Narrative:

We were approaching mht airport from the east on vectors for the ILS to runway 35. Just prior to entering a left downwind we were instructed to change our landing runway to runway 17 and to expect a visual approach. I tuned in the appropriate navaids and the first officer reprogrammed the FMS. We were given a left turn to approximately 40 degrees and a descent from 5000 ft to 3000 ft. On this heading and altitude we were cleared for the visual approach to runway 17 and instructed to turn final from the heading we were on, because of noise abatement. This vector and the restr to make a final turn of approximately 130 degrees left us high and close in without the option of squaring off our pattern to lose altitude. In the initial descent from 5000 ft to 3000 ft I extended the flaps and deployed the flight spoilers to expedite my descent. When cleared for the approach, I called for flaps 15 degrees, flaps 20 degrees, and gear down. We executed our turn to final and rolled out on centerline approximately 5 mi out at 1500 ft AGL. I called for flaps 40 degrees and dialed the autothrottles down to 140 KIAS (which was 10 KTS above our computed final approach speed). I was about to dial the autothrottles to our 130 KT approach speed when I noticed our airspeed was down into the red 'hook,' on the pfd (pilot flight display) at that time the autothrottles went into thrust latch (ie, locked into maximum thrust). I disengaged the autothrottles and manually retarded the throttles to keep from over speeding the flaps. I saw the red 'hook' speed (which represents 1.3 V stall) was about 150 KTS, which was well above our computed approach speed of 130 KTS. We both double checked flap/slat and gear position and checked the ECAM (our onboard system monitor) for confign problems. We found none, even though there were actually two normal indications that the flight spoilers were still deployed. We accepted the pfd representation of our minimum speed and I flew hook plus five as approach speed. I instructed the copilot to select autobrakes to medium and we landed safely but firmly. We stopped easily within the available runway length. There was no adverse affects on the airplane, except probably some extra brake wear. I noticed the spoiler handle full aft on landing rollout and knew then what had happened. The cause of this situation was entirely crew error, primarily my error as PF and as captain. If I had not forgotten to retract the spoilers, the approach and landing would have been very normal and uneventful. Also, proper checklist discipline would have saved us from a high speed landing with the flight spoilers extended. Arming of the ground spoilers is an item on the 'before landing' check and would have brought our attention to the spoiler handle. We obviously became preoccupied with what was taking place on final and neglected to complete the checklist. The above notwithstanding, I believe that an aural/visual warning system that activates when the flight spoilers are deployed simultaneously with the slats/flaps in a landing confign would have saved us from this incident. Such a system probably would prevent future events such as this, or even worse ones. Additionally, the common practice of vectoring aircraft in close and high for visual approachs, in order to satisfy noise requirements, causes a workload increase that can overload a crew (especially a 2 person crew), when some unforeseen event occurs that requires crew attention and action.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG RWY CHANGED WHEN FLC WAS CLOSE IN TO ARPT AND FMS REPROGRAMMED ACCORDINGLY. ATC INSTRUCTED FLC TO FLY A PATTERN WHICH WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE AREA NOISE ABATEMENT WHICH IN TURN KEPT ACFT HIGH AND CLOSE IN. AS A RESULT SPOILERS, FLAPS AND GEAR WERE DEPLOYED TO SLOW AND DSND, BUT THE SPOILERS WERE FORGOTTEN AS WAS THE LNDG CHKLIST. CONSEQUENTLY, AIRSPD DEGRADED, AUTOTHROTTLES RESPONDED WHICH WERE THEN TURNED OFF IN ORDER TO NOT OVERSPD THE FLAPS AND MINIMUM APCH SPD MAINTAINED.

