Narrative:

On taxi out at pit, while approaching taxiway D3, we switched from ramp control to ground control. A takeoff on runway 28C had been anticipated and briefed. Ground control issued the following clearance: 'air carrier xyz turn right on taxiway west, hold short of runway 28C and plan takeoff from intersection papa on runway 28L.' by the time the copilot finished his readback, we were turning onto taxiway west. The copilot immediately consulted his airport diagram to figure out the intended taxi route and the flight engineer consulted his weight and balance data to ensure that we did indeed have takeoff data for the intersection takeoff. I, as captain, was taxiing straight ahead on taxiway west looking for a hold short line or runway end identifier. As we approached an intersection, ground control issued an emphatic 'air carrier xyz hold short of runway 28C.' I looked to my left and saw an aircraft in its takeoff roll heading in our direction. I hit the brakes hard and stopped the aircraft immediately, with the nose of the aircraft right at the edge of the intersection. At this point I realized the unmarked, nondescript pavement in front of us was an extension of runway 28C. A visual check to our left and a review of the airport diagram distinctly shows the white painted pavement and runway end identifier lights well to our left. The pavement directly in front of us appeared to be and is depicted to be taxiway. If this section of pavement is actually part of runway 28C, it must be marked as such to prevent this kind of confusion from occurring in the future. Receiving our taxi clearance, which was lengthy and contrary to what we thought we were going to do, added to the confusion, giving us very little time to identify a holding point. Not being terribly familiar with the airport, it would have been helpful to know that the actual end of runway 28C was to our left. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was not accustomed to operating at this airport. He believes that other carriers' flcs may be familiar and aware of the area, so that the taxi situation is not such a surprise to them. It was just getting dark, the crew had just been switched from the ramp controller to ground controller, and they were then given a lengthy taxi clearance involving a new departure runway. This prompted everyone to go off in different directions, and left the reporter looking outside on his own. The reporter (captain) missed any indication of the runway hold short area and was still looking, when the controller intervened. The reporter states that he recently received an update to his commercial chart publication (the former chart was yellow) which depicts the taxiway as joining the runway and that this contributed to his crew's confusion the night of the incident. They didn't understand how the hold short clearance figured in, since the first officer was looking at the diagram and it did not show the taxiway as meeting the runway. At this point, the controller interrupted and told the reporter that he had 'better get the radios checked.' this reporter reiterates that the lengthy clearance and the fact that it contained a new runway, placed a sudden, unanticipated workload on the crew. They had to find the new data and check for legality. The first officer was monitoring, but it all happened too quick, the reporter started to anticipate a problem just as it happened. This captain still wonders where the hold short lines were located. Supplemental information from acn 345698: if there was a hold short line (we saw no signs or lines) we would have been about 10 ft extended over it. The other aircraft went overhead at about 100 ft.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR B727 FLC INADVERTENTLY TAXIED PAST THE HOLD SHORT AREA FOR RWY 28C AT PIT. THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED A CHANGE IN DEP RWYS AND TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND WERE REFING THE ARPT DIAGRAM AND CHKING FOR THE DATA ON THE NEW RWY. THE CTLR STOPPED THE CREW AS THE NOSE OF THE ACFT JUTTED UP AGAINST THE RWY.