraft with FMC system. Everyone on the approach was managing in some way or another, whether it was through use of an FMC or by utilizing the DME off the VOR for a general fix, as this flight crew managed. The visual conditions below a 2500 ft overcast (actually appeared broken) allowed the flight crew to visually descend to the runway following the localizer. Reporter suggests that the controller should have at least been stating, 'intercept the localizer, I'll call the fixes for you.'

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 FLC WAS CLRED FOR AN APCH THAT THEY LEGALLY COULD NOT FLY WITHOUT ATC RADAR ASSISTANCE. THE FLC REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE, BUT DID NOT RECEIVE IT FROM ATC.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE LOC RWY 27L APCH AT CHICAGO O'HARE ARPT. THE GS WAS RPTED OTS ON THE ATIS. ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT DESIGNATED A LOC AND DME APCH ON THE COMMERCIALLY PUBLISHED IAP CHART, LOC DME WAS NEEDED TO IDENT THE STEP-DOWN FIXES, EXCEPT FOR THE OM. SEVERAL ACFT AHEAD RPTED THE DME OTS. ATC ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, BUT CONTINUED TO CLR ACFT FOR THE APCH, AS THOUGH OBLIVIOUS TO THE FACT THAT DME WAS NECESSARY TO DSND FOR LNDG. THE SAME CONDITION EXISTED FOR OUR APCH. ATC WAS SO OVERLOADED THEY COULD NOT RECEIVE OUR ADVISORY THAT THE DME WAS OUT OR OUR REQUEST TO CALL THE INITIAL STEP-DOWN FIX. FORTUNATELY THERE WAS A BREAK IN THE CEILING AND WE WERE ABLE TO DSND VISUALLY AND CLR OF THE CLOUDS. THIS APPEARS TO BE A SIT WHERE A CTLR WHO IS VERY COMPETENT AT CTLING PLANES IS UNFAMILIAR WITH OUR END OF THE EQUATION AND CANNOT MEET OUR NEEDS. THE CTLR WAS ALSO OVERLOADED, AND THEREFORE A BREAKDOWN IN COM TOOK PLACE SO THAT IMPORTANCE OF THE DME REQUIREMENT NEVER REGISTERED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR BELIEVES THAT THIS PROB WAS EXACERBATED BY A COMS GAP. ATC MAY NOT HAVE TAKEN ANY ACTION TO CHANGE THE SIT BECAUSE THEY ARE EITHER UNAWARE OF THE PARTICULAR NEEDS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH TYPE OF ACFT EQUIP OR THEY ARE GETTING USED TO THE NEWER GENERATION ACFT WITH INTERNAL NAV SUCH AS ACFT WITH FMC SYS. EVERYONE ON THE APCH WAS MANAGING IN SOME WAY OR ANOTHER, WHETHER IT WAS THROUGH USE OF AN FMC OR BY UTILIZING THE DME OFF THE VOR FOR A GENERAL FIX, AS THIS FLC MANAGED. THE VISUAL CONDITIONS BELOW A 2500 FT OVCST (ACTUALLY APPEARED BROKEN) ALLOWED THE FLC TO VISUALLY DSND TO THE RWY FOLLOWING THE LOC. RPTR SUGGESTS THAT THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST BEEN STATING, 'INTERCEPT THE LOC, I'LL CALL THE FIXES FOR YOU.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A B727 flight crew was cleared for an approach that they legally could not fly without ATC radar assistance. The flight crew requested the assistance, but did not receive it from ATC.