Narrative: WE WERE APCHING MHT ARPT FROM THE E ON VECTORS FOR THE ILS TO RWY 35. JUST PRIOR TO ENTERING A L DOWNWIND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CHANGE OUR LNDG RWY TO RWY 17 AND TO EXPECT A VISUAL APCH. I TUNED IN THE APPROPRIATE NAVAIDS AND THE FO REPROGRAMMED THE FMS. WE WERE GIVEN A L TURN TO APPROX 40 DEGS AND A DSCNT FROM 5000 FT TO 3000 FT. ON THIS HDG AND ALT WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17 AND INSTRUCTED TO TURN FINAL FROM THE HEADING WE WERE ON, BECAUSE OF NOISE ABATEMENT. THIS VECTOR AND THE RESTR TO MAKE A FINAL TURN OF APPROX 130 DEGS LEFT US HIGH AND CLOSE IN WITHOUT THE OPTION OF SQUARING OFF OUR PATTERN TO LOSE ALT. IN THE INITIAL DSCNT FROM 5000 FT TO 3000 FT I EXTENDED THE FLAPS AND DEPLOYED THE FLT SPOILERS TO EXPEDITE MY DSCNT. WHEN CLRED FOR THE APCH, I CALLED FOR FLAPS 15 DEGS, FLAPS 20 DEGS, AND GEAR DOWN. WE EXECUTED OUR TURN TO FINAL AND ROLLED OUT ON CTRLINE APPROX 5 MI OUT AT 1500 FT AGL. I CALLED FOR FLAPS 40 DEGS AND DIALED THE AUTOTHROTTLES DOWN TO 140 KIAS (WHICH WAS 10 KTS ABOVE OUR COMPUTED FINAL APCH SPD). I WAS ABOUT TO DIAL THE AUTOTHROTTLES TO OUR 130 KT APCH SPD WHEN I NOTICED OUR AIRSPD WAS DOWN INTO THE RED 'HOOK,' ON THE PFD (PLT FLT DISPLAY) AT THAT TIME THE AUTOTHROTTLES WENT INTO THRUST LATCH (IE, LOCKED INTO MAX THRUST). I DISENGAGED THE AUTOTHROTTLES AND MANUALLY RETARDED THE THROTTLES TO KEEP FROM OVER SPDING THE FLAPS. I SAW THE RED 'HOOK' SPD (WHICH REPRESENTS 1.3 V STALL) WAS ABOUT 150 KTS, WHICH WAS WELL ABOVE OUR COMPUTED APCH SPD OF 130 KTS. WE BOTH DOUBLE CHKED FLAP/SLAT AND GEAR POS AND CHKED THE ECAM (OUR ONBOARD SYS MONITOR) FOR CONFIGN PROBS. WE FOUND NONE, EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE ACTUALLY TWO NORMAL INDICATIONS THAT THE FLT SPOILERS WERE STILL DEPLOYED. WE ACCEPTED THE PFD REPRESENTATION OF OUR MINIMUM SPD AND I FLEW HOOK PLUS FIVE AS APCH SPD. I INSTRUCTED THE COPLT TO SELECT AUTOBRAKES TO MEDIUM AND WE LANDED SAFELY BUT FIRMLY. WE STOPPED EASILY WITHIN THE AVAILABLE RWY LENGTH. THERE WAS NO ADVERSE AFFECTS ON THE AIRPLANE, EXCEPT PROBABLY SOME EXTRA BRAKE WEAR. I NOTICED THE SPOILER HANDLE FULL AFT ON LNDG ROLLOUT AND KNEW THEN WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THE CAUSE OF THIS SIT WAS ENTIRELY CREW ERROR, PRIMARILY MY ERROR AS PF AND AS CAPT. IF I HAD NOT FORGOTTEN TO RETRACT THE SPOILERS, THE APCH AND LNDG WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. ALSO, PROPER CHKLIST DISCIPLINE WOULD HAVE SAVED US FROM A HIGH SPD LNDG WITH THE FLT SPOILERS EXTENDED. ARMING OF THE GND SPOILERS IS AN ITEM ON THE 'BEFORE LNDG' CHK AND WOULD HAVE BROUGHT OUR ATTN TO THE SPOILER HANDLE. WE OBVIOUSLY BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH WHAT WAS TAKING PLACE ON FINAL AND NEGLECTED TO COMPLETE THE CHKLIST. THE ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING, I BELIEVE THAT AN AURAL/VISUAL WARNING SYS THAT ACTIVATES WHEN THE FLT SPOILERS ARE DEPLOYED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SLATS/FLAPS IN A LNDG CONFIGN WOULD HAVE SAVED US FROM THIS INCIDENT. SUCH A SYS PROBABLY WOULD PREVENT FUTURE EVENTS SUCH AS THIS, OR EVEN WORSE ONES. ADDITIONALLY, THE COMMON PRACTICE OF VECTORING ACFT IN CLOSE AND HIGH FOR VISUAL APCHS, IN ORDER TO SATISFY NOISE REQUIREMENTS, CAUSES A WORKLOAD INCREASE THAT CAN OVERLOAD A CREW (ESPECIALLY A 2 PERSON CREW), WHEN SOME UNFORESEEN EVENT OCCURS THAT REQUIRES CREW ATTN AND ACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.