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT AT PIT, WHILE APCHING TXWY D3, WE SWITCHED FROM RAMP CTL TO GND CTL. A TKOF ON RWY 28C HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED AND BRIEFED. GND CTL ISSUED THE FOLLOWING CLRNC: 'ACR XYZ TURN R ON TXWY W, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28C AND PLAN TKOF FROM INTXN PAPA ON RWY 28L.' BY THE TIME THE COPLT FINISHED HIS READBACK, WE WERE TURNING ONTO TXWY W. THE COPLT IMMEDIATELY CONSULTED HIS ARPT DIAGRAM TO FIGURE OUT THE INTENDED TAXI RTE AND THE FE CONSULTED HIS WT AND BAL DATA TO ENSURE THAT WE DID INDEED HAVE TKOF DATA FOR THE INTXN TKOF. I, AS CAPT, WAS TAXIING STRAIGHT AHEAD ON TXWY W LOOKING FOR A HOLD SHORT LINE OR RWY END IDENTIFIER. AS WE APCHED AN INTXN, GND CTL ISSUED AN EMPHATIC 'ACR XYZ HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28C.' I LOOKED TO MY L AND SAW AN ACFT IN ITS TKOF ROLL HEADING IN OUR DIRECTION. I HIT THE BRAKES HARD AND STOPPED THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY, WITH THE NOSE OF THE ACFT RIGHT AT THE EDGE OF THE INTXN. AT THIS POINT I REALIZED THE UNMARKED, NONDESCRIPT PAVEMENT IN FRONT OF US WAS AN EXTENSION OF RWY 28C. A VISUAL CHK TO OUR L AND A REVIEW OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM DISTINCTLY SHOWS THE WHITE PAINTED PAVEMENT AND RWY END IDENTIFIER LIGHTS WELL TO OUR L. THE PAVEMENT DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF US APPEARED TO BE AND IS DEPICTED TO BE TXWY. IF THIS SECTION OF PAVEMENT IS ACTUALLY PART OF RWY 28C, IT MUST BE MARKED AS SUCH TO PREVENT THIS KIND OF CONFUSION FROM OCCURRING IN THE FUTURE. RECEIVING OUR TAXI CLRNC, WHICH WAS LENGTHY AND CONTRARY TO WHAT WE THOUGHT WE WERE GOING TO DO, ADDED TO THE CONFUSION, GIVING US VERY LITTLE TIME TO IDENT A HOLDING POINT. NOT BEING TERRIBLY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO KNOW THAT THE ACTUAL END OF RWY 28C WAS TO OUR L. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS NOT ACCUSTOMED TO OPERATING AT THIS ARPT. HE BELIEVES THAT OTHER CARRIERS' FLCS MAY BE FAMILIAR AND AWARE OF THE AREA, SO THAT THE TAXI SIT IS NOT SUCH A SURPRISE TO THEM. IT WAS JUST GETTING DARK, THE CREW HAD JUST BEEN SWITCHED FROM THE RAMP CTLR TO GND CTLR, AND THEY WERE THEN GIVEN A LENGTHY TAXI CLRNC INVOLVING A NEW DEP RWY. THIS PROMPTED EVERYONE TO GO OFF IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS, AND LEFT THE RPTR LOOKING OUTSIDE ON HIS OWN. THE RPTR (CAPT) MISSED ANY INDICATION OF THE RWY HOLD SHORT AREA AND WAS STILL LOOKING, WHEN THE CTLR INTERVENED. THE RPTR STATES THAT HE RECENTLY RECEIVED AN UPDATE TO HIS COMMERCIAL CHART PUB (THE FORMER CHART WAS YELLOW) WHICH DEPICTS THE TXWY AS JOINING THE RWY AND THAT THIS CONTRIBUTED TO HIS CREW'S CONFUSION THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT. THEY DIDN'T UNDERSTAND HOW THE HOLD SHORT CLRNC FIGURED IN, SINCE THE FO WAS LOOKING AT THE DIAGRAM AND IT DID NOT SHOW THE TXWY AS MEETING THE RWY. AT THIS POINT, THE CTLR INTERRUPTED AND TOLD THE RPTR THAT HE HAD 'BETTER GET THE RADIOS CHKED.' THIS RPTR REITERATES THAT THE LENGTHY CLRNC AND THE FACT THAT IT CONTAINED A NEW RWY, PLACED A SUDDEN, UNANTICIPATED WORKLOAD ON THE CREW. THEY HAD TO FIND THE NEW DATA AND CHK FOR LEGALITY. THE FO WAS MONITORING, BUT IT ALL HAPPENED TOO QUICK, THE RPTR STARTED TO ANTICIPATE A PROB JUST AS IT HAPPENED. THIS CAPT STILL WONDERS WHERE THE HOLD SHORT LINES WERE LOCATED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 345698: IF THERE WAS A HOLD SHORT LINE (WE SAW NO SIGNS OR LINES) WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABOUT 10 FT EXTENDED OVER IT. THE OTHER ACFT WENT OVERHEAD AT ABOUT 100 